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the rise and fall of steve bannon
A Nationalist International should be a contradiction in terms, but 
that didn’t stop Steve Bannon from trying to create one.
Steven Bannon was the head of Breitbart News and a darling of 
the alt-right when he took over as Donald Trump’s campaign CEO 
in August 2016. He was captaining what virtually all U.S. political 
observers believed to be a sinking ship. And yet, in the space of a 
few months, he managed to right the foundering vessel on the way to 
achieving one of the most remarkable electoral surprises in American 
history. The victory contributed to his confidence that he could accom-
plish virtually anything he envisioned.
Bannon subsequently joined the Trump administration as a spin 
doctor, strategic advisor, and conduit to what he liked to call the 
“deplorables,” an ironic reference to Hilary Clinton’s infamous dis-
paragement of a certain subset of Trump supporters.1 One year later, 
as a result of political infighting, the sole member of Trump’s brain 
trust left the administration, with the president himself declaring that 
Bannon had “lost his mind.”2 Even this ignominious departure didn’t 
dim Bannon’s enthusiasm for his commander-in-chief. He would later 
return to Trump’s aid in the autumn of 2019, launching a daily radio 
show and podcast to rally support for the president in the face of con-
gressional impeachment and, later, the coronavirus crisis.3
In between these efforts on behalf of his chosen Prince, the Machi-
avellian Bannon set off in early 2018 on an extended world tour. His 
mission was even more ambitious than getting Trump elected. Bannon 
hoped to build a loose network of right-wing populists with a strong 
transatlantic link and branches in ideologically sympathetic outposts 
elsewhere in the world. In grand fashion, he wanted to replicate on the 
global stage his success in building bridges within the U.S. right.
Bannon believed very strongly in his own timing. With the Breitbart 
media empire, which injected far-right ideas on immigration, politics, 
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and culture into the American mainstream, Bannon had created a 
platform for Donald Trump’s candidacy. In his role as vice president of 
Cambridge Analytica, Bannon also worked behind the scenes in 2015 
to lay the groundwork for what seemed at the time to be a longshot 
attempt to pull the United Kingdom out of the European Union.4 
As with Trump’s election, the successful Brexit referendum in 2016 
turned out to be an upset victory for the far right and a vindication of 
Bannon’s foresight.
In 2018, which Bannon thought was the perfect moment to create a 
Nationalist International, the far right hadn’t just been winning in the 
United States and the United Kingdom. In the 2010s, far-right poli-
ticians made unprecedented leaps into power throughout Europe. In 
Eastern Europe, right-wing populists took over in Hungary in 2010, 
Poland in 2015, and the Czech Republic in 2017. Ideologically similar 
leaders entered coalition governments in Austria in 2017 and Italy in 
2018. Even in notoriously tolerant Scandinavia, the far right made sig-
nificant headway. The True Finns acquired enough votes after the 2015 
election to enter a coalition government with center-right parties, 
while the Sweden Democrats, a party with neo-Nazi roots, came close 
on several occasions to becoming that country’s most popular party. 
In Germany, the extremist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) became 
the third-largest party in 2017 even as the government was banning 
neo-Nazi organizations.
In celebration of its success that year, the AfD sponsored a conven-
tion in Koblenz that brought together a group of these like-minded 
European leaders. Movement headliners Marine Le Pen from France, 
Geert Wilders from the Netherlands, and Matteo Salvini from Italy 
all participated. It took place shortly after Donald Trump’s inaugura-
tion, which prompted Wilders to comment, “Yesterday a free America, 
today Koblenz, tomorrow a new Europe.”5 Two years later, in the 
European Parliament elections in May 2019, far-right parties were the 
top vote-getters in the UK, France, Italy, and Hungary. It seemed as 
though Wilders’s prediction was coming true.
Although they’d existed in Europe for several generations, far-right 
parties had always hovered on the fringes of politics: boycotted by 
mainstream politicians, mocked in the mainstream media, and ignored 
in the broader culture. In the late twentieth century, huge demonstra-
tions thronged the streets of France, the Netherlands, Austria, and 
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other European countries to block the far right’s entrance into main-
stream politics. By the 2010s, it was the far right bringing people out 
onto the streets as they evolved into serious political players and, 
in some cases, governing parties. Bannon intended to build on this 
dramatic reversal of fortune by providing the European far right—a 
motley crew of parties, movements, and marginal figures—with an 
organizing upgrade.
Furthermore, the success of the far right was not restricted to the 
United States and Europe. In the Philippines, “Asia’s Donald Trump” 
Rodrigo Duterte won the presidential election in May 2016, prefigur-
ing Trump in many ways with his profane and sexist rhetoric, assaults 
on the rule of law, crackdowns on dissent, and direct criticisms of 
Barack Obama. In December 2016, Duterte signaled a shift in policy 
toward the United States by congratulating Trump on his electoral 
victory. “We both like to swear,” Duterte said. “One little thing, we curse 
right away; we’re the same.”6 The president-elect returned the favor by 
praising the Philippine leader’s drug policy, which had attracted wide-
spread criticism for involving thousands of extrajudicial killings.
After 2016, other parts of the world experienced a Trumpification of 
politics, and again Bannon could justifiably claim some credit, if only 
indirectly. Jair Bolsonaro, who took the reins in Brazil in 2017, “copied 
a lot from Trump: his online politics, his speeches against political cor-
rectness, his anti-feminist and hate speech,” explains Esther Solano of 
the Federal University of São Paulo.
Elsewhere right-wing leaders began to bend toward Trump like 
flowers to the sun. In Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu had been pushing 
politics inexorably to the right since becoming prime minister in 2009, 
but he managed to achieve some of his key dreams—such as moving 
the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem—only after his friend 
Donald Trump took power in Washington. Two long-serving leaders, 
Vladimir Putin in Russia and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, turned 
more fully to the right the longer they stayed in office, and both grav-
itated toward Trump as well. So did Narendra Modi, whose Hindu 
fundamentalist party came to power in India in 2014. Even Japanese 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, although he didn’t pattern his politics 
after the U.S. president, tried to leverage his relationship with Trump 
to bolster his more hardline nationalist stance.
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These leaders looked to Trump as a model. They copied his attacks 
on the elite status quo, his use of social media to connect directly with 
his base, his strategic incorporation of racist and sexist rhetoric, and 
his frankly authoritarian style. They echoed his skepticism of economic 
lockdowns in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and supported his 
claims of fraud following his loss in the 2020 presidential election. 
Some, like Vladimir Putin, even withheld congratulations to the 
winner of the 2020 presidential election, Joe Biden, out of deference 
to Trump’s wounded ego. In this way, Trump’s influence could be felt 
beyond America’s borders, thanks in part to Bannon’s illiberal philos-
ophy and toolbox of tactics.
Although he would only serve one term in office, Trump left his 
mark on U.S. and global politics. For instance, he expanded the 
boundaries of what is acceptable for a U.S. president on the interna-
tional stage. By inviting autocrats to the White House and routinely 
flouting global norms, “Trump has created space for the international 
far right,” Paris-based political consultant Ethan Earle argues. “He’s 
given carte blanche to people further down the pecking order in geo-
politics to continue to push their politics further and further to the 
right knowing that there’s political coverage coming from the very 
top.” In fact, these illiberal rulers played a game of follow-the-leader. 
As Barbarina Heyerdahl, the Vermont-based manager of the Acorn 
Fund notes, 
There is a cabal of authoritarian, racist leaders—Trump, Modi in 
Kashmir, Xi in Hong Kong, Putin acting against protesters in Russia, 
Bolsonaro against indigenous communities in Brazil, and Erdoğan 
against the Kurds in Syria—who are just watching each other to see 
what the others are getting away with to calculate what they can get 
away with in their own countries.
Although other right-wing leaders looked to him for inspiration, 
Trump showed neither the interest nor the capacity to head up a new 
Nationalist International. Others, however, have been eager to rush 
in where Trump fears to tread. Certain leaders, like Putin in Moscow 
and Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, have put themselves forward as potential 
leaders of an axis of illiberalism.
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But in 2018, believing that he had the time and the skills necessary 
to organize such an axis, Steve Bannon threw his hat into the ring.
Despite his attacks on globalism and globalists, Bannon has an 
ideology well-suited to building a global movement. His worldview 
has been shaped by three major founts of internationalism: Catholi-
cism, Hollywood, and Wall Street. Raised Irish Catholic, he attended 
Catholic schools and, after a flirtation with Buddhism, eventually 
settled on a more fundamentalist, medieval version of the Vatican’s 
teaching.7 With a degree from Harvard Business School, Bannon 
began to work with Goldman Sachs, eventually moving to Los Angeles 
to handle investments in the entertainment industry. Over time, he has 
come to believe in a holy trinity of capitalism, nationalism, and Chris-
tianity. But all three, he argues, have been infected by liberalism of one 
sort or another, represented by the “party of Davos,” the transnational-
ism of the European Union, and religious reformers like Pope Francis.8
Although Bannon consorted with the extreme right during his 
days at Breitbart, his own philosophy has its roots in more traditional 
Burkean conservatism. However, as an organizer who dreams not only 
of a new Europe but a new world, Bannon has a different role model in 
mind than a statesman and philosopher like Edmund Burke. He sees 
himself as something of a right-wing Lenin, an international activist 
committed to destroying rather than conserving the status quo.9 Like 
Lenin, he aspires not simply to control a single state but to spur a 
worldwide revolution. His philosophy of state, however, is the opposite 
of Lenin’s. An advocate of small government, Bannon is eager to seize 
control of the levers of state and transfer power to non-state actors like 
the corporate sector and religious institutions.10 At the global level, he 
is doubly suspicious of anything that smacks of world government, like 
the United Nations.
Bannon is a populist, not a statist. Despite his elitist background, 
he always speaks of the power of the People. “It’s not a question of 
whether populism is on the rise and going to be the political future,” 
Bannon has said, nodding in the direction of Donald Trump and pres-
idential aspirant Bernie Sanders. “The only question before us is: is it 
going to be populist nationalism or populist socialism.”11
To ensure that his version of populism triumphs, Bannon has been 
pushing coordination not only across international borders but across 
ideological borders within the world of his political co-religion-
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ists. Political scientists distinguish between the “radical right” and 
the “extreme right.” The latter, which includes terrorists, neo-Nazis, 
and white nationalists on the fringes, is contemptuous of democracy 
overall and refuses to engage in electoral politics. The radical right, 
which is critical of liberal democracy with its emphasis on legisla-
tive safeguards and the protection of minority rights, is content to 
win power through the ballot box. “In essence, the radical right trusts 
the power of the people, the extreme right does not,” writes political 
scientist Cas Mudde.12
By helping to create a new alternative right—or alt-right—Bannon 
was instrumental in blurring the distinction between these two catego-
ries. At Breitbart News, he smuggled some of the content of the extreme 
right, particularly on immigration and identity issues, into the radical 
right. Meanwhile, he consistently pushed a populist line against the 
anti-democratic extreme. And he latched onto Donald Trump, whose 
political views were hitherto all over the map, as a figure he could mold 
into a politician acceptable to both the radical right and the extreme 
right—and ultimately the conservative mainstream as well.
In this way, Bannon has been instrumental in creating a “new right” 
that merges elements of extremism, radicalism, populism, and conven-
tional conservative thinking even as it attempts to distance itself from 
Nazism—just as a “new left” emerged in the 1960s from an amalgam 
of communist, socialist, progressive, and liberal thinking that delib-
erately rejected Stalinism. And unlike its parochial predecessors, the 
new right is well-suited to become a global ideology.
the movement
To consolidate this “new right” globally, Bannon teamed up with right-
wing Belgian politician Mischaël Modrikamen in 2018 to establish 
a bulkhead in Europe with something they called the Movement. 
Hoping to take advantage of surging dissatisfaction with European 
integration, Bannon rolled his Trojan horse into the very heart of the 
enemy’s camp. They located their new organization in—of all places—
Brussels, the home of the European Union. With the Movement, 
Bannon wanted to wrest the EU from the control of social democrats 
and pallid conservatives, the Vatican from the reforms of the too-per-
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missive Pope Francis, and the West from the clutches of immigrants 
and multiculturalists.
To create a new generation of leaders for his Movement, Bannon 
pinned his hopes on what he called a “school for gladiators.” With the 
help of conservative British Catholic Benjamin Harnwell, he leased 
a thirteenth-century monastery south of Rome from the Italian gov-
ernment. Here the two men planned to establish a training academy 
that, according to Harnwell, would “institutionalise the thoughts and 
political insights of Steve Bannon.”13 Italy held a special fascination 
for Bannon because of its lineage of right-wing populist leaders, from 
Silvio Berlusconi to Matteo Salvini of Lega Nord. When the latter did 
surprisingly well in the 2018 parliamentary elections, which enabled 
Lega to form a government with the more politically ambiguous Five 
Star Movement, Bannon was effusive: “Nobody has been more engaged 
in the European project than the political leaders in Italy. Yesterday, 
what you had was a total rejection by the Italian voters, and I think that 
was the earthquake; the tremor is going to continue.”14
Bannon journeyed to the epicenter of the earthquake to meet with 
like-minded colleagues and build institutional infrastructure. Finding 
enough money for this new venture, however, posed something of a 
challenge (much later, money would ultimately prove the undoing 
of Bannon). Key funders abandoned him when he was driven out of 
the Trump administration and published a book containing critical 
remarks about his former boss. But the silver-tongued Bannon found 
other sources of money, including a million-dollar-a-year contract 
from the Chinese billionaire, Guo Wengui.15
Now all Bannon needed were the troops. For that, he had to 
persuade the various radical right parties and movements to line up 
behind him. He started things off with a dinner in London in July 
2018, which included his Belgian pal Modrikamen and Brexiteer Nigel 
Farage, representatives of Belgian and French far-right parties, and 
a former member of the far-right Sweden Democrats.16 Filmmaker 
Alison Klayman was at the dinner to gather footage for her documen-
tary about Bannon, The Brink. She called her husband afterwards and 
told him, “Either I just filmed the Wannsee Conference [a meeting of 
senior Nazis in 1942], or I filmed a bunch of jerks having dinner.”17
Bannon’s ambitions reached far beyond Europe. In Latin America, 
he appointed Bolsonaro’s youngest son as his regional representative 
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to help build on the right’s electoral successes in Brazil, Colombia, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Paraguay.18 With Guo Wengui, he created 
a Rule of Law Fund as the point of a spear aimed at the regime in 
Beijing and began filming what he called a “devastating takedown of 
the ‘myth of Chairman Xi’ including the Wall Street and corporatist 
faction that props up the regime.”19 He visited Japan at the invitation of 
the Happiness Realization Party, a political cult that embraces Japanese 
militarism.20 Israel, too, was part of the alt-right archipelago because 
Bannon, a self-professed “Christian Zionist,” sees Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu as a key link in a future anti-Islamic front. Also 
figuring prominently in his thinking is Russia, a vast country led by 
a critic of Western liberalism and “radical Islam” that alt-right leader 
Richard Spencer has called “the sole white power in the world.”21
Bannon talks big and grabs headlines. As a politico and filmmaker, 
he’s a master illusionist. Despite all these efforts, however, Bannon 
never managed to turn his illusions into reality.
The Movement Bannon hoped to create in Brussels never became 
operational, having repeatedly postponed its promised launch 
throughout 2019 and then disappearing from the news altogether. 
Most of the political parties that Bannon and Modrikamen expected 
to line up behind them simply refused. After an embarrassing failure 
in the Belgian elections in May 2019, Modrikamen dissolved his right-
wing Francophone party and grumbled that he might give up his own 
political career as well.22 Bannon’s much-hyped training center for 
right-wing politicians in Italy didn’t get off the ground either as the 
19-year lease the government provided to Bannon’s organization—and 
then subsequently annulled—is now entangled in litigation.23
Bannon’s European grand tour in 2018 was a basically a bust, 
and that London dinner in 2018, in retrospect, was just a Wannsee 
wannabe.
One of Bannon’s chief selling points—that he was an American 
who could mediate among different European actors—turned out to 
be a major drawback. “For some people it was a complicated game 
to play: Anti-Americanism is an integral part of many nationalisms 
in Europe,” Jordi Vaquer of the Open Society Foundations points out. 
“Bannon wanted to oversell what he was doing. It was more about the 
announcement than a carefully crafted strategy.”
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Bannon’s prominent failures have attracted nearly as much attention 
as his promised successes.24 Those failures followed Bannon back to 
the United States. On the morning of August 20, 2020, federal postal 
inspectors and representatives of the U.S. attorney’s office in Manhattan 
raided Guo Wengui’s yacht near Westbrook, Connecticut, and arrested 
Bannon for fraud. He’d been involved in an elaborate scheme to bilk 
investors who contributed to We Build the Wall, a private initiative 
supposedly set up to help Trump erect his long-promised wall along 
the southern border with Mexico.25
Then, in November, Bannon’s Prince lost the 2020 presidential 
election, despite Bannon’s confident predictions, up to and including 
the night of the election, that Trump would win.26 In the aftermath of 
the vote, Bannon continued to trumpet his loyalty to the soon-to-be-
ex-president by spinning outlandish conspiracy theories about election 
fraud. Two days after the election, he went further in his defense of 
Trump by calling for the beheading of two administration officials—
FBI head Christopher Wray and top health official Anthony Fauci—for 
their perceived disloyalty to the president. “I’d put the heads on pikes,” 
Bannon said on his live podcast. “Right. I’d put them at the two corners 
of the White House as a warning to federal bureaucrats. You either 
get with the program or you are gone.” The comment prompted both 
Facebook and YouTube to remove the video and Twitter to perma-
nently suspend his account.27
Bannon’s rise and fall eerily paralleled that of Trump. The November 
election might not have seemed close by either the popular vote (a dif-
ference of more than 7 million votes and 4 percent of the ballots cast) 
or the Electoral College results (306 to 232), but the margin in the key 
swing states was razor close: only 43,000 votes. From this near-win on 
election day, Trump quickly spiraled downward and out of control. He 
launched an ill-advised effort, with Bannon’s support, to overturn the 
election through a mixture of legal challenges, pressure tactics against 
state officials, and the incitement of his base.
This latter strategy culminated on January 6 with the president 
urging his followers—many of them fired up by global right-wing 
ideologies and conspiracy theories—to march to Capitol Hill where 
Congress was scheduled to certify the results of the 2020 election. 
Thousands of those followers overwhelmed local police, broke into 
the Capitol building, and came close to confronting the vice president 
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and the assembled legislators. One police officer was killed, and four 
protesters died.
In the aftermath of this failed insurrection, the social media giants 
did to Trump what they’d done to Bannon: canceled his accounts. 
Congress voted to impeach him a second time. Like Bannon, he also 
faced a number of serious criminal charges. The parallel lines inter-
sected once more when, during this time, Trump reached out to 
Bannon by phone as part of a reconciliation with his former advisor.28 
In one of his last acts as president, Trump issued a pre-emptive pardon 
of Bannon. Unlike their collaboration in 2016, the two men were now 
united in defeat, not victory.
Yet, it would be a mistake to project these failures backward and 
assume that Bannon’s attempts to organize a Nationalist International, 
inspired in part by Trump, have had no impact. “Bannon might fail 
to build a coherent alliance across the Atlantic,” French human rights 
activist Yasser Louati explains. “Nevertheless, the discourse he and 
his natural allies are pushing has become the ruling ideology in their 
countries—the United States, the UK, Italy, Hungary. White national-
ism is in power in those countries.”
Bannon’s failure to establish a political bulkhead in Europe for a 
transatlantic far-right movement and Trump’s failure to win a second 
term obscures a disturbing reality: both men were on to something. 
Even without Bannon at the fore or Trump as a symbolic figurehead, 
the new right has patiently been building its global connections—at 
the level of political parties, through civil society organizations, in the 
digital realm, and at the level of discourse. Bannon, like Lenin, tried 
to usurp an emergent project and make it seem like a mainstream 
concern rather than a minority sentiment.29 For once, Bannon’s timing 
was off, much like Lenin and his calls for revolution in Russia in 1905.
History, of course, gave Lenin a second chance. Will the same hold 
true for Bannon and his political revolutionaries?
the big picture
Whatever his talents as a political organizer, Steve Bannon has always 
been an acute seismologist. He understood that a succession of social 
upheavals over the last decade has radically realigned political power 
throughout the world. As a result of these tectonic shifts, what had 
introduction
11
once been on the furthest fringes of the right has now moved toward 
the center while the left has been pushed to the margins.
“Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold,” poet William Yeats wrote 
at a time of similar political churn in 1919. “The best lack all convic-
tion, while the worst are full of passionate intensity.”
Today, a century after the publication of Yeats’s poem, those who 
are full of passionate intensity now rule over considerably more than 
half the world’s population. “The right is full of belief,” Transnational 
Institute organizer Brid Brennan observes. “The left is full of doubts.” 
Many of these right-wing leaders have come to power democrati-
cally but are determined to undermine democratic institutions. Their 
political rise has often been supported by more conventional conser-
vative parties. They have aligned themselves on an ad hoc basis with 
other authoritarian leaders who owe their positions to military coups, 
one-party deliberations, or dynastic succession. Further to the extreme, 
a set of avowedly racist organizations and networks provide ideas, 
messaging, and sometimes muscle for these leaders of the new right. 
These ideas have also inspired a series of mass shooters to embark on 
racist killing sprees in the United States, throughout Europe, and even 
in New Zealand.
This is not a normal oscillation in electoral power. The new right 
wants to permanently reorder the political landscape. Mainstream 
parties have lost credibility. Politics have become even more polarized. 
Not just liberalism but democracy itself is under attack. Even where 
leaders have lost power, as Trump has in the United States, their sup-
porters continue to push their agenda, on the streets as well as in the 
corridors of power, to prepare the ground for a successor of similar 
mindset.
Nor will the guardrails of democratic governance necessarily contain 
the ambitions of these new right leaders, for they have challenged con-
stitutional, legislative, and judicial restraints. They have attacked the 
cornerstones of civil society, including the press and other watchdog 
institutions. They aspire to become leaders for life (like Vladimir 
Putin, in charge since 1999) or to establish parties that govern with 
little opposition for decades on end (like Japan’s Liberal Democratic 
Party, in power almost continuously since 1955).
Rhetorically, the new right is focused on securing borders, protect-
ing sovereignty, and challenging global elites. These leaders use the 
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language of nationalism and particularism. They speak in the name of 
imagined majorities that are racially or religiously homogenous.
Yet, despite this obsession with strengthening the nation-state, 
this new right has increasingly been active across borders. States and 
parties have created international alliances. Extremist civil society 
organizations have worked transnationally to promote a climate of 
intolerance that nurtures the political ambitions of right-wing populist 
leaders. White nationalists in particular have created alternative digital 
platforms to spread their messages and recruit new members across 
the globe.
Progressives have organized locally and nationally to respond to 
the new right. But ironically, given their historic internationalism, 
progressives have been slow to work across borders—in a sustained, 
coordinated manner—in response to the new transnational assault on 
democracy. This dilute internationalism coincides with both the new 
right’s attacks on global institutions and an intensification of various 
global threats such as climate change, pandemics, widening economic 
inequality, and weapons proliferation.
“Internationalism is now a problem for the left,” observes Gadi 
Algazi of Tel Aviv University, “and a reality for the right.”
four arguments
This book, which benefits from interviews with more than 80 activists, 
analysts, and academics around the world, will analyze the rise of 
the global new right and its political pivot during the coronavirus 
pandemic. It will highlight some of the effective responses to the new 
right. It will survey the current state of transnational progressive orga-
nizing. It will outline the challenges to that organizing and identify 
some of the lessons learned. And it will conclude with a discussion of 
what’s missing from a robust, multi-issue, progressive transnational-
ism and how to fill those gaps. In the process, I will be making four 
key arguments.
First, the new right has made significant gains politically because it 
has effectively channeled discontent with economic globalization. This 
liberal development project, supported by mainstream political parties 
of the center left and center right, certainly provided benefits to some. 
But many more people have been “left behind” by globalization—or 
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they feel increasingly insecure as a result of this global project—and 
the new right has reached these constituencies in ways that the inter-
nationalist left simply hasn’t. 
A second key to the new right’s success has been a story that can 
be applied effectively across borders: the “great replacement.” The 
argument that minorities and immigrants, with help from “global-
ists,” are “stealing” the privileges of the dominant group has proven 
appealing to both an extremist fringe and more mainstream conserva-
tives. Indeed, this narrative has provided the glue binding together the 
new right alliance of extreme right, radical right, populists, and main-
stream conservatives.
A third element is the new right’s authoritarian opportunism. These 
leaders have promised quick, simple solutions to complex problems. 
Because they are not interested in building consensus, they can effec-
tively navigate in polarized political environments. Despite their 
populist pretensions and anti-corruption rhetoric, they have also used 
their offices to leverage state power on behalf of themselves and their 
political cronies. The coronavirus pandemic in 2020 provided leaders 
like Donald Trump, Viktor Orbán, and Benjamin Netanyahu an even 
greater opportunity: to operate in states of emergency that allowed 
them to seize more powers and implement policies that hitherto 
encountered legislative or judicial resistance. 
Finally, the new right has a major Achilles heel. It has nothing 
to say about global crises like pandemics and the ever-worsening 
climate crisis—or what it does have to say is demonstrably wrong. For 
the latter, progressives and liberals can put together their own new 
coalition, centered around a Global Green New Deal. Such a plan, if 
constructed according to principles of equity, wouldn’t just address the 
environmental crisis. By creating enormous numbers of well-paying 
jobs, it would also speak to those left behind by economic globaliza-
tion. Such a narrative would undermine the new right’s anti-globalist 
appeals while offering up a positive vision to rally around within and 
across borders.
As the twenty-first century began, progressives famously proclaimed 
that “another world is possible.” They imagined a world beyond rote 
democracy and the rapacious market.
With the longstanding liberal-conservative status quo now 
crumbling, the new right has not only taken up this call, it is also 
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putting it into practice. The new right’s construction of “another 
world”—an intolerant, anti-democratic, unsustainable world—can 
and must be stopped before it is too late. But it requires that the best 
of us regain the conviction that Yeats described, not just to counter the 
new right but to save the planet from ruin.
This book is about that battle for another world.
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Origins of the new right
He was a wealthy businessman who suddenly decided to run for 
president. Nobody in the political elite took him seriously. After all, as 
an outsider, he’d never been successful in politics. Plus, he trafficked 
in outlandish conspiracy theories, which led him to say the craziest 
things. Given these handicaps, there was no way he could beat the 
established parties and their candidates to become president.
But Stan Tymiński surprised everyone. Long before Donald Trump 
scored his electoral upset in the United States, Tymiński upended 
politics in Poland in 1990.
As a successful entrepreneur in Canada, Tymiński had made 
millions.1 He proved luckless, however, in Canadian politics. His 
Libertarian Party never received more than 1 percent of the vote. In 
1990, he decided to return to his native Poland, then preparing for its 
first free presidential election since the 1920s.
In June of the previous year, as the Warsaw Pact was beginning to 
unravel, Poland had held a relatively open parliamentary election, 
producing a solid victory for candidates backed by the independent 
trade union, Solidarność. These dissidents-turned-politicians 
governed for a year, under the leadership of their prime minister, 
Solidarność intellectual and pioneering newspaper editor Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki. During that first year of transition, former Communist 
general Wojciech Jaruzelski retained considerable authority as 
president. In 1990, the general finally decided to step aside.
Two political giants hoped to replace Jaruzelski as president. 
Mazowiecki thought he could trade on his year of experience as prime 
minister plus his status as a member of Solidarność’s intellectual elite. 
Also in the running was former trade union leader Lech Wałęsa, who 
had done more than any other Pole to take down the Communist 
government (receiving a Nobel Prize for his efforts).
Compared to these famous figures, Tymiński was a nobody.
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All three candidates made promises. Wałęsa announced that he 
would provide every Pole with $10,000 to invest in new capitalist 
enterprises. Mazowiecki swore he’d get the Rolling Stones to perform 
in Poland. Tymiński had the strangest pitch of all. He carried around 
a black briefcase inside which, he claimed, was secret information that 
would blow Polish politics to smithereens.2
Tymiński managed to get a toehold in national politics because, by 
November 1990, many Poles were already fed up with the new status 
quo Solidarność had created. They’d suffered the early consequences of 
the “shock therapy” economic reforms that would soon be introduced 
across much of Eastern Europe and, after 1991, Russia. Although 
Poland’s macroeconomic indicators had finally stabilized by the end of 
1990, unemployment had shot up from next to nothing to 6.5 percent, 
while the country’s national income had fallen by more than 11 
percent.3 Though some were doing well in the new business-friendly 
environment, the general standard of living had plummeted as part 
of Poland’s price for entering the global economy. The burden of 
transition had fallen disproportionately on workers, pensioners, small 
farmers, and sunset industries.
Mazowiecki, the face of the new political elite, would, like Hillary 
Clinton many years later, go down to ignominious defeat. Tymiński, 
meanwhile, garnered support from areas hardest hit by the disloca-
tions of economic reform. He made it to the second round of voting 
to square off against the plainspoken, splenetic Wałęsa who pledged to 
take an ax to what remained of the Communist status quo.4 Although 
he would ultimately accuse Wałęsa of collaborating with the secret 
police during the Communist era, Tymiński would lose in the second 
round of voting by a margin of three to one.
Stan Tymiński eventually took his wild conspiracy theories and 
populist pretensions back to Canada, a political has-been. And yet 
he was prescient in so many ways (including those charges against 
Wałęsa, who probably did collaborate briefly with the secret police).5 
The liberal reforms that Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe 
implemented after the transformations of 1989 were supposed to be 
a one-way journey to a future as prosperous as Scandinavia’s. Instead, 
the immediate post-1989 was a nightmare for a huge number of people 
in the region, and they responded in politically unpredictable ways.6
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After Poland’s initial experiment in shock therapy, one country after 
another in Eastern Europe embraced fast-track free-market reforms 
and rapid privatization, which together represented a condensed 
version of economic globalization. Like Poland, they plunged into 
crises characterized by high unemployment and a sharp polarization 
of wealth. The major political parties—liberal, conservative, post-
socialist—by and large supported these disruptive economic reforms. 
Future loans from international financial institutions and membership 
in the European Union depended on it. Meanwhile, with the explosion 
of far-right extremism came an uptick in intolerance and an escalation 
of attacks on minorities, particularly Roma.7
Tymiński was not the only politician in the region to gesture in the 
direction of this grimmer, unpredictable future. In Slovakia, Vladimir 
Mečiar steered his country out of its union with the Czech Republic 
in 1993, away from integration with Europe and down an insular, 
more nationalist path. Populist leaders in Serbia and Croatia were so 
determined to expand their national boundaries and homogenize their 
populations that they tore apart former Yugoslavia in a succession of 
wars in the 1990s.
With the exception of the former Yugoslavia, the prospect of joining 
the transnational European Union initially limited the spread of these 
political tendencies in Eastern Europe. When offered a choice between 
candidates promising eventual European citizenship plus access to EU 
resources versus those espousing narrow nationalism, voters unsur-
prisingly chose the former. But once most of the countries in the region 
became EU members, the anti-liberal alternative no longer carried 
with it that particular political or economic cost. On top of that, the 
financial crisis of 2008–2009 eroded what remained of popular faith in 
liberal economic reforms and the parties promoting them. As a result, 
nationalist and populist tendencies reemerged to become dominant in 
the region—and increasingly around the world.
Tymiński’s “children” now govern nearly every country in Eastern 
Europe: Jarosław Kaczyński and the Law and Justice Party in Poland, 
President Miloš Zeman and Prime Minister Andrej Babiš in the Czech 
Republic, Prime Minister Igor Matovič in Slovakia, Prime Minister 
Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Prime Minister Boyko Borissov in Bulgaria, 
President Aleksandar Vučić in Serbia, and Prime Minister Janez Janša 
in Slovenia. The Polish-Canadian demagogue anticipated the rise 
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of new post-Cold War populists in Western Europe as well. Silvio 
Berlusconi, an even wealthier outsider with no political experience, 
came to power in Italy in 1994 while far-right leader Jörg Haider 
brought his Freedom Party into a coalition government in Austria 
in 2000. Even the United States, where a stable two-party system was 
supposed to safeguard against extremism, would eventually fall into 
the grip of a Tymiński-like leader.
What had once seemed to be a paranoid dead end in politics has 
turned out to be a royal road to power. More disturbing, Tymiński’s 
“children” are now working together across borders to build an illiberal 
superhighway that circles the globe.
band of brothers
Right-wing populism is nothing new. In the Anglo-American tra-
dition, it can be found in the anti-Communist firebrand Joseph 
McCarthy in the United States in the 1950s and the fire-breathing 
nationalist Enoch Powell in the UK in the 1960s. Several longstanding 
European parties like the French National Front (now National Rally) 
have relied on right-wing populism to attract voters. Echoes can also 
be found in movements in the Global South, from the Baathist party 
in Syria to the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India.
But right-wing populists like Donald Trump in the United States 
and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil are something different. For one thing, 
they have helped to create a new right by uniting a rising “identitarian” 
movement that focuses on racial and religious identity with more con-
ventional right-wing parties that see political opportunity in the shift 
rightward.8 This new right makes appeals to the majority—the “peo-
ple”—even as it dog-whistles to a specific subset of the population, 
such as whites or, in the case of Indian leader Narendra Modi, upper-
caste Hindus. Unlike run-of-the-mill authoritarianism or direct-action 
extremism, the new right seeks power through the ballot box by prom-
ising to go after the political elite and its economics of austerity. Once 
in power, however, the new right looks for ways to stay in office by 
short-circuiting the usual mechanisms of democratic governance.
In this media-saturated era, modern right-wing populism is more 
of a style—or, more precisely, a performance—than a coherent set 
of policy proposals.9 Political figures like Trump and Bolsonaro are 
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performers who create daily theater pieces for their audience of fans. 
They alter the content of their performances according to the needs 
of the political moment rather than the requirements of ideology. To 
elevate the drama of their governance, they identify one crisis after 
another which only they can resolve, manufacturing cliffhangers just 
as streaming TV shows draw in audiences primed to binge watch. To 
engage new audiences, they create fictional plots—about a “deep state,” 
a threatening wave of immigrants, or a liberal conspiracy to seize all 
firearms—and rely on the mainstream media to amplify these plots 
even as careful journalists attempt to debunk them.
A key difference between the new right and conventional author-
itarian leaders is their respective relationship to institutions. 
“Authoritarianism is a governance system,” observes Jan Nederveen 
Pieterse, a Dutch sociologist at UC Santa Barbara. “Right-wing pop-
ulism is a governance crisis.” The new right, to use a motto of Steve 
Bannon, wants to “deconstruct the administrative state.”10 Authoritar-
ian regimes, meanwhile, rely on such administrative apparatuses as 
part of their governance strategy: “they don’t just control institutions, 
they are the institutions,” Pieterse adds.
Despite this significant difference, the new right bears a family 
resemblance to right-wing authoritarian leaders, and they often col-
laborate on an ad hoc basis. These authoritarians also benefit from a 
general dissatisfaction with liberalism and a yearning for simple solu-
tions to complex solutions. But unlike the new right, authoritarians 
are not so interested in membership in the community of democra-
cies. Some, like Prayut Chan-o-cha in Thailand, owe their positions to 
military coups. Other authoritarians have come to power through one-
party systems (Xi Jinping of China) or royal succession (Mohammed 
bin Salman of Saudi Arabia). Many stay in power through rigged elec-
tions (Paul Biya of Cameroon).
There are also authoritarian figures on the left, like Daniel Ortega 
in Nicaragua and Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, who have as much 
distaste for liberalism as those on the far right. “There’s a tendency 
on the left to assume that authoritarianism is a feature of the right,” 
observes sociologist Edgardo Lander of the Central University of Ven-
ezuela. “But some leftist governments have become very authoritarian.”
Rounding out these numbers are the religious fundamentalists that 
challenge internationalism, multiculturalism, and inclusive democ-
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racy, from the Islamic State and the Union of the Right-Wing Parties 
in Israel to the Christian fundamentalists in the United States who 
formed a core of support for Donald Trump.
Today’s illiberal leaders are a band of brothers—and they are almost 
all of them male—when it comes to their shared preference for top-
down, nationalist governance. Despite these structural similarities, 
however, the content of their ideologies sometimes diverges. In the 
Philippines, for instance, Rodrigo Duterte has attacked the Catholic 
Church for defending the sanctity of human life and challenging his 
campaign of extrajudicial murder. In Nicaragua, however, one-time 
revolutionary Daniel Ortega has courted the Catholic Church as a 
pillar of his undemocratic rule. Vladimir Putin presents himself and 
his country as the saviors of Christianity, while Turkey’s Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan promotes his own brand of political Islam, Narendra Modi 
has ridden to power thanks to Hindu nationalism, and Xi Jinping 
eschews religion altogether. Some right-wing nationalists like Bolson-
aro have ambitious plans to privatize state assets, while others want to 
nationalize major properties, as Lega proposed for the Bank of Italy.11 
Hungary’s Viktor Orbán expresses concern about climate change, but 
most right-wing populists like Donald Trump insist that the threat 
doesn’t exist and want to extract ever more fossil fuels.
Although these illiberal leaders may not rhyme, they all dance to the 
same rhythm. They share a distaste for the constitutional constraints 
of liberalism, the oppositional stubbornness of civil society, and the 
watchful eye of a free media. In forming a larger anti-democratic and 
illiberal political ecosystem, these leaders have also become the world’s 
most dominant political life form: these populists, authoritarians, and 
fundamentalists now rule over half the world’s population. Democ-
racy, by contrast, is in retreat—by a number of different measures. 
“Of the 41 countries that were consistently ranked Free from 1985 
to 2005, 22 have registered net score declines in the last five years,” 
notes Freedom House in its 2019 report.12 In the 2020 Rule of Law 
index from the World Justice Project, more countries declined than 
improved for the third year in a row.13 The Economist Intelligence 
Unit’s Democracy Index in 2019 registered its lowest score—the least 
democratic outcome—since the ranking began in 2006.14
The new right provides a new twist to the old illiberalism of the 
authoritarians and religious fundamentalists. It represents a modern 
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synthesis of authoritarian style and superficially democratic practices, 
with an assist from the latest information technologies. The author-
itarians of the last century controlled television and film. Today’s 
illiberals gravitate toward websites and social media. If Silvio Berlus-
coni, a media tycoon, created a new telepopulism in Italy, his successor 
Beppe Grillo today is better known for his cyberpopulism. Both 
Donald Trump and Narendra Modi use Twitter effectively to reach out 
to their followers. “Each new communications technology has its own 
form of populism,” concludes historian Marco Revelli.15
Most importantly, the new right is a calculated response to the most 
salient dynamic of the post-World War II era: globalization. New right 
politicians have identified three crises in the globalization project—
the failure of economic globalization to benefit the majority, the lack 
of political legitimacy of the parties that supported neoliberal reforms, 
and the challenges that immigrants and minorities of all kinds repre-
sent to an enforced culture of homogeneity.
against globalization
The new right is, at least rhetorically, skeptical about globalization and 
critical of the political and economic elite that supports the neoliberal 
project of reducing barriers to trade, investment, and financial flows. 
Against this “globalist” agenda, the new right emphasizes nationalism, 
sovereignty, and conservative values. “There has never been so much 
open friction between national and globalist forces,” Hungarian Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán put it starkly in 2018:
We, the millions with national sentiments, on the one side, the 
citizen-of-the-world élite on the other side. We who believe in 
nation-states, in the defense of borders, in the value of the family 
and work on the one side and in opposition to us those who want 
an open society, a world without borders and nations, a new kind of 
family, devalued work and cheap workers over which an opaque and 
unaccountable army of bureaucrats reigns.16
The new right is capitalizing on some authentic grievances. Although 
the more interconnected global economy has helped both billionaires 
and nearly a billion Chinese, many people in between have been left 
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behind. In 2018, the richest 1 percent of people owned nearly half of 
the world’s wealth, while the poorer 50 percent of the global popula-
tion owned less than 1 percent.17 The rich just keep getting richer: in 
2019, the 500 richest individuals increased their wealth by an extraor-
dinary 25 percent over the previous year.18 It’s hard to track how much 
the world’s poorest have lost in this polarizing environment, though 
the bottom 50 percent saw their collective wealth drop by more than 
8 percent in 2018.19
A political backlash was inevitable. When Eastern Europeans 
experienced the pain of their compressed version of economic glo-
balization—which rapidly restructured their economies so that they 
could enter the global financial system—they switched their political 
allegiances to illiberal leaders. The negative impact of globalization 
that Eastern European countries experienced in the 1990s didn’t 
start hitting more advanced economies in a more sustained way until 
after 2005. According to a 2016 McKinsey report, Poorer Than Their 
Parents, fewer than 10 million people in 25 advanced economies—
approximately 2 percent of households—experienced a flatlining 
or falling income between 1993 and 2005. Over the next nine years, 
between 2005 and 2014, that figure rose to 540–580 million people, or 
65–70 percent of households.20 Such an extraordinary increase in the 
number of families experiencing economic distress, from 2 percent to 
70 percent, is certain to have a political impact. And indeed, right-wing 
populism rose sharply in precisely those countries that have experi-
enced the greatest drop in family income between 2005 and 2014: Italy 
(97 percent of households), the United States (81 percent), the United 
Kingdom (70 percent), and France (63 percent).21
The financial crisis of 2008–2009, which took place in the middle 
of this critical period, focused popular resentment on the global 
economic elite. Some of that anger could be found in the mobilizations 
against Wall Street by the Occupy movement or against European 
Union financial policies by the Spanish indignados. But it was even 
more widespread. According to an exhaustive study of protests by 
the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 164 protests took place around the 
world between 2006 and 2013 that targeted international finan-
cial institutions and their policies.22 Since that time, another wave 
of anti-austerity protests swept through Lebanon, Tunisia, Chad, Sri 
Lanka, Haiti, Argentina, Ecuador, and Chile, among other countries.
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Unlike the World Bank protests at the end of the 1990s or the Occupy 
gatherings after the 2008 financial crisis, it wasn’t the left that took 
advantage of the more recent discontent with global economic insti-
tutions and their austerity programs. “At the root has been the right 
wing’s capacity to harness people’s sense of alienation—the discontents 
of globalization,” observes Fiona Dove of the Transnational Institute 
in Amsterdam. This alienation has caused a political shift in work-
ing-class loyalties—for instance, from the French Communist Party 
to Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally or the surge of support in 
proletarian Rotterdam for Geert Wilders.23 The deindustrialization of 
Germany, particularly in the eastern regions, has pushed previous sup-
porters of the Social Democrats into the ranks of the Alternative für 
Deutschland.24
To attract supporters of left parties, the far right offered what 
amounted to a leftish economic program. Beginning in 2015, the 
Polish right-wing Law and Justice Party (PiS) pushed through classic 
Keynesian stimulus measures and popular redistribution policies to 
woo supporters of the post-Communist Party as well as Solidarność 
trade union loyalists. “When PiS came to power it implemented a 
number of pro-worker economic policies, such as generous childcare 
payments that have cut poverty rates and strengthened the labor-
market position of single mothers,” writes political scientist David Ost. 
“It has increased minimum wages, lowered the retirement age, and cut 
back on the use of ‘junk’ job contracts. It has imposed new taxes on 
foreign banks and insurance companies to pay for these programs.”25 
PiS has also offered free medicine to those over the age of 75 and 
dropped the income tax requirement for those under the age of 26.26
Another example is the swing among many Labour voters in 
the United Kingdom in favor of the 2016 referendum to leave the 
European Union. The Labour Party was fatally conflicted about 
whether to support withdrawal from the European Union, since many 
members—and leader Jeremy Corbyn—had long attacked the EU for 
diluting its commitment to social-democratic values, such as a more 
equitable distribution of wealth among member countries, in favor of 
a newer neoliberal emphasis on reduced barriers to the flow of capital. 
These “Lexiteers” joined with some conservatives newly converted 
to anti-globalization, like Conservative MP Iain Duncan Smith, who 
began lambasting the very big business ethos he’d earlier celebrated.27 
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The UK could not have exited the EU without a spavined Labour Party 
and the swing votes of a disgusted working class.
Neither the alienation of the working class nor the populist right’s 
opportunism is confined to the Global North. Authoritarian populism 
has widespread appeal throughout the Global South, thanks to a bevy 
of charismatic leaders. “Their appeal to the electorate and their huge 
support comes from at least a rhetorical anti-neoliberal agenda,” notes 
Wolfram Schaffar of the International Institute for Asian Studies 
in Leiden. “You see that with Thaksin Shinagawa in Thailand. He 
introduced universal health care coverage in Thailand, which made 
him hugely popular.” Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, a student 
of Communist-Party founder Jose Maria Sison, initially appointed 
several prominent leftists to his cabinet and made some economic 
overtures to the traditional working-class constituency of the left, 
qualifying him as a “fascist original” in Walden Bello’s terms.28 Duterte 
“came to power with anti-neoliberal and pro-welfare promises,” 
Schaffar adds. “That’s why he has the stable support of more than 80 
percent of the population.” In Brazil, urban working-class supporters 
of Bolsonaro abandoned the left because of surging unemployment 
and the pervasive crime in the cities.29 Pinochetism—the right-wing 
free-market ideology embraced by Augusto Pinochet in Chile in the 
1970s and 1980s—lives on in certain leaders, like Colombia’s Iván 
Duque, but is not an appealing program for most voters.
Central to this political shift of both working-class and blue-collar 
middle-class voters has been the decline of labor unions. In the Orga-
nization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)—36 of 
the wealthiest countries in the world—trade union membership has 
fallen by half since 1985, from 30 percent to 16 percent.30 Globally, 
for workers in the formal sector, the density of trade union member-
ship is 17 percent—not counting China, Belarus, and Cuba—with 
dramatic declines in Eastern Europe over the last 30 years.31 In Poland, 
for instance, where the independent Solidarność trade union once 
boasted a membership of 10 million people in a country of 40 million, 
union membership has dropped to around 10 percent.32
In the United States, the drop has been equally dramatic. Unions 
were “the central piece supporting the welfare state in the United 
States,” points out political economist and historian Gar Alperovitz, 
co-founder of the Democracy Collaborative. Union membership has 
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“gone from 34.2 percent to 11 percent—only 6 percent in the private 
sector. The institutional powerbase that once sustained the so-called 
liberal program is gone.” Without union pressure, wages for the average 
U.S. worker are the same today as they were back in 1973 (adjusted for 
inflation), and the situation has been much worse for those who have 
lower annual earnings.33
Union guarantees of job security have been central to forestalling 
the “fear of falling” of the working and middle class.34 A growing fear 
of relinquishing hard-won economic gains has been central to the 
rise of the new right, representing, for instance, a greater predictor of 
support for Donald Trump in the 2016 elections than economic status 
alone.35 “The crucial group are those not yet at the bottom who fear 
social and economic declassification,” observe Lorenzo Marsili and 
Niccolo Milanese.36 This is a familiar conclusion in the literature of 
political science. As Robert Jensen has written, “status loss is one of 
the most important drivers for the emergence of the radical positions 
within the electorate.”37
In this way, the critique of globalization appeals not just to the have-
nots but to the have-somes as well. Traditionally seen as the motor 
for democratization, the middle class has provided an “active consen-
sus” behind right-wing movements in countries like the Philippines, 
Thailand, and Brazil, suggests sociologist and former member of the 
Philippines parliament Walden Bello. “The lower classes tend to get 
swept up with authoritarian politics, but they don’t have the same kind 
of approach or response,” he notes. “The middle class, especially the 
urban middle class, provides a more active consensus.”
There is also a geographic factor behind the new right’s popularity, 
at least in the Global North where neoliberal policies have generally 
benefited urban and suburban workers at the expense of those who 
live in the countryside. It’s no surprise, then, that the new right has 
also done well in rural areas and small towns—the Polish country-
side, the American farm belt, the Anatolian heartland—that did not 
traditionally benefit from the economic growth in more liberal urban 
centers.38 Economic globalization has made the livelihoods of farmers 
more precarious, and the countryside tends to be more culturally con-
servative and less cosmopolitan than the cities. As sociologist Walden 
Bello argues, rural areas frequently provide a base for a populist and 
occasionally fascist “counter revolution” to liberal democracy.39
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The new right has also attracted support from particular economic 
sectors, such as the fossil-fuel industry, where policies addressing 
climate change threaten jobs from the executive boardroom all the 
way down to the coal mine. These constituencies, too, are concen-
trated outside the cities. In her book Strangers in Their Own Land, 
sociologist Arlie Hochschild has explored why even environmentalists 
support the new right in heavily polluted Louisiana, where the oil and 
chemical industries have joined conservative politicians to portray 
pro-immigration and pro-environment liberals as anti-job.40 “It feels 
like we’re living through the last gasps of not just a dying industry but a 
whole economic order around extraction,” explains May Boeve of 350.
org in Oakland. “This intense right-wing surge is a reaction.”
The new right has directed much of the anger of those who have 
not benefited from globalization toward the presumed architects of 
the project: transnational institutions and elites. In this way, Bannon’s 
platform of “deconstructing the administrative state” has translated 
into campaigns against the “globalist structures” in Brussels (the 
EU) and Washington (the IMF) responsible for pushing neoliberal 
economic policies. In particular, new right leaders want to reduce the 
power of international institutions and accords that impinge on the 
sovereignty of the nation-state and restrict the power of national cor-
porations. They are suspicious of any global institutions, like the World 
Health Organization, that claim to be acting in the common good.
Nor have the failures of globalization been lost on the managers of 
the global economy. Even the IMF has acknowledged that worsening 
economic inequality has called into question the capacity of economic 
globalization to lift all boats in a rising tide (but without engaging in 
the necessary institutional overhaul to address the problem).41 Also 
eroding faith in globalization has been “slowbalization.”42 Over the last 
decade, the portion of trade as part of global GDP has fallen. Multina-
tionals have seen a drop in their share of global profits. Foreign direct 
investment tumbled from 3.5 percent of global GDP in 2007 to 1.3 
percent in 2018.43 Globalization, in other words, was having problems 
not just distributing the wealth but producing it in the first place.
Finally, a set of technological transformations, particularly automa-
tion, has threatened to make the global assembly line obsolete, which 
puts at risk the jobs and livelihoods of millions of workers, including 65 
percent of Nigerian workers and 69 percent of Indian workers, accord-
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ing to World Bank projections.44 Economists who have examined how 
automation has spiked at times of recession expect a similar surge as 
a result of the economic downturn associated with the coronavirus 
pandemic, with low-income workers, the young, and workers of color 
at greatest risk.45 COVID-19 alone will not be responsible for causing 
an economic transformation analogous to the massive reduction of 
the agricultural workforce in the industrial era, but it could very well 
represent a moment of punctuated equilibrium in this technological 
evolution.
Economic globalization, even before the pandemic hit in 2020, was 
failing to deliver on many levels. But the economic crisis also offers a 
wealth of political opportunities.
attacking the political consensus
The political forces that hitched their wagons to economic global-
ization faced a crisis of their own after the 2009 financial recession. 
Voters had had enough of their promises of prosperity, which so obvi-
ously did not correspond with their reality. This disgust was directed at 
parties across the political spectrum, not just the Tories in the UK and 
Republicans in the United States, but also the liberals that embraced 
“Third Way” politics, French Socialists that pushed austerity eco-
nomics, even former Communist parties from Eastern Europe that 
supported versions of “shock therapy.”
After 2009, angry voters were casting around for alternatives. “The 
main establishment parties—Republicans and Democrats in the United 
States, Social Democrats and Christian conservatives in Europe—all of 
them were giving the same response, which was to bail out the finance 
sector and cut social spending to cover the costs of those bailouts,” Sol 
Trumbo Vila of the Transnational Institute points out. “Most people 
felt that they had only two choices: follow the neoliberal globalization 
model, which has now been exposed as dysfunctional, or go back to 
nationalist projects and frames, which are outmoded but familiar.”
Progressives might have represented a third option for voters reject-
ing mainstream parties in the wake of the financial crisis. The upswell 
of support for Bernie Sanders in the United States, Jeremy Corbyn’s 
rise to the leadership of the UK Labour Party, and the electoral surge 
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of the Greens in the 2019 European parliament elections all reflected 
this dissatisfaction.
But many on the left have remained suspicious of electoral politics. A 
2012 study on “subterranean politics” in Europe reviewed the activism 
going on at the time—the Occupy movement, the anti-fascist orga-
nizing—and concluded, as the London School of Economics’ Mary 
Kaldor put it, that “it was very anti-political because people didn’t 
want anything to do with the political class.”46 This disillusionment 
was reinforced by the center left’s flirtation with Third Way politics, 
which had pushed the Labour parties in the UK, Australia, and New 
Zealand, the Democratic Party in the United States, the Swedish Social 
Democratic Party, and others toward neoliberalism. After 2008, as 
Sheri Berman writes in a study of Why the Left Loses,
the centre-left lacked a convincing message for dealing with the 
crisis, or a more general vision of how to promote growth while pro-
tecting citizens from the harsher aspects of free markets. Instead, 
it kept on trying to defend outdated policies or proposed watered-
down versions of neoliberalism that barely differentiated it from the 
centre-right.47
While the left was compromised by its history, other political actors 
were prepared to take advantage of the vacuum created by the financial 
crisis. “The right wing that was waiting in the wings basically stepped 
in and harvested the arguments and the resistance organized by move-
ments and unions around the world against corporate globalization,” 
explains Shalmali Guttal of Focus on the Global South in Thailand. 
“But they changed the enemy. The enemy was not mainly global cap-
italism and neoliberalism and corporations. They created this ‘other.’ 
The enemy were the globalizers, the ones who put free trade before 
national interests. and those who talked about national interest in the 
language of justice, equality, and peoples’ rights.”
Hungary’s Viktor Orbán is a case in point. In the late 1980s, Orbán 
started his political career by co-founding a new party, Fidesz, that 
embodied the hopes of a new generation of liberal and radical youth. 
When support for liberalism collapsed in the wake of the country’s 
economic reforms, Orbán found a new home on the opposite end of 
the political spectrum. Thanks in part to his sharpened critique of glo-
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balism, he became prime minister for the second time in 2010. Once a 
prominent opponent of Russian imperialism and an ardent supporter 
of European integration, Orbán took advantage of his second shot at 
power to guide Hungary further away from European liberalism and 
toward Russian absolutism. It was an astonishing ideological reversal, 
particularly in a country with a historically strong anti-Russian and 
pro-European tilt, which had emerged as the poster child for liberal-
ism after 1989.
It wasn’t the only example of political opportunism. “There’s an 
enormous number of people who feel deeply let down by the existing 
political establishment who are very vulnerable to nationalist, populist, 
racist calls to power,” notes Ethan Zuckerman of MIT’s Center for Civic 
Media. “These opportunistic political leaders are masterfully grabbing 
that sentiment. And once they grab it, they fully believe it. Politicians 
are salespeople. They have to persuade themselves of something so 
that they can sell it.”
The backlash against liberalism in the wake of the financial crisis was 
slow in building in some countries. In the United States, even before 
quintessential liberal Barack Obama won the presidential election in 
the midst of the downturn in 2008, he was a target of extremist ire. In 
2008, David Adkisson was motivated by his hatred of the Democratic 
candidate—“He is a joke,” he declared of Obama in his manifesto, 
“He is dangerous to America”—to walk into a Unitarian Universalist 
Church in Knoxville, Tennessee, where children were rehearsing the 
musical Annie, pull out a shotgun, and kill two people before he was 
wrestled to the ground. “Liberals are evil,” Adkisson concluded in his 
manifesto, “Kill liberals.”48
Approximately a quarter of the American population formed a 
nascent resistance to Obama as soon as he took office. This was the 
26 percent of Americans “who still approved of George W. Bush in the 
waning days of his presidency; the 26 percent who in 2009 said they’d 
like to see Sarah Palin as Obama’s successor in 2012 … and the 26 
percent who believed that Obama’s 2008 election was not legitimate,” 
writes journalist Will Bunch.49 The resistance would find political 
form in the Tea Party almost immediately after Obama’s inauguration, 
a vehicle for the radical right that helped to take over the Republican 
Party and win power through electoral means.
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Some of the disgruntled also found a home among white nation-
alists and other extremists, whose groups multiplied.50 Much of this 
expansion took place online where widely dispersed and otherwise 
isolated extremists could find community. Between 2012 and 2016, 
according to a report by George Washington University’s Program on 
Extremism, “there was a 600 percent increase in followers of American 
white-nationalist movements on Twitter.”51 By the summer of 2015, 
the alt-right was all over the internet, thanks to Steve Bannon and Bre-
itbart News.
But, as journalist David Neiwert points out, the alt-right “lacked 
a real leader—a charismatic political figure around whom it could 
finally coalesce, whom its members could devote their energies to 
electing to office.”52 The backlash against Obama needed someone 
who could bridge the gap between the radical Tea Partiers and the 
racist extremists.
Donald Trump was just that bridge. He was the first president to 
be memed into office, as writer Dale Beran puts it, courtesy of the alt-
right, 8Chan jokesters, and a sympathetic conservative media, with 
a big assist from WikiLeaks and Russian hackers.53 These armchair 
activists put forward Trump as a representative of “the America of the 
peripheries, of all the isolated peripheries forgotten by the centres” 
while simultaneously portraying Hillary Clinton as the candidate of 
a wealthy, urban elite.54 This carefully curated backlash downplayed 
Trump’s cultivation of wealthy donors and promises of big kickbacks to 
Wall Street. In the 2016 election, Trump was improbably presented as 
a man of the people even though it was his opponent, Hillary Clinton, 
who won decisively among those who earned less than $30,000 a 
year.55 The pattern was repeated in 2020, with Biden doing even better 
among those earning less than $50,000; despite his populist persona, 
Trump only won among those earning more than $100,000.56 At the 
same time, the rural and white working class continued to support 
Trump, pointing to a longer-term transformation of the bases of the 
two major parties, with the Republican Party following the pattern of 
new right parties in other parts of the world by attacking cosmopolitan 
elites, including the financiers that have generally supported conserva-
tive politics, in favor of the “people.”57
Trump is but one of the new charismatic, populist leaders. In the 
Philippines and India, for instance, “we’re moving away from politics 
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as usual or democracy as usual and moving into a period of charis-
matic politics,” explains Walden Bello. “The source of authority is 
charismatic rather than rational-legal or traditional. People might say, 
for instance, ‘We have too much deadlock and we need a strong leader 
to break those deadlocks.’” These charismatic leaders tend to be out-
siders or, at least, present themselves as outsiders like Donald Trump 
or career politicians like Modi and Bolsonaro who remade themselves 
into anti-establishment figures. The rejection of conventional politi-
cians has been so categorical that voters have even flocked to support 
well-known comedians, like Jimmy Morales in Guatemala, Beppe 
Grillo in Italy, and Volodymyr Zelensky in Ukraine.
What unites the new right is its exploitation of popular anger at the 
political and economic status quo. But it has been even more success-
ful in taking advantage of cultural grievances and thereby gaining the 
support of those who face little or no economic challenges.
cultural struggle
The new right has flourished in countries that have not prospered eco-
nomically over the last 15 years. But it has also done well in places such 
as Austria and the Scandinavian states, which made out quite well.
Although the rejection of economic globalization and the embrace 
of charismatic, anti-establishment politicians explain much of the new 
right’s appeal, many supporters are responding to factors that are not 
precisely political or economic. “Decades of academic research have 
shown that cultural backlash is much more important than economic 
anxiety,” writes Cas Mudde. “In short, there are few far-right voters 
who are informed only by economic anxiety, while there are many who 
are only expressing a cultural backlash.”58 As Melissa Ryan, the editor 
of the Ctrl Alt-Right Delete newsletter, points out, voters are respond-
ing to something visceral. The new right is “fighting a cultural war 
first, and a political war second,” she says. “A lot of the time, policy 
doesn’t even enter into it. I closely follow Trump’s online army, which 
is both American and international. It’s hard to get them excited about 
policy but easy to get them amped up around cultural cues: racist, 
misogynistic, anti-immigrant, and Islamophobic views.”
These cultural issues all involve a policing of some type of border. 
White nationalists are focused on preserving white privilege and 
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maintaining white “purity” in the face of challenges from minorities 
at home and migrants from non-white countries. Religious extrem-
ists want their religion—and only their religion—to be fused with the 
nation-state. Gender activists are concerned about the loss of hetero-
sexual privileges and male supremacy. This larger effort by the new 
right to police cultural and physical borders can also be understood 
as a rejection of Enlightenment values of rationality, progress, and 
equality.59 The goal is to rewrite an entire historical trajectory devoted 
to breaking down barriers and distributing political and economic 
power more equitably throughout society.
That historical trajectory extends to the gains made by social move-
ments in the modern era, beginning with the victories of feminism. 
“The ways in which women’s movements have challenged the funda-
mental assumptions of patriarchy have created a set of fears about what 
will replace it,” Kavita N. Ramdas of Open Society’s Women’s Rights 
Program points out. “The language of nationalism and hypermascu-
linity are tied to each other—there’s a reason it’s called patriotism.” The 
Proud Boys in North America and other masculinist groups fret that 
men are under siege from the feminist movement, while right-wing 
populist leaders emphasize their virility and machismo, disparag-
ing women and feminists as Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro have 
repeatedly done. Their misogyny extends even toward gender studies. 
“Viktor Orbán prohibited gender studies in Hungarian universities in 
2018,” notes Birgit Sauer of the University of Vienna, so the European 
far right wants “to use Hungary as an example to cut off the financing 
of gender studies.”
Immigration has long been a preoccupation of the far right, which 
has demonized outsiders for “stealing” jobs, diluting dominant culture, 
and even threatening the health of society. It wasn’t only despair over 
economic conditions that motivated German voters to support the far-
right Alternative für Deutschland. The anti-immigrant sentiment of 
many supporters of the post-Communist Party of Democratic Social-
ism—plus a belief that immigrants were taking their jobs as well as 
government benefits—pushed them to support the far right.60 The 
same holds true throughout Europe.61
The new right’s anti-immigrant discourse is suffused with Islam-
ophobia, particularly in Europe. According to the myths of “Eurabia” 
and “Europistan,” Muslims are waging both a demographic and 
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an ideological campaign to take over the continent.62 These myths 
motivated Norwegian mass shooter Anders Breivik in 2011 and his 
would-be acolyte Philip Manshaus, who attacked a Norwegian mosque 
in summer 2019. They helped generate movements like the English 
Defence League in the UK and Pegida in Germany. The roots of this 
Islamophobia run deep, an amalgam of Crusader nostalgia, Oriental-
ist misreadings of history and culture, anger over post-World War II 
guest worker programs, and concerns about terrorism.63
Nor can this Islamophobia be separated from the geopolitics of the 
last half-century, beginning with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
and the Iranian revolution of 1979 through the cultivation of the muja-
hideen opposition and the rise of the Taliban and al-Qaeda to the U.S. 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The collapse of the Taliban-led govern-
ment in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, followed by 
the Arab Spring uprisings and the civil wars in Syria and Libya, precip-
itated a huge outflow of migrants and refugees from North Africa, the 
Middle East, and Central Asia. The transformation of the demograph-
ics of Europe and the United States by an influx of Muslims—fleeing 
wars and conflicts that were more often than not instigated or at 
least aggravated by U.S. military intervention—produced a cultural 
backlash that anti-Islamic movements weaponized politically.
Today, ground zero of this Islamophobic campaign is France, where 
a succession of governments has used strict secularism, the country’s 
famous laïcité, to impose bans on anything that might be construed 
as promoting religion in public spaces. In practice, these laws have 
targeted Muslim women who wear head coverings. France is also 
home to novelist Michel Houellebecq, who has turned anti-Islamic 
sentiment into bestselling novels, and Renaud Camus, who devel-
oped the “great replacement” doctrine. The attacks in Christchurch, 
New Zealand in March 2019 “show that France has been the promised 
land for many white supremacists,” says French human rights activist 
Yasser Louati, referring to the killer’s manifesto entitled The Great 
Replacement. “The Christchurch terrorist said that he was inspired 
or motivated by what is happening in France. France has the largest 
Muslim minority in the West—and it is the country that has passed the 
greatest number of laws targeting the Muslim community.”
Trump tried to import something similar into the United States 
with his Muslim travel ban, which lower courts successfully blocked 
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before the Supreme Court upheld it in a narrow 5–4 decision. The 
Indian and Israeli governments are focused on keeping Muslims at 
arm’s length through stricter citizenship laws. Some Buddhist govern-
ments, too, have jumped on the bandwagon, forming an anti-Muslim 
International that connects Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Thailand. Even 
Nobel Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi has joined the fray by visiting 
Hungary and discussing with Viktor Orbán their shared concern over 
“continuously growing Muslim populations.”64 The EU made only a 
lukewarm statement on Myanmar’s ethnic cleansing of the Muslim 
Rohingya minority “because Orbán did not want to have a clear 
statement on that,” says Wolfram Schaffar. “Orbán said that he could 
understand Myanmar expelling what it considers illegal immigrants.” 
In other words, Orbán could understand genocide as long as it applied 
to Muslims.
Islamophobia is a subset of a more encompassing xenophobia asso-
ciated with populism. Much media focus has been on anti-immigrant 
sentiment in Europe. But attacks on foreigners have become so acute in 
South Africa that more than a thousand refugees camped out in front 
of UN offices in Cape Town in October 2019 demanding that they be 
relocated to a third country because they feared for their lives.65 Ven-
ezuelan refugees have faced xenophobic backlash throughout Latin 
America.66 Hatred of ethnic Chinese periodically resurfaces through-
out southeast Asia and has spread more widely in the wake of the 
COVID-19 pandemic.67 Anti-immigrant parties have also attracted 
significant support in Australia and New Zealand.
The border crosser, according to this anti-globalization ideology, is 
suspect, whether a globetrotting financier, a cosmopolitan liberal, a 
family seeking a better life in another country, or a desperate refugee 
fleeing a warzone. The coronavirus pandemic has only further stigma-
tized border crossers as potential vectors of infection.
going mainstream
Immigration has proven to be the gateway issue for many extremists to 
enter the mainstream. To do so successfully, they needed the assistance 
of mainstream media figures. In Europe, for instance, fringe parties 
and movements couldn’t have weaponized the immigration issue to 
boost their vote totals without a corresponding boost from the media. 
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“Mainstream media and politicians chose to frame the influx of asylum 
seekers as a ‘crisis’ thereby providing ammunition to the already mobi-
lized far right,” writes Cas Mudde.68
The media has facilitated this mainstreaming in other ways. Because 
it proved useful for ratings, TV networks in the United States devoted 
considerable airtime to the outrageous statements of Donald Trump 
during his presidential campaign, thus effectively providing him free 
political advertising for his proposals to build a wall along the Mexican 
border and kick out all undocumented workers. The internet, mean-
while, has provided a megaphone for fringe personalities who would 
otherwise have narrow appeal. In the United States, Peter Brimelow, 
formerly a senior editor at Forbes, set up the VDare blog in 1999 to 
showcase his anti-immigration views and those of like-minded white 
nationalists (though Brimelow himself, British born and now living in 
the United States, is an immigrant).
The far right has moved into the mainstream through a variety of 
tactics and not just by creating successful political parties. “The real 
danger today is not that we have an unstoppable wave of far-right 
populism,” notes Princeton professor Jan-Werner Mueller. “The real 
danger is the opportunism of the mainstream: other parties that 
outright collaborate with these far-right populist parties or de facto 
copy at least some of their rhetoric and even some of their policies.”
Mainstream political parties in Europe have long maintained a 
practice of quarantining the far right, allowing their political parties 
to run for parliament but refusing to partner with them to form coa-
lition governments. In 1991, for instance, Belgian parties agreed to a 
cordon sanitaire to keep the far-right Vlaams Blok out of government. 
Despite street protests, this agreement has held, even as the Vlaams 
Blok has changed its name to Vlaams Belang and witnessed a resur-
gence of support that has prompted the mainstream right-wing parties 
to challenge the restriction.69
A similar cordon sanitaire is still holding in the European par-
liament, where mainstream parties are blocking the far right from 
chairing any important committees. But the rising number of far-right 
deputies is putting pressure on this strategy.70 Also, political isolation 
has its unintended consequences. “Seeking legal recourse to mute a 
party that gains voice for its anti-system message through institution-
alized channels of participation and representation, however, may 
right across the world
36
itself be seen as being of dubious democratic merit and so risks further 
alienating a portion of the electorate already suspicious of the estab-
lishment,” writes political scientist William Downs.71
Whether because of this unintended consequence of fueling 
populism or the sheer increase in the new right’s vote totals, conserva-
tive parties have begun to renege on their informal non-cooperation 
pacts. In Austria, for instance, the far-right Freedom Party led by Jörg 
Haider entered a coalition partnership with the conservative People’s 
Party in 2000. Hundreds of thousands of Austrians demonstrated on 
the streets, and the EU pledged not to cooperate with the new gov-
ernment.72 Eighteen years later, when the Freedom Party returned to 
government, fewer demonstrators showed up on the streets and the 
EU made no so such threats. “It was an indication of the normalization 
of incorporation,” concludes Cas Mudde.73
The Freedom Party was eventually embroiled in a corruption 
scandal, and the government collapsed. But the far right had already 
had its impact, for the People’s Party standard bearer, Sebastian Kurz, 
adopted much of the far right’s rhetoric. Kurz “has a quite authori-
tarian agenda,” Alexandra Strickner of the Austrian chapter of Attac 
points out. “It’s important to look at how the center—the Christian 
Democrats and even the Social Democrats—is shifting much more to 
the right” in Austria.
Something similar has happened in Japan, where right-wing nation-
alist Shinzo Abe has injected what had once been fringe views about 
Japanese history into the mainstream. “Since Abe took office the second 
time at the end of 2012, he has really shifted the whole society to the 
right,” Satoko Norimatsu of the Peace Philosophy Centre in Vancouver 
explains. “For example, something that would have been controversial 
10 or 20 years ago is no longer controversial. If a cabinet member had 
denied that the Nanjing Massacre ever happened 10 or 20 years ago, 
he’d have been dismissed immediately. Now, almost the whole cabinet 
accepts this.” In Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu likewise 
“started supporting far-right activists and candidates and mainstream-
ing their ideas in order to keep himself in power,” reports Ran Cohen 
of Israel’s Democratic Bloc. The resignation of Abe in August 2020 and 
the collapse of the Netanyahu coalition government in December 2020 
did not substantially alter the overall hard right-wing political consen-
sus in either country.
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In Russia, some activists of the extreme right chose ideology over the 
nation when they joined explicitly fascist Ukrainian brigades against 
Russian-aligned separatists. But Vladimir Putin has done much to 
lure the far right back into his fold, for instance, by using a subtle 
shift in vocabulary to signify his appropriation of a more exclusion-
ary nationalist project. In the Russian language, the term “Russian” 
can be translated as either russky (ethnic Russian) or rossisky (Russian 
by citizenship). “Since 2012, Putin started using russky,” explains Ilya 
Matveev, a founding editor of Openleft.ru living in St. Petersburg. 
“Previously Putin supported the civic nation. But since the annexation 
of Crimea, nationalism became more ethnicized. This is precisely what 
the nationalists wanted, and they became semi-allies of the regime.”
In the United States, meanwhile, the victory of Trump in the 2016 
elections, but more so his transformation of the Republican Party into 
a haven for the new right, meant that “the line between the fringe 
and the right is starting to collapse,” notes Heidi Beirich of the Global 
Project Against Hate and Extremism. “Over the last year, there has 
been a deepening of the alliance between the Republican Party and 
these groups that were never accepted in the GOP. The Republicans 
would dog-whistle a lot about Blacks and immigrants. But now they’re 
openly working with extremists who were beyond the pale before.” In 
the past, a rather marginal figure like Ron Paul, a Republican Con-
gressman from Texas who ran unsuccessfully for president in 2008 and 
2012, was the conduit for the far right into the Republican Party main-
stream.74 Trump proved to be a much more successful pipeline.
Sometimes a right-wing populist party will even align with more 
extremist civil society. In Poland in 2018, for instance, government 
officials for the first time joined the Independence Day march orga-
nized by the far-right National Radical Camp.75 The following year, 
local politicians from the Law and Justice Party (PiS) also showed up 
in support of an anti-LGBT demonstration in Białystok. “Everyone 
was quite shocked that this collaboration happened in Białystok,” 
reports Igor Stokfiszewski of Krytyka Polityczna. “Until now, we had 
the impression that PiS was trying to keep at least a little distance, but 
now they are directly collaborating with the far right.”
Indeed, the new right is breaking out of quarantine in many different 
ways. “An anti-immigration right-wing populist party like Alternative 
für Deutschland or a grassroots movement like Pegida functions as 
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an incubator or hub where people from the conservative right meet 
highly violent extremists that they would normally not meet,” explains 
Daniel Koehler of the German Institute in Radicalization and De-Rad-
icalization Studies. “These populist right-wing parties systematically 
bring down the social barriers that would normally prevent extremist 
groups from interacting with the political mainstream.”
Another path to the mainstream is through the military. Neo-Nazi 
organizations and the KKK have made inroads in the U.S. military, 
particularly during the 2000s when recruiters were desperate to fill 
quotas for the post-9/11 wars. White nationalism persists in the ranks 
at disturbingly high levels.76 The arrest of a Coast Guard lieutenant in 
2019 accused of stockpiling weapons to start a race war, the training 
of white supremacists by active-duty U.S. military personnel and 
veterans, and a plot uncovered in 2020 involving a young Army soldier 
coordinating with a neo-Nazi group to kill members of his own unit all 
testify to the close links between the extreme right and members of the 
military.77 Germany has been busy trying to purge the far right from 
the ranks of the Bundeswehr and has been investigating 450 cases of 
identitarians and neo-Nazis.78 The German government was even 
forced to disband an elite special forces unit in 2020 because of far-
right infiltration.79 Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa: all have 
struggled with white supremacists in the ranks of their militaries. The 
problem extends to police departments as well.
To move into the mainstream requires money. Right-wing civil 
society organizations and foundations have facilitated this flow of 
money. The far-right embrace of climate denial, for instance, has 
gotten a big global lift from the likes of ExxonMobil and the Koch 
brothers. The U.S. climate-denial thinktank the Heartland Institute 
works closely with European partners. At the UN climate conference 
in Katowice, Poland in 2018, according to German journalist Susanne 
Götze, “the Heartland Institute connected with the Polish trade union, 
Solidarność. They signed a contract of collaboration. They did it offi-
cially. They don’t hide.” Solidarność represents Poland’s dwindling 
number of coal miners.
In Spain, where the stigma attached to former fascist dictator Fran-
cisco Franco hitherto restricted the emergence of far-right political 
parties, the new Vox party took advantage of considerable interna-
tional support to get off the ground.80 Campaign finance laws in the 
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EU make it difficult for foreigners to contribute money to elections. As 
in the United States, however, foreigners could support like-minded 
organizations that spread Vox-like messages.81 During the parliamen-
tary elections in April 2019, the party went from zero to 10 percent (and 
24 MPs) in record time and then, in a second election in November, 
doubled its seats to become the country’s third-largest party in parlia-
ment. “The internationals helped shape the image of Vox, the rallies, 
the discourse, and gave it lots of messages to test, like anti-immigra-
tion,” explains Jordi Vaquer of the Open Society Foundations.
Entering the mainstream also opens up new sources of funding. 
Vox first achieved electoral success at the regional level, in Andalu-
sia in December 2018. Even though the party had previously criticized 
state funding for parties, it gladly accepted nearly 3 million Euros of 
such funding.82 In Germany, meanwhile, political parties that make it 
into the Bundestag in consecutive elections become eligible for state 
funds to support their activities worldwide. The far-right Alternative 
für Deutschland (AfD) created a foundation, the Erasmus Stiftung, to 
tap into those funds when it becomes eligible. If the AfD is able to 
remain in the Bundestag in 2021, which is likely given its successes 
in the local and European parliament elections in 2019, the founda-
tion could receive as much as 70 million Euros of taxpayer money 
per year.83 Those funds will help establish Erasmus Stiftung offices in 
multiple countries with a mandate to support like-minded organiza-
tions and promote their international cooperation.
Once in power, the populist right attempts to transform the main-
stream by suppressing oppositional civil society. In Brazil, for instance, 
“The Bolsonaro government has criminalized popular movements and 
political organizations,” explains Tchenna Maso of La Via Campesina 
and Movement of People Affected by Dams in Latin America. “The 
government is focused on suppressing organizing on the left, shutting 
down marches and protests.” Bolsonaro early on in his term issued a 
decree to “supervise, coordinate, monitor and accompany the activi-
ties and actions of international organizations and non-governmental 
organizations in the national territory.”84 A major focus of this height-
ened government control has been on environmental organizations, 
which the Brazilian president has even blamed for the intensification 
of fires in the Amazon.85
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Suppressing progressive civil society organizations also involves 
restricting their access to funding. “When it comes to the European 
situation, if some of these parties take power, as happened in Austria, 
there’s a lot more to lose in Europe than in the United States because 
civil society groups are tied to the state,” adds Heidi Beirich. In 
Germany, for instance, the AfD is championing the removal of gov-
ernment support for precisely those civil society initiatives devoted to 
identifying and confronting the far right.86
This has already happened in Poland. “We are dealing with struc-
tural discrimination against civil society organizations including 
Krytyka Polityczna,” explains Igor Stokfiszewski. “We have been cut 
off from any public funds. We have been attacked in the public media, 
on public TV, and pointed out as an enemy of the people.” In Russia, 
the Putin government instituted a “foreign agent” law in 2012 that 
stigmatizes any NGO that accepts money from a foreign entity.87 In 
Hungary, the parliament passed two laws in summer 2018, one crimi-
nalizing assistance to migrants and another that imposes a tax on any 
groups that advocate on behalf of the undocumented. Many organiza-
tions feel that if they “owned up to the fact that they were working on 
this subject, it would damage their overall reputation and their ability 
to fundraise among Hungarian citizens and attract volunteers,” reports 
Márta Pardavi of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee.
The problem goes beyond the financing of civil society organiza-
tions. If the populist right manages to take control of government, it 
often engages in “state capture,” using the mechanisms and resources 
of state power to strengthen the party and its affiliated organizations. 
In Hungary, for instance, the Fidesz government of Viktor Orbán has 
helped concentrate the media in the hands of its supporters and has 
even distributed something as relatively minor as licenses for cigarette 
sales to party loyalists.88 If the Hungarian government renationalizes 
utilities or banks, it’s not because of some fundamental belief that the 
state benefits from interfering in the economy in this way. Rather, 
Fidesz simply wants more power in its hands and more spoils to dis-
tribute. “The problem is not that they are privatizing the state for 
themselves,” argues sociologist András Bozóki, who once served in the 
Hungarian government as a minister of culture.
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They are nationalizing other people’s private goods for the state and 
the state is equal to themselves. There is a privatization via nation-
alization because the state itself is privatized. Don’t be misled when 
you hear that some private activities are nationalized. It just means 
that the larger mafia took over the smaller one.89
Such policies of state capture, alongside voter suppression and consti-
tutional changes, help explain the persistence in power of such parties 
and politicians: Vladimir Putin in Russia (since 1999), Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan in Turkey (since 2003), Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua (since 
2007), Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel (since 2009), Viktor Orbán in 
Hungary (since 2010), and Narendra Modi in India (since 2014). Even 
Donald Trump, a septuagenarian in a country with a two-term limit 
on the presidency, “joked” on multiple occasions about becoming 
“president for life” and did his utmost to overturn the results of the 
2020 election.90 Despite his age and his unpopularity with much of the 
country, he has made noises about running again in 2024. His former 
strategist, Steve Bannon, has talked of Trump’s base of support prepar-
ing for a governing majority for 50 years. “Trump is a transformative 
president and a historic figure,” Bannon says. “He is going to be in 
your lives ten, twenty, and thirty years from now—that’s a Kafkaesque 
novel, isn’t it? It is.”91
By systematically dismantling the guardrails of democracy, these 
political forces aspire to transform the electoral realm and end the 
more conventional oscillation of political passions. Bannon is being 
disingenuous when he talks of a governing majority. The new right 
does not just want to win at politics. It wants to end politics—as it is 
practiced in democratic societies.
a changing playbook
Three key elements facilitated the move of these political, economic, 
and cultural sentiments into the mainstream. The first was the end 
of the Cold War, which destroyed an anti-fascist consensus that 
joined together not only the United States and Soviet Union but also 
all mainstream political parties. The emergence in the 1990s of far-
right politicians like Jörg Haider in Austria, Jean-Marie Le Pen in 
France, and Vladimir Zhirinovsky in Russia paved the way for future 
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parties and movements to break the anti-fascist taboo more vigor-
ously. Indeed, the new right went further by attempting to criminalize 
anti-fascist organizing by branding the “antifa” as a terrorist entity.92
The second element was the internet, which linked up niche groups. 
“Social media amplifies everything—that goes for veganism as well as 
the radical right,” explains Matthew Feldman of the Centre for Analysis 
of the Radical Right in the UK.
It’s the medium that most speaks to the radical right: potentially 
international, potentially permanent, potentially anonymous—all 
the things that the radical right lacked going back many years. If 
you wanted to be involved in, let’s say, Holocaust denial, you’d have 
to have known the groups beforehand, probably subscribe to some 
dodgy magazine of questionable quality. But now you or I could go 
on Twitter or Facebook, type in “Holocaust denial” and get materi-
als not available even in the 1990s.
A third element has been the patient organizing of the new right; 
some of it copied directly from the left’s playbook. The identitarian 
movement has borrowed various counter-cultural strategies and com-
munity organizing tactics.93 It is active on campuses, for instance, where 
it projects a “cool” and “hip” aesthetic that appeals to young people. 
From Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, the new right has borrowed 
the idea of taking over the state through a “long march through the 
institutions” like political parties, trade unions, the military, and the 
police. It has overcome the extremist suspicion of electoral politics 
and political institutions more generally. The Tea Party, for instance, 
targeted the Republican Party as the first step to influencing U.S. 
politics. Within a year of its formation in 2009, it was grabbing low-
level precinct leader positions within the Republican Party, 60 percent 
of which, out of 150,000 in all, were vacant at the time.94
After the EU parliament elections in 2009, when Hungary’s far-right 
Jobbik party won three seats, Larry Olomoofe of the People of African 
Descent Resource Centre remembers seeing
a cluster of people in Hero Square in Budapest around the Hungar-
ian flag, and it turned out they were Jobbik members handing out 
leaflets and continuing their crusade. Even though they’d achieved 
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unprecedented results in the election three days prior, they were 
still out there doing this. While we were intellectualizing them away 
by saying, “look at these idiots,” they took our political participa-
tion strategies, created a critical mass, and now they’re setting the 
agenda.
These three factors—the disappearance of an anti-fascist consensus, 
the creation of extremist communities online, and the grassroots orga-
nizing of the far right—created the conditions within which a new, 
anti-liberal politics could thrive. This new right has marshaled its 
political, economic, and cultural arguments to consolidate power at a 
national level and simultaneously attack global elites. This attack goes 
beyond economic institutions (like the World Bank) to those of civil 
society (like human rights organizations) that campaign for the rights 
of minorities, refugees, or political prisoners against the presumed will 
of the majority.
This antipathy toward globalism, however, has not stopped the new 
right from pursuing a global project of its own, with its own peculiar 
version of universalism. The ultimate goal: to replace existing inter-
national institutions and agreements with what Larry Rosenthal, the 
chair of the Berkeley Center for Right-Wing Studies, calls “an approx-
imation of the liberal order in illiberal terms.”
44
2
Transnational organizing  
of the new right
Kaleb Cole is an extremist version of Steve Bannon—with guns.
Cole is the leader of the Atomwaffen Division (AWD) in Washing-
ton state. A white supremacist group with cells in 20 U.S. states, the 
AWD is dedicated to precipitating a global race war, drawing its inspi-
ration from such sources as Nazism and cult leader Charles Manson.1 
In December 2018, Cole embarked on a 25-day tour of Europe. In 
Poland, he visited Auschwitz where he took a selfie with an Atom-
waffen flag. In Ukraine, he attended a neo-Nazi music festival.
His trip was also focused on creating a global network of white 
supremacists. Thanks to Cole, the AWD has linked up with the 
fascist Azov Batallion in Ukraine, the white supremacist Sonnenk-
rieg Division in Europe, and the neo-Nazi Antipodean Resistance in 
Australia.2 AWD aspires to be a paramilitary outfit, and it has been 
implicated in the murders of five people. Cole is an avowed “accel-
erationist,” someone who cares little about electoral politics and only 
wants to hasten the collapse of the liberal system. In November 2019, 
police in Texas arrested Cole with one of his associates and seized 
guns, ammunition, and drugs from their car. The authorities charged 
Cole with threatening journalists. Pending a trial in 2021, he has been 
held without bail.
Kaleb Cole is just one of several white supremacists with global 
ambitions to recently come out of the woodwork.
Rinaldo Nazzaro, whose nom de guerre is Norman Spear, is similarly 
fixated on the downfall of the U.S. government. Unlike Cole, Nazzaro 
has avoided the reach of the FBI by relocating with his Russian wife 
to St. Petersburg. There he appears to work as a security consultant, 
with a working relationship with the Russian government. But his 
main preoccupation has been to run The Base, a paramilitary outfit 
that hopes one day to create a white homeland in the Pacific Northwest 
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of the United States.3 Several days before a pro-gun rally in Virginia 
in January 2020, the FBI arrested three Base members on weapons 
charges and on suspicion of intending to foment violence at the rally.4 
Nazzaro, however, remains beyond the FBI’s grasp.
The attempted coup on January 6 in Washington, DC, attracted an 
even larger group of armed white nationalists. Although fixated on 
reversing Trump’s 2020 electoral defeat, many of the organizers are 
global in their strategizing, their connections, and their aspirations. 
Unlike with AWD and The Base, however, the far right was able this 
time to piggyback on the organizing of more conventional conser-
vative organizations. Groups like the Republican Attorneys General, 
Turning Point Action, and Tea Party Patriots planned the two days of 
rallies that preceded the storming of the Capitol.5 Militia members, 
QAnon fanatics, and Proud Boys mixed freely with Christian activists, 
former congressional staffers, and off-duty police officers.
The presence of ex-military among the ranks of the insurrectionists 
points to a higher level of organization than initially reported.6 In this 
sense, the insurrection was not an unplanned riot. The FBI was aware 
in advance of the plans to attack the Capitol Building.7 The FBI office 
in Norfolk, Virginia passed on a report of this planning to their coun-
terparts in Washington, DC, which included this message picked up 
from an online discussion:
Be ready to fight. Congress needs to hear glass breaking, doors being 
kicked in, and blood from their BLM and Pantifa slave soldiers being 
spilled. Get violent. Stop calling this a march, or rally, or a protest. 
Go there ready for war. We get our President or we die. NOTHING 
else will achieve this goal.
In the aftermath of the attack, the authorities arrested members of the 
Oath Keepers, an anti-government militia movement, who organized a 
group of well-trained insurrectionists, devised plans to make “citizens’ 
arrests” of members of Congress, and coordinated their actions during 
the assault on the Capitol building.8
Cole, Nazarro, and many of the January 6 insurrectionists are ardent 
white nationalists. They are equally fervent internationalists. This is 
not a contradiction. The Nazis, after all, also developed their own 
peculiar version of internationalism.
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In the 1920s and 1930s, the Nazis defined racial purity in transna-
tional terms—not German, but Aryan. To create their ideology, they 
drew on Norse mythology, Hindu symbolism, and U.S. race theories.9 
Indeed, racism trumped nationality. Some ardent German nationalists 
who failed to meet Nazi standards of racial purity, particularly those of 
Jewish descent, occupied a much lower status in Hitler’s Germany than 
those of Scandinavian stock. Even Han Chinese and Japanese, whom 
the Nazis designated “honorary Aryans,” ranked higher than German 
Jews or Roma.
For all their talk of Germany First and the need for an extended 
realm (lebensraum) for the German people, the Nazis were in fact glo-
balists who forged close international ties with fascists in Italy and 
Spain as well as imperial royalists in Japan. Hitler went so far as to 
imagine that he could bring the entire Muslim world onto his side in 
his war against Jews and liberals. The Nazis recruited Muslim soldiers, 
allied with religious leaders to issue pro-Nazi fatwas, and even dissem-
inated the notion that Hitler was the long-expected “twelfth imam.”10
These attempts to woo Muslims, which were ultimately unsuccess-
ful, didn’t prevent Nazis from making overtures to Hindus as well. 
The radical Hindutva movement in India in turn looked to Hitler 
for inspiration. M.S. Golwalkar, a leader of the extremist Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) movement, wrote in a 1939 book, “Germany 
shocked the world by her purging the country of the Semitic Races—
the Jews … a good lesson for us in Hindustan for us to learn and profit 
by.” Another far-right leader, Bal Thackeray, told Time magazine in 
1993, “If you take Mein Kampf and if you remove the word ‘Jew’ and 
put in the word ‘Muslim,’ that is what I believe in.”11 Thanks to Savitri 
Devi, a European neo-Nazi convert to Hinduism, some neo-Nazis 
even believe that Hitler is an avatar of Vishnu.12
In the 1960s, George Lincoln Rockwell, the founder of the American 
Nazi Party, translated this particular brand of Nazi internationalism 
into the American context. Aryan supremacy became, simply, white 
supremacy. Rockwell and other neo-Nazis, “always viewed their chal-
lenge as uniting white people in white countries around the cause of 
recovering, from their perspectives, their ethno-states,” notes Heidi 
Beirich of the Global Project Against Hate and Extremism. Internation-
alism, the neo-Nazis demonstrated, need not be an inclusive project.
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Rockwell was joined in this project by William Luther Pierce—the 
author of The Turner Diaries, a touchstone text for extremists—who 
established ties with the far right in Germany and Greece. Others 
in the movement promoted cross-border relations as well. “It’s hard 
to understand the mythology of transnationalism within the white 
nationalist movement without going back to Francis Parker Yockey 
and Willis Carto—both now deceased but two highly influential white 
nationalists in the United States,” points out Eric Ward of the Western 
States Center. 
Yockey developed the idea of a far-right alliance between Russia and 
the United States that was then developed by folks like David Duke 
who toured Eastern Europe extensively. Willis Carto held interna-
tional gatherings around Holocaust denial and promoted far-right 
internationalism in the pages of Spotlight, the weekly flagship of the 
white nationalist movement from the 1970s through the 1990s.
In the days before the internet, this transnationalism of white suprem-
acy spread through books, magazines, and even music. Resistance 
Records sold white power music to neo-Nazis in North America and 
Europe, Ward points out, generating as much as a million dollars a 
year in sales.13
Today, thanks to the internationalism of their philosophy, neo-Nazis 
can be found in otherwise unlikely geographic locales. They show up 
at Poland’s Independence Day, in Ukrainian military forces, and at the 
fringes of Russian politics, even though the Nazis considered Slavs 
to be subhuman. “When the Central America migrant crisis began,” 
reports Manuel Perez-Rocha of the Institute for Policy Studies, “there 
were some small rallies of self-described neo-Nazis in central Mexico.” 
The Malay heavy metal group, Boot Axe, subscribes to neo-Nazi 
ideology in its support of a “pure” Malay race,14 and there are enough 
bands of similar persuasion to put together a festival in Malaysia.15
Given its frequent recourse to nationalist rhetoric, the new right 
often presents as nationalist. Its appeals to race or ideology, however, 
facilitates transnational solidarity. “One of the biggest misconceptions 
of the American left and left-of-center movements in Europe as well 
is the tendency to think of the far right as a nationalist movement,” 
says Melissa Ryan, the editor of the Ctrl Alt-Right Delete newsletter. 
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“It’s actually the opposite. They operate internationally. They share 
best practices; they share funding streams. They’re internationalists 
claiming to be nationalists.”
the great replacement
The innovation of the new right has been to find a vehicle for white 
supremacy that can appeal to mainstream voters who would otherwise 
be uncomfortable with direct references to Hitler or neo-Nazism. This 
vehicle is a powerful new transnational narrative: the “great replace-
ment” of white people by non-white people.
At first glance, the man who came up with the idea of the “great 
replacement” might not seem your usual suspect. Renaud Camus was 
a radical student demonstrator in Paris in 1968 and in 1981 voted for 
socialist Francois Mitterrand as president of France.16 A noted poet 
and novelist, Camus published books on his gay identity that attracted 
accolades from the likes of intellectual Roland Barthes and poet Allen 
Ginsberg.17 By the early 2000s, however, Camus had begun to outline 
a new philosophy that distinguished between “faux” or false French 
(immigrants or their children) and real French (those who had lived 
in the country for many generations).18 In 2010, he published a book 
entitled Le Grand Replacement bemoaning the prospects of a France 
and Europe transformed by immigration.
Camus’s work became the foundational text for a growing movement 
called Generation Identity, an updated version of white nationalism 
that has spread throughout Europe, influenced the alt-right in the 
United States, gained momentum on the internet, and become a global 
phenomenon out of all proportion to the relatively small number of 
actual adherents. The “identitarians” embraced Renaud Camus and 
spread his ideas in a virtual echo chamber. The philosophy of the great 
replacement has inspired violent extremists as well, showing up in the 
manifestos of mass shooters in Christchurch, New Zealand, in March 
2019, and El Paso, Texas, in August 2019.
The great replacement doctrine is not just about keeping out immi-
grants but, through a policy of “remigration,” expelling ones already 
in place. The platform of the German far-right party, Alternative für 
Deutschland (AfD), for instance, reads: “Germany and Europe must 
put in place remigration programs on the largest possible scale.”19 
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France’s National Rally and Austria’s Freedom Party also reportedly 
back remigration, as do various identitarian groups and small far-right 
parties in Europe.20
Although white nationalists use the phrase “great replacement” in 
its explicitly racist meaning, more cautious conservatives transpose the 
phrase into the cultural context of a “civilization” under threat. This 
reformulation strikes a chord in Europe where conservative politicians 
frequently lament the erosion of “Western civilization” at the hands 
of multiculturalists. Thilo Sarrazin, the former German social-demo-
cratic politician, published an explosive bestseller in 2010—Germany 
Abolishes Itself—that translated the great replacement ideology into 
cultural terms that appealed to a broad audience. In the place of mul-
ticulturalism, the new right proposes “ethnopluralism” and “diversity 
in isolation”—maintaining cultural walls between different ethnic 
groups—as an alternative to the European Union’s official motto of 
“united in diversity.”21 Thus, they turn identity politics on its head, 
asserting a “positive” identity for a privileged majority to counter the 
demands of minority communities for equal access and opportunity.
The cultural versions of the great replacement have significant 
appeal in the United States as well. Even after the election of Donald 
Trump as president in 2016, for instance, support for the alt-right 
remained relatively low: about 6 percent, according to a Reuters/Ipsos 
poll in 2017. But the message that the majority is under threat has 
broader political appeal. In the same 2017 poll, 39 percent of Ameri-
cans agreed with the statement that “white people are currently under 
attack in this country.”22 In a 2019 poll, a roughly equivalent number 
believed that “immigrants are invading our country and replacing our 
cultural and ethnic background.”23 This percentage corresponds to the 
number of people who constitute Trump’s base of unwavering sup-
porters and who continue to voice approval of him despite his refusal 
to concede the 2020 election.24
Anti-immigrant ideas have long circulated across borders. “The pro-
motion of The Camp of the Saints—the French xenophobic and racist 
novel that first mainstreamed the replacement theory that everyone 
is talking about—was highly promoted and distributed by Social 
Contract Press” in the United States, explains Eric Ward. “Through 
that kind of work, the idea of a Fortress America is built off what the 
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new right was doing in Europe based on Fortress Europe—the idea of 
stopping all undocumented migration into the U.S.”
This “Fortress” concept has spread even further. Far-right Hindu 
nationalists aim to create a Fortress India that expels all undocumented 
Muslims, including those who have lived in the country their whole 
lives.25 Several moves by the Modi government—a National Register of 
Citizens that left 1.9 million mostly Muslim Indians stateless, followed 
by the Citizenship Amendment Act that fast-tracked citizenship for 
many undocumented migrants except Muslims—suggest that the 
prime minister is heading inexorably in that direction.26 Impressed 
by this state-led Islamophobia, far-right activists and politicians in 
several countries have reached out to Hindu nationalists and lavished 
praise on Modi.27
Similarly, Benjamin Netanyahu pushed through a new citizen-
ship law in Israel that effectively formalized second-class status for 
non-Jewish Israelis, saying that only Jews could exercise the right of 
self-determination and establishing Hebrew as the official language of 
the country. Bolsonaro is building a kind of “Fortress Brazil” by por-
traying refugees as a threat and calling them “scum of the earth.”28 
In Myanmar, the expulsion of the predominantly Muslim Rohingya 
minority reinforced the government’s efforts to create a more homog-
enously Buddhist country.
In the 1920s, the American far right attracted adherents by blaming 
all the ills of the nation on “degenerate races,” an argument that united 
incipient fascists with conservatives like Calvin Coolidge.29 With the 
great replacement narrative, this disturbing history of political consol-
idation on the right is repeating itself. “The demographic replacement 
is a similar master frame that can unite both clear extremists and con-
servatives who might be worried about demographic change,” warns 
Matthew Feldman of CARR. “Once you add those two together you 
have potential majorities in many countries. They’ve found a winning 
formula. There’s nothing that I’ve seen that comes remotely close to 
countering that formula.”
the focus on europe
Steve Bannon’s organizing focus, when he left the Trump administra-
tion, was Europe. The choice for the American alt-right to look across 
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the Atlantic seemed obvious. The far right in Europe has capitalized 
politically on the refugee crisis aggravated by the wars in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere in the Middle East. It has taken advantage of 
Euroskepticism, the dissatisfaction with the institutions and policies 
of European integration. And it is operating in an explicitly transna-
tional political space that generates opportunities for the new right to 
join hands across borders.
For many years, the European far right directed its ire against the 
European Union but couldn’t prevent their countries from joining the 
regional body. Even after failing to block membership, these fringe 
political actors continued to champion withdrawal.
The victory in 2016 of the Brexit campaign initially provided 
momentum for such Euroskeptics eager to escort their own countries 
out of the EU: Frexit, Czexit, and the like. Nigel Farage, the architect 
of Brexit, became a leading force in the European new right, even as 
his project of pulling the UK out of the EU was initially proving to be 
such a political disaster for his country. In the space of two months in 
2019, while one Brexit plan after another foundered, Farage rebuilt the 
fledging Brexit Party, blitzed the country with a social media campaign, 
and captured 31 percent of the UK vote in the European elections.30 
Farage and his Brexit Party were a mass of contradictions. Here was a 
right-wing party that explicitly rejected the European Union, led by a 
man who had served in the European parliament for two decades, and 
that was, briefly, the largest single party operating in that assembly. 
And Farage, an avowed nationalist, accomplished this feat in part by 
forging a transnational alliance. “He seriously went to school with the 
Five Star Movement in Italy,” reports Larry Rosenthal. “He just backed 
up his truck and asked, ‘How do you do this on-line thing?’ And then 
he reproduced it.”
With the final passage of Brexit legislation at the end of 2019, Farage 
finally bid farewell to the European parliament, where he’d been 
pulling down 100,000 pounds a year for his job as a termite eating 
away the foundations of the house into which he’d been invited.31 “To 
be honest,” he admitted, “we used the wherewithal provided by the 
European parliament to build a UK political movement.”32 Part of his 
time was also spent misspending funds, which forced the EU to dock 
his pay. His departure from the European parliament was of a piece 
with his undistinguished tenure as a parliamentarian. “I’m hoping this 
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begins the end of this project,” he crowed on his last day in the body 
as he waved his little Union Jack. “It’s a bad project, it isn’t just undem-
ocratic, it’s anti-democratic.” The parliament’s vice president, Mairead 
McGuinness, told him to sit down and put away his flag.33
Even before Farage bid farewell to Europe, however, the new right’s 
strategy was changing. The European new right was no longer on 
the outside looking in. It was winning more and more seats in the 
European parliament. As Lorenzo Marsili of European Alternatives in 
Rome points out, 
They gave up attacking the EU and calling for an exit from the Euro 
and leaving the EU. Now the rhetoric is to take it over, to build the 
EU as a space of exclusion with stronger borders and looser fiscal 
policy. They have Europeanized their own rhetoric. They have a 
vision for Europe that’s possibly more worked out than the center 
left or center right.
The new right, in other words, now wants to work its way through 
European institutions. It prefers “voice” rather than “exit,” to use econ-
omist Albert O. Hirschman’s famous formulation.34 “There is quite a 
bit of potential for the better use of the new institutional power that the 
populists have been gaining in municipalities, in regions, in countries, 
and in EU institutions,” Jordi Vaquer adds. “These parties have learned 
some of the games of international cooperation in the EU. They are 
increasingly sharing agendas, conspiracy theories, the media space.”
It has long been a dream of the European far right to create a 
powerful, transnational organization. In 1997, Jean-Marie Le Pen 
created EuroNat, but it attracted mostly fringe groups from Eastern 
Europe. Only in 2015 was Le Pen’s dream realized by his daughter 
Marine, who joined Geert Wilders in launching the parliamen-
tary bloc known as the Europe of Nations and Freedom. Ironically, 
the formation was possible in part because Marine Le Pen had suc-
cessfully maneuvered her father, a polarizing figure even within his 
own party, out of the National Front. Reflecting their new approach 
to working within the EU, the member parties of this bloc prefer to 
call themselves “sovereignist” rather than anti-European. In 2019, the 
bloc doubled in size as a result of the European parliament elections 
and renamed itself the Identity and Democracy Party. Representing 
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nearly 10 percent of the parliament, the bloc encompasses Italy’s Lega, 
France’s National Rally, the German AfD, Austria’s Freedom Party, 
the Finns Party, and several smaller parties. Despite its growing size, 
Identity and Liberty doesn’t even represent the entire European new 
right as it doesn’t include either of Hungary’s far-right parties, Fidesz 
and Jobbik, Poland’s Law and Justice Party (PiS), or Spain’s Vox.
Steve Bannon wasn’t the only political figure to eye the European 
new right as ripe for the influencing. Russia has been even more per-
sistent in its outreach. Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party has signed 
formal agreements with Italy’s Lega and Austria’s Freedom Party. The 
Kremlin has provided some financing for the European far right, either 
directly or through wealthy intermediaries like Konstantin Malofeev.35 
Media outlets like RT and Sputnik amplify certain Russian messages 
for their European audiences. Still, “it’s not like the Fourth Interna-
tional, this time a right-wing one, with a secretariat in Moscow and 
every country has a national chapter,” Jordi Vaquer cautions. “Each of 
these parties has deep national roots, and their overwhelming focus is 
on national politics.”
Putin himself has sounded new right messages about the obsoles-
cence of liberalism, the dangers of immigration and minority rights, 
and the virtues of traditional values.36 Like his new right colleagues in 
Europe, Putin has emphasized the importance of Russian sovereignty 
above all, for instance, asserting in a 2020 amendment that the Russian 
constitution takes precedence over international law. Burnishing his 
reputation as a Russian nationalist, and obscuring his career origins 
as a Soviet apparatchik, he has fought for the rights of ethnic Russians 
in the near abroad and pushed back against NATO encroachment on 
his borders. His embrace of nationalism also coincides with souring 
engagement with the United States. “But in terms of rhetoric, Putin 
is not really a populist,” explains Ilya Matveev. “Populism means this 
rhetoric of ‘common people’ versus the elite. Putin never attacks the 
elite in Russia. It is his own elite. He is a nationalist, not a populist. His 
rhetoric is about Russia as a nation versus other countries like the U.S. 
or the West in general.”
Putin is not even opposed to the global elite. 
“This type of rhetoric is quite instrumental,” adds Ilya Budraitskis, a 
Moscow-based political theorist. 
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It doesn’t mean that Putin has any clear long-term strategy to 
become a true leader of a new uprising against the liberal elites, that 
he really wants to become a leader of a right-wing populist inter-
national. He uses this kind of rhetoric as an element of a game for 
recognition that he’s playing with the Western elite. He wants to 
become a full member of the international elite that he was expelled 
from after the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
As much as he can, however, Putin is committed to changing the ideo-
logical composition of this elite by supporting anti-liberal political 
forces throughout the world, whether on the right or the left.
Hungary, too, aspires to be a hub of coordination for the European 
new right. A number of extremists, like Swedish far-right business-
man Daniel Friberg and his identitarian publishing house Arktos, have 
made their home in Budapest.37 The Hungarian government wants to 
be “a leading force within the EU of the sovereignist versus the fed-
eralist camp,” Márta Pardavi of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee 
in Budapest says. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, in office since 2010, 
has frequently criticized liberals and liberal internationalism, and 
assailed the European Union for making “grave mistakes” on migra-
tion and economic policies.38 His party’s departure from European 
norms has pushed the EU to censure Hungary, the right-of-center 
European People’s Party to suspend Fidesz’s membership in the bloc, 
and Freedom House to revoke the country’s democratic status in 2020.
Orbán doesn’t seem to care. His critiques of the EU are greeted 
with enthusiasm by other sovereignist parties. Meanwhile, Orbán is 
building a transnational power basis in southeast Europe. “His polit-
ical and business associates are buying media in Macedonia and 
Slovenia,” Jordi Vaquer observes. 
Orbán was the first European leader to welcome Milorad Dodik, the 
separatist leader from Republika Srpska who is now a member of 
the Bosnian presidency. He is close to the increasingly authoritarian 
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. He is hosting in Hungary the 
fugitive former Macedonian premier Nikola Gruevski, sentenced to 
two years in prison for corruption.
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At the paramilitary level, Ukraine, too, has had an influence on the 
new right. The conflict in eastern Ukraine has served as a training 
ground for white supremacists and neo-Nazis from around the world 
who flocked to openly fascist units like the Azov Battalion. These 
foreign fighters have returned (or attempted to return) to their home 
countries to apply what they’ve learned. The Ukrainian government, 
for instance, arrested a member of the French far right fighting in the 
country who was plotting to attack several targets in France, includ-
ing a synagogue and a mosque.39 Former fighters from Italy smuggled 
into their country an air-to-air missile, rocket launchers, and machine 
guns, which the Italian authorities confiscated in a raid.40 In Septem-
ber 2019, the FBI arrested a U.S. soldier in Kansas who planned to 
attack CNN. He’d been mentored by two American GIs who’d fought 
with a far-right Ukrainian paramilitary group.41
The European new right has done its share of exporting its ideas to 
like-minded groups in more distant countries that it considers outposts 
of European civilization. “The far right in Australia has been bringing 
in speakers from the far right globally,” reports Phil Ireland, the chair 
of GetUp in Australia. “Nigel Farage is a darling of theirs. I understand 
that there have been interactions with Steve Bannon. Geert Wilders 
from the Netherlands has also been brought out to Australia.”
A more complicated relationship connects the European far 
right with Israel. Neo-Nazi organizations for the most part want 
nothing to do with the country. But new right parties in Europe, like 
Austria’s Freedom Party, have reached out to Israel, with party leader 
Heinz-Christian Strache visiting Israel in 2016.42 Such connections 
“allow these parties in Europe to say that they’re not anti-Semites 
because people see that they are working with Jews and supporting 
Israel,” explains Ran Cohen of the Israeli Democratic Bloc. “It also 
allows them to exchange their anti-Semitism for Islamophobia in a 
very smooth way.”
Israel has become a beacon for transnational right-wing activism in 
another way. “If you want to talk about refugees, you have to under-
stand Israel and Palestine,” explains Khury Petersen-Smith of IPS. “In 
the late 1990s, early 2000s, Israel said, ‘We should just build a wall 
to keep out Palestinians.’ At the time, it was out of bounds of what’s 
acceptable in the international community. But Israel said, ‘Well, 
we’re doing it.’ And now there are a lot of walls.” Trump has frequently 
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compared his proposed wall at the Mexican border to Israeli walls: “Do 
walls work?” he asked rhetorically in February 2017. “Just ask Israel. 
They work.”43 Trump administration officials have visited Israel to 
examine how Israel builds its walls.44 In addition, Israeli firms have 
won contracts to supply technology at the U.S.–Mexico border.45 And 
the Israeli government has also sent troops to Honduras to train the 
border patrol there.46
cleavages on the right
It’s hard to imagine that nationalists all trying to make their countries 
“great again” could find much common ground. Populist right-wing 
governments can indeed all agree that their governments have exclu-
sive and sovereign control within their borders. In practice, however, 
they have clashed over territory and trade. Differences in religion, 
ethnicity, and historical memory also divide the new right. Only a 
common threat—global institutions, immigrants, minority rights—
provides coalitional cohesion across borders.
“At a time of deep nationalism, it’s actually hard to get nationalists 
to agree on anything,” observes Eric Ward. “That’s why Yockey, Carto, 
and Pierce really pushed the idea of white identity. The European far 
right doesn’t really coalesce until the identitaire movement takes off.”
Despite ideological agreement about the identitarians’ great 
replacement theory, the European far right is not on the same page 
on all issues, for instance, financial flows within the European Union. 
“Salvini is arguing for spending more money for Italy,” points out 
Alex Demirovic, a senior scholar at the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung 
in Germany. “But the German right-wing populists were founded 
on a criticism of the Euro policies and the European central bank 
policies after the crisis, so they are totally against any support for other 
European countries.” The European new right in creditor countries 
like France and Germany has made a habit of criticizing the enormous 
monetary contributions their countries have made to the European 
Union budget. But the new right government in Poland, the largest 
recipient of Euro funds, does not sing in that particular chorus.
Russia is another divisive issue. Although a couple of far-right 
parties have signed association agreements with Putin’s United Russia 
party, PiS in Poland hasn’t followed suit. The head of PiS, Jarosław 
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Kaczyński, “would never say that he’s an ally of Vladimir Putin,” points 
out Bartosz Rydliński, a professor of political science in Warsaw. 
A lot of PiS supporters still think Russia is responsible for the crash 
in Smolensk in 2010 [which killed Kaczyński’s brother, President 
Lech Kaczyński, and much of his cabinet]. Also, in 2008 when Russia 
invaded Georgia, Lech Kaczyński went to Tbilisi with the presidents 
of Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, and other Central European coun-
tries to show solidarity with Mikheil Saakashvili. Kaczyński said, 
“Today, Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine, the next day the Baltics. And 
there might come a day when Poland faces a similar threat.”
Although Bolsonaro and Orbán share a distaste for the LGBTQ 
movement, other far-right leaders like Geert Wilders have embraced 
same-sex marriage and decried Islamists for opposing gay rights.47 
Similarly, some elements of the far right are old school sexist, while 
others have updated their ideology to acknowledge women leaders like 
Alice Weidel of the Alternative für Deutschland and Pia Kjærsgaard 
of the Danish People’s Party. In a perverse way, the anti-immigrant 
agenda has absorbed feminism. As Birgit Sauer points out, the more 
modern new right argues that “Western countries are gender equal 
while most of the migrants have traditional patriarchal gender rela-
tions.” Some elements of the European far right have begun to support 
stronger measures to protect the environment—in part out of concerns 
that rising waters will produce more migrants—and craft a new kind of 
Green fascism.48 Both Bolsonaro and Trump, however, remain firmly 
aligned with the fossil-fuel industry.
Racism and intolerance are also stumbling blocks for building a 
global new right. Nationalists tend to disparage minority rights unless 
the minority happens to be their ethnic brethren in another country. 
The Austrian far right sticks up for ethnic Germans in northern Italy, 
while the Italian far right pushes back against any mention of dual cit-
izenship for the German minority.49 In a world of rapidly changing 
demographics, meanwhile, white nationalism can only forge a wider 
consensus by redefining “white,” much as the Irish and Italians became 
white in the United States in the nineteenth century and the Nazis 
expanded their definition of Aryan. Thus, the new right struggles over 
the acceptability of Jews in their movement: many white supremacists 
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adhere to their historic anti-Semitism while the alt-right has opened its 
ranks to people of Jewish background, like top Trump advisor Stephen 
Miller.50 Similarly, a number of prominent alt-right men in the United 
States have dated or married women of Asian descent51—echoing the 
racist sentiment that some Asians are “honorary whites”—and even 
white supremacist Dylann Roof wrote that “East Asian races … are by 
nature very racist and could be great allies of the White race.”52
civil society on the right
Transnational activism is not limited to politicians and political parties 
of the new right. As the internationalism of the neo-Nazis demon-
strated, extremist civil society organizations have long been creating 
connections across borders. “The world of social conservatives in 
the United States is intensely involved internationally in every single 
place, pushing anti-LGBT and anti-abortion thinking,” explains Heidi 
Beirich, formerly of the Southern Poverty Law Center. “They are very 
cognizant of the need to go beyond the nation-state to push their 
issues. You’d think that the most parochial movement, Christian con-
servatives in the U.S., wouldn’t think that way. But they think bigger 
than we do.”
The new right civil society has largely focused on pushing back 
against the human rights demands of minority populations: the 
LGBTQ community, people of color (in predominantly white coun-
tries), and Muslims (in majority Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, and 
Jewish countries). Such organizations challenge the social gains of 
progressives “from below” even as new right politicians attempt to 
deconstruct the progressive aspects of the administrative state from 
above. This “inside–outside” strategy recalls the very same successful 
civil rights campaigns that the new right is now trying to roll back.
The World Congress of Families (WCF), founded in 1997, promotes 
its religious-nationalist agenda through regular global gatherings. 
“Their convenings have increasingly been a site for cross-fertilization 
across political and religious movements, mostly within Christian-
ity but also other faith traditions,” reports Tarso Ramos of Political 
Research Associates. One year after meeting in Budapest in 2017, the 
WCF congratulated Viktor Orbán on his electoral victory: 
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your victory is also a beam of hope for Western Christian Civiliza-
tion. Many nations in Europe have grown weary and seek little more 
than a childless decline and ultimate disappearance. In contrast, 
you have mobilized the Hungarian people toward rebuilding a 
family-centered, religiously grounded nation, as a contribution 
to the renewal of all Europe and the recovery of an authentic 
Christendom.53 
Christian fundamentalists in the United States have poured $50 
million in dark money contributions to a number of WCF partners 
in Europe.54
Another recipient of that funding, Alliance Defending Freedom 
International, has launched court cases in more than 50 countries 
against same-sex marriage and abortion.55 With 3,200 affiliated 
lawyers and special consultative status at the United Nations, ADFI is 
the international wing of a combative Christian fundamentalist orga-
nization in the United States that has been involved in key legal cases, 
including defending the Christian baker in Colorado who refused to 
make a cake for a same-sex couple.56 In Europe, the organization has 
worried about the impact of Islamophobia—not on Muslims but Chris-
tians. “Governments are using the Islam problem to also reduce the 
freedom of Christians within Europe,” explains Roger Kiska, ADFI’s 
senior counsel. “They will say we need to limit freedom of expression 
or freedom of religion because of Islamic terrorism, because of Islamic 
fundamentalism, and they have been using that also to cut back on the 
right of Christians to express themselves in the public square.”57
The global right-wing petition organization CitizenGo, based in 
Spain, specializes in online activism among ultra-conservatives and 
thinks of itself as a right-wing version of the liberal MoveOn. It made 
its name by gathering nearly 1.9 million signatures for a Council of 
Europe petition against late-term abortion, the largest number of sig-
natures for a citizens’ initiative of that type in Europe.58 CitizenGo 
has also promoted its anti-transsexual messages on buses around the 
world.59
Throughout Eastern Europe but also in some Western European 
countries, the Roma minority has been a particular target of far-
right hostility. “The right wing and extremists always need to have an 
enemy: one day it can be Roma, another day it will be another group,” 
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explains Zeljko Jovanovic of the Open Society Roma Initiatives Office 
in Berlin. “Usually the most under-represented groups with the least 
political power to strike back are those who are attacked, minority 
groups in particular.” Also responsible, he adds, are groups from the 
center left and center right that fail to see that the attacks on Roma rep-
resent a danger for democracy in general.
Given the dominant narrative of the great replacement within the 
new right, immigration has served as a major networking opportunity 
for civil society organizations like the Center for Immigration Studies 
and the Federation for American Immigration Reform. The Swedish 
Democrats, originally formed by neo-Nazis, have received a warm 
welcome from the U.S. new right, and Russian funding has helped 
spread the party’s anti-immigration misinformation in Sweden.60 
Anti-immigrant organizations organized against the Global Compact 
on Migration, and new right politicians govern in the five countries 
that refused to ratify the compact (United States, Israel, Hungary, 
Poland, and the Czech Republic).
Although the great replacement remains a powerful narrative for 
the far right, a shift is now underway at the level of civil society—
toward climate change. With the Adelphi Institute, German journalist 
Susanne Götze conducted research that determined that “nearly all the 
right-wing parties in Europe are linked to climate deniers.”61 The shift 
could be seen even before the COVID-19 pandemic closed borders. In 
the 2019 European parliament elections, for instance, the right wing 
showcased its new agenda of climate denial.
“Climate change was always a bit of a niche topic that the far right 
focused on, but this time it overtook the topic of migration, which has 
been huge in Europe and featured as the top theme among far-right 
activists for last few years,” reports Julia Ebner of the Institute for Stra-
tegic Dialogue (ISD). “Now for the first time it has completely shifted 
toward a focus on climate change. There were also smear campaigns 
against Greta Thunberg as the face for pro-environmentalism. This 
strategy of putting a face on the topic was the same thing they did to 
George Soros on the migration topic.”
For this new campaign of climate-change denialism, civil society 
organizations of the new right found a face for their side: Naomi Seibt. 
The 19-year-old climate skeptic from Germany hit the headlines in 
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2020 thanks to her sponsor, the Heartland Institute, a climate-denial 
thinktank based in the United States with strong links to Europe. Seibt 
has connections to the youth chapter of the Alternative für Deutsch-
land, and her mother has done legal work for the party.62 Although 
she has been coy about her political affiliations, the teenager has been 
quite clear in linking the older and newer preoccupations of the new 
right: “I’ve always been skeptical of the ideas of white nationalism, of 
identitarianism and white identity,” she told a reporter. “However, I 
am an empiricist, and I could not help but notice that I could have 
peaceful, free, easy, civilized, and safe discussions in what is essentially 
an all-white country.”63 It was an indirect way of suggesting that mul-
ticultural countries are full of strife and danger, that they are not free, 
and that they are not civilized—all classic racist tropes. After her short 
tenure in the media spotlight, Seibt has attempted to maintain her 
notoriety by abandoning her empiricism and embracing the QAnon 
conspiracy theory.64
Civil society organizations are also active in the diaspora, where 
they funnel money back to right-wing parties and politicians back 
home. “In the case of the Philippines for instance, many of the Filipi-
nos who support Trump in the United States also support [Philippine 
President Rodrigo] Duterte,” says Walden Bello. A global network of 
Diehard Duterte Supporters (DDS) holds meetings in various coun-
tries and aggressively criticize Duterte opponents on the internet.65 
The often-violent rhetoric becomes even more ominous for those who 
recognize that DDS also stands for Davao Death Squad, the paramili-
taries linked to Duterte when he was mayor of Davao City.
The 28-million strong Indian diaspora is a key constituency for 
Modi’s BJP—and a source of fundraising as well.66 Donald Trump’s 
appearance at a Modi rally in Houston in mid-September 2019 under-
scores the importance of diaspora politics in the electoral imagination 
of both leaders.67 Right-wing Jewish donors in the United States 
provide financing for the non-profits, political parties, and settlement 
activities of Israeli extremists.68 Meanwhile, the diaspora can also be 
a source of support for the far right’s push for regime change abroad, 
as is the case with a group of Chinese living in America who translate 
Trump’s tweets into Chinese in the hopes of undermining the Com-
munist Party in Beijing.69
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digital organizing
The far right has proven to be not only early adopters when it comes to 
digital technology, but adept at constructing its own alternative plat-
forms when barred from access to mainstream outlets.
“Stormfront went up on the Web in 1995, and that was the first place 
where all of the sudden you had global thinking around white suprem-
acy,” says Heidi Beirich. 
More recently, they’ve been able to forge the bonds of white pride 
worldwide, and the Web just made it easier. So, now you can have 
American white supremacists funding identitarians in places like 
Italy and Austria to fund a boat to go out and round up immigrants. 
This coordination factor didn’t use to exist.
The far right early on realized the potential of the internet. Established 
in 1984, Liberty Net was the first message board to link white nation-
alists for the purposes of planning and recruitment. Its creator, Aryan 
Nations activist Louis Beam, was able to use the network to get around 
border controls to send hate literature to other countries.70 Later, when 
the World Wide Web debuted in 1989, the far right quickly under-
stood the key to viral content, which was to harness what Atlantic 
writer Derek Thompson calls “the natural tendency of web content to 
veer toward high-arousal emotions, such as outrage and paranoia, to 
attract attention and promote social sharing.”71 The far right used new 
platforms like the website Infowars (started in 1999) and the Breitbart 
network (2007) to spread their ideologies through memes and con-
spiracy theories.
The bulletin board 4chan, set up in 2003, fed the preoccupations 
of a young, mostly male generation of “Anons” devoted to ridicul-
ing “normies” just for laughs, as they did when they mounted digital 
attacks on Tom Cruise and the Church of Scientology. Those preoc-
cupations became explicitly political in the 2010s as the Anons veered 
to the far right by going after women and feminists, particularly in 
the Gamergate affair, which boiled down to an opportunity for misog-
ynists to spread hate against women and feminists in the gaming 
community. The banning of discussion about Gamergate in 4chan led 
to the creation of 8chan and a more serious fusion of far-right politics 
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with the counter-cultural spirit of the early digital jesters. Coordinated 
attacks on Scientology gave way to the birther movement—which 
questioned Barack Obama’s U.S. citizenship—and conspiracy theories 
involving a child pornography ring in the basement of the Comet Ping 
Pong pizzeria in Washington, DC (which derived from something as 
incidental as the initials “CP” that link the two).72 The “alt-lite” com-
munity of disaffected young men began to merge with the alt-right.73
In the Trump era, 4Chan produced perhaps the wildest right-wing 
conspiracy theory of all: QAnon. Even though the Comet Ping Pong 
charge was baseless, an anonymous 4Chan poster took this nonsense 
to another level by alleging in October 2017 that Hollywood actors 
and liberal politicians were part of an international child trafficking 
network, and that these Satan-worshiping pedophiles in fact run the 
world. As in some superhero action film, only Donald Trump and 
his allies could save the day.74 It would be easy to dismiss QAnon 
as truly beyond the fringe except that some Republican politicians 
actually believe in it. Marjorie Taylor Greene, a new Republican 
member of Congress from Georgia, described QAnon as “a once-in-
a-lifetime opportunity to take this global cabal of Satan-worshiping 
pedophiles out.”75
The new right’s digital activism is not confined to conspiracy 
theories and lame jokes. “There’s absolutely evidence that the far right 
has found ways to create compelling content,” Ethan Zuckerman adds. 
“A lot of that content is in plain sight. Their most powerful tool is 
exploiting YouTube’s recommendation algorithm. If you spend enough 
time on a topic, you tend to go down these rabbit holes of extremism.” 
Canada’s Jordan Peterson, for instance, might seem like just another 
self-help guru. But if you start watching his videos on YouTube, his 
references to race, masculinity, or incel culture (involuntary celibates) 
could very well lead you to more extreme content, thanks to YouTube’s 
suggested links.76
Even when the far right is “deplatformed”—which removes pro-
moters of hate speech from mainstream social media like Twitter or 
Reddit—it continues to distribute its content through 8chan (now 
8kun), the chat app Discord, the Twitter substitute Parler, or platforms 
like Gab, which has attracted nearly a million registered users with 
its extremist content, alt-right celebrity posters, and sophisticated user 
interface.77 Live-streaming extreme content through sites like Twitch, 
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whether it’s a Trump rally or a gunman killing two people outside 
a synagogue in Halle in October 2019, provides the far right nearly 
unfettered access to a global audience.78
“These movements are not necessarily transnational in the sense 
of someone in a castle in Austria leading the movements of all the 
neo-Nazis,” Zuckerman continues. Rather, they are transnational in 
their storytelling. “These movements are always trying to get you to 
reject standard narratives and believe that there’s a suppressed narra-
tive out there, and that once you unlock that suppressed narrative, you 
will understand the secret truth of the world.” That’s where Bannon 
and Breitbart come in: to upcycle alternative narratives, like the great 
replacement, into the mainstream.
These transnational connections form a three-way collaboration. 
“On the one hand you have extreme right groups trying to push their 
narrative, dictate the political agenda, and also dictate what’s reported 
in the news,” Julia Ebner explains. 
These are often coordinated campaigns involving troll armies and 
social media fake accounts. The second part of the triangle is the 
alternative media outlets: a whole new empire of alternative blogs 
and hyper-biased information that the far right has built across 
Europe in different languages and often linked to American media 
outlets like Breitbart or Rebel Media in Canada. Once the disin-
formation spreads across one platform it spreads across the other 
platforms, so it’s hyper-networked in this sense. The third part of 
the triangle are the far-right populist parties.
These parties benefit from these campaigns, share the biased articles, 
and piggyback on the hashtags within an extremist echo chamber. At 
times, far-right activists launch unbranded social media campaigns in 
which they try to obscure their fingerprints to give an appearance of 
neutrality, much as Russian trolls tried to influence the U.S. presiden-
tial election in 2016 through a set of fake Facebook avatars and groups.
This sharing takes place most visibly across the Atlantic. But 
traces can even be found in China. For instance, the Chinese website 
Zhihu sponsored a “Q&A” after the New Zealand mosque attack in 
2019. “A lot of people cheered for [the attack] and expressed support 
for the shooter,” researcher Chenchen Zhang says. “Those were top 
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voted comments.” Although the website ultimately removed those 
comments, other racist and Islamophobic content remains uncensored 
in China because, from the point of view of the government, it high-
lights the failures of Western liberalism and shows the strength of the 
Chinese system.79
The new right expected that digital organizing would serve as the 
prelude to real-world action: demonstrations, political mobilizations, 
policy implementation. After the failure to spark mass mobilizations 
at the time of the Charlottesville Unite the Right gathering in 2017, 
however, a certain disconnect appeared between the most extreme 
exhortations online and the capacity to rally boots on the ground.80 
While digital organizing retained its centrality in new right thinking, 
other methods of influencing the mainstream acquired greater 
salience.
Moreover, other opportunities presented themselves for the new 
right’s global organizing—such as the coronavirus pandemic of 2020.
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The new right’s pandemic pivot
Not long after the outbreak of the coronavirus in Europe in early 2020, 
the former liberal and current prime minister of Hungary Viktor 
Orbán quickly displayed his skills as a political opportunist. As cases 
started to multiply in nearby Italy, Orbán moved to take advantage of 
the crisis to advance his own political agenda. Since becoming prime 
minister for the second time in 2010, he’d been steadily remaking 
Hungary, a small Central European nation with a population of 10 
million, into a more homogenous, more illiberal, and more vertically 
organized country. He’d defied the European Union on several occa-
sions, all in the interests of bolstering his authority within the borders 
of his country.
From the beginning of his tenure, Orbán has been fixated on keeping 
immigrants out of Hungary. He has built walls along the country’s 
southern borders with Serbia and Croatia and illegally held asylum 
seekers in legal limbo.1 He has refused to accept his country’s quota 
of the 160,000 refugees that the European Union agreed to resettle 
throughout the region—because, he said, he wanted “to keep Europe 
Christian.”2 He even made it a crime for organizations within Hungary 
to advocate on behalf of undocumented immigrants and refugees.3
It was no surprise, then, that on March 1, 2020, Orbán’s chief advisor 
on domestic safety announced that Hungary would no longer accept 
refugees into transit camps along the Serbian border because “there 
is a certain connection between the coronavirus epidemic and illegal 
migration.”4 Later that month, Orbán would echo that sentiment when 
he said that “we are fighting a two-front war. One front is called migra-
tion and the other one belongs to the coronavirus. There is a logical 
connection between the two as both spread with movement.”5
Further anti-immigration measures during the coronavirus crisis 
became unnecessary as Hungary effectively walled itself off and the 
EU closed its external borders. But Orbán wanted to put the pandemic 
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to even greater uses. At the end of March, with the help of the super-
majority his party enjoys in the Hungarian parliament, he pushed 
through an “enabling act” that gave him nearly unlimited power to 
rule by decree for an unlimited period of time. The act provided 
Orbán with new tools to attack his critics. Spreading “false informa-
tion” about the coronavirus, for instance, became punishable by up to 
five years in prison. This measure “is nearly indistinguishable from a 
similar measure in Saudi Arabia,” writes long-time Hungarian activist 
Laszlo Bruszt. “In effect, the enabling act minimises the remaining 
room for Hungary’s independent media.”6
Orbán was determined to permanently weaken an already margin-
alized political opposition. “In the two weeks since the law passed,” 
writes Zack Beauchamp in Vox, Orbán “has seized funding provided 
to opposing political parties for their campaigns and re-appropri-
ated it in the name of stimulus. He has taken advantage of the loss in 
coronavirus advertising revenue to buy up one of the few remaining 
independent media outlets in Hungary.”7 With his disgust for inde-
pendent journalism exceeded only by his dislike of minorities, Orbán 
has also pushed through legislation withdrawing gender recognition 
of trans citizens and banning same-sex adoption. Freedom House’s 
decision, in its 2020 report, to label Hungary as “not free” put addi-
tional pressure on the European Union to act against a member that 
had clearly departed from the rules and conditions of membership.8
The terrible irony of the enabling act was its irrelevance given the 
supermajority that Orbán’s party enjoyed in parliament. When faced 
with judicial opposition to one policy or another, he has used that 
supermajority to amend the constitution—eight times by 2020. During 
his decade of rule, he has declared Hungary an “illiberal state,” kicked 
out the Central European University, and worked behind the scenes to 
close the major independent daily newspaper, Népszabadság.9 “With 
the exception of a short period after a by-election in 2015,” writes his-
torian Eva Balogh, “he has ruled without any domestic constraints for 
the last ten years.”10
Autocrats, however, thrive on self-aggrandizement. Orbán doesn’t 
just want to exercise power through other actors; he wants that power 
to be visibly invested in him as a pseudo-monarch. “Orbán wants to 
show that he is on the winning side, that he’s managing the crisis well,” 
reports Márta Pardavi. Even when he ended the enabling act in June, 
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he retained the right to declare a medical state of emergency at any 
point. “It’s hard to let go of these powers once they have been put in 
place,” she adds.
Orbán’s politics all along have been based on fear: a fear of immi-
grants, a fear of non-Christians and non-heterosexuals, a fear of 
Brussels, a fear of globalists. The coronavirus produced an entirely 
new fear that Orbán could leverage. He was not alone in exploiting the 
coronavirus in this way. The new right—whether the extreme, radical, 
or populist right—similarly thrives on fear. It, too, moved quickly to 
use the coronavirus pandemic, which generated widespread panic, to 
advance its own agenda. All the hallmarks of the far right came into 
play during the COVID-19 crisis. It pushed to close borders. It demon-
ized foreigners and particularly border crossers. It spread a variety of 
conspiracy theories. And where it was in power—Hungary, Israel—it 
moved to increase that power through emergency measures.
On the other hand, the fact that the top four countries where the 
pandemic spread out of control—the United States, Brazil, Russia, and 
India—were governed by right-wing leaders may well set back the new 
right’s cause. COVID-19 has dramatically exposed the sheer incompe-
tence of the new right in many countries, with Donald Trump’s 2020 
electoral loss, for instance, far more a function of his bungling of the 
pandemic response than any of his other failings. Moreover, the scale 
of the COVID-19 threat has put on the table the kind of large-scale 
transformative policies supported by progressive activists that hitherto 
circulated only on the margins.
COVID-19 will inevitably contribute to a transformation of gover-
nance. But it’s still unclear which way the political pendulum will swing.
pandemics and politics
Most diseases require only medical interventions. Epidemics of infec-
tious diseases, as they go global, often require political responses as 
well. As they cross communities and borders, pandemics threaten 
national and global economies, push governments to declare states of 
emergency, and trigger urgent debates over rapid-response resource 
allocation.
A pandemic’s mortality rate alone can have profound political con-
sequences. The Black Death in the fourteenth century created labor 
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shortages in England that eroded the foundations of feudalism, while 
the genocide of indigenous peoples by diseases Europeans brought to 
the New World in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries helped create 
a huge surge in the African slave trade to provide laborers for mining 
and agriculture.11 In the modern era, epidemics have often left in their 
wake profound reorganizations of society. The cholera outbreak in 
London in the 1850s, for instance, focused attention on public health 
and led to the modernization of the city’s sewage system.12
COVID-19’s rapid spread in 2020 starkly revealed the strengths 
and weaknesses of different political systems. China responded to 
the initial outbreak as it would a manifestation of dissent: with cen-
sorship and political containment, followed by a more general social 
quarantine.13 In South Korea and Taiwan, competent and centralized 
democratic leadership—combined with sophisticated technology, the 
means to ramp up national production and distribution of critical 
resources, and a public spirit of compliance—helped contain the 
pandemic without resort to a full social lockdown. The U.S. failure 
to respond in a timely and efficient manner—to devise a national 
strategy or put in place consistent testing, contact tracing, and quaran-
tine mechanisms—revealed how a weak federalism ensures different 
outcomes for different states and populations.
To address COVID-19, even democracies felt the need to suspend 
normal political operations. Over 80 countries declared some kind 
of state of emergency during the pandemic.14 These temporary man-
dates permitted authorities to impose quarantines of individuals, close 
businesses and public gathering spaces, and otherwise ensure physical 
distancing among the population.15 In some cases, this authority has 
extended to the equivalent of wartime requisitioning. Even those lead-
ers who brazenly ignored the pandemic resorted to extreme measures: 
Gurbanguly Berdimukhammedov of Turkmenistan forbade anyone in 
his country from uttering the word “coronavirus.”16 Other undemo-
cratic leaders took advantage of the coronavirus to put greater pressure 
on their favorite targets: immigrants, dissidents, and journalists.17
In liberal and illiberal countries alike, the spread of COVID-19 was 
accompanied by an increase of surveillance, ostensibly to monitor 
compliance with the rules of quarantine and trace the contact trails 
of the infected. Singapore introduced an app, TraceTogether, that 
citizens voluntarily download and that accesses their phones’ Blue-
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tooth data. The government promised not to collect any data 
except phone numbers.18 South Korea gathered information on the 
movement of infected persons via cell phone data, credit card records, 
and closed-circuit television but also shared some of that information 
publicly.19 In a number of countries, authorities used drones to warn 
people to stay at home.
Although much of the data collection and surveillance has been 
consensual—citizens have participated in the system to feel safer—
some countries are engaged in systematic violations of privacy. Israel 
passed legislation allowing its spy agency to use data collected for 
counter-terrorism purposes in the coronavirus fight.20 Thanks to the 
coronavirus, China has refined and ramped up many of its intrusive 
surveillance techniques, from facial-recognition software to smart-
phone apps that restrict travel. More sophisticated bio-surveillance, 
powered by advanced AI, have been put into place at many borders, 
ostensibly to track the potentially infected, but it will be difficult to roll 
back this technology when the pandemic recedes.21
Pandemics can promote greater international cooperation to 
prevent cross-border infection. After the eruption of SARS in 2003, the 
World Health Organization took on greater responsibility to coordi-
nate global responses to pandemics. But especially in the initial panic, 
pandemics often encourage a turn inward as countries close borders. 
In 2020, for instance, the countries that vested the WHO with new 
authority after SARS largely ignored the revised protocols, particu-
larly around notifications and travel restrictions.22 Countries imposed 
follow-the-pandemic travel bans. To deflect attention from his own 
failures to respond adequately to the coronavirus, Donald Trump esca-
lated his attacks on the WHO, withdrawing U.S funding and ultimately 
quitting the organization altogether.
Pandemics have long been associated with the movement of traders 
and soldiers, the agents of globalization. With its critique of globaliza-
tion, the new right has been well positioned to advance its agenda in 
the new COVID-19 era.
opportunity for new right leaders
For some new right leaders, the pandemic was an opportunity to display 
the same kind of denialism that they’d expressed about climate change.
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Donald Trump, for instance, dismissed the novel coronavirus as 
nothing more serious than a seasonal flu, and, as he said in a February 
26 press briefing, “we’ll essentially have a flu shot for this in a fairly 
quick manner.”23 In January and February, he insisted that his admin-
istration had the situation “totally under control.”24 He would later 
claim that he hadn’t received any reason to believe otherwise even 
though the World Health Organization on January 23 released all the 
information about COVID-19 that was necessary to understand its 
potential global impact. Some members of the Trump administration, 
like Health Secretary Alex Azar, tried to push the president to take 
the threat seriously. But others, like Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, 
saw an opportunity in the epidemic gathering force in China. “I think 
it will help accelerate the return of jobs to North America,” Ross told 
the press that January.25
During this critical period, Trump viewed the pandemic as a politi-
cal tool that Democrats and the expert class were using to undermine 
his administration’s policies. Trump supporters rallied around this 
notion that COVID-19 was a hoax to undermine the Trump presi-
dency. On February 24, for instance, Rush Limbaugh told his radio 
audience that “the coronavirus is being weaponized as yet another 
element to bring down Donald Trump. Now, I want to tell you the 
truth about the coronavirus … I’m dead right on this. The coronavi-
rus is the common cold, folks.”26 In mid-March, influential right-wing 
Congressman Devin Nunes (R-Ca) was still dismissing fears of infec-
tion by saying, “it’s a great time to just go out, go to a local restaurant.”27
In all, Trump wasted 70 days before he finally began to take the 
pandemic seriously.28 According to two epidemiologists writing in 
The New York Times, this delay was responsible for 90 percent of U.S. 
deaths.29 Even after finally supporting various quarantine restrictions, 
Trump chafed at the economic losses and supported governors, invari-
ably conservative, who more aggressively pushed for their states to 
reopen, with the predictable result of a resurgence in cases through-
out the country at the beginning of summer 2020 and a much more 
serious upsurge the following November.
For all his initial indifference to COVID-19, however, Trump didn’t 
miss the political opportunity that the pandemic presented to push 
through parts of his cherished economic agenda, like further tax cuts 
and deregulation by fiat.30 He implemented a 60-day moratorium on 
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accepting new immigrants. Despite the huge costs of the stimulus 
packages and the drop in government tax revenues, he pushed forward 
with his plan to build a wall along the border with Mexico and spend 
an additional half a billion dollars painting the structure black.31 
Even after he was voted out of office in November, Trump used his 
lame-duck period to sign a raft of executive orders undermining envi-
ronmental standards, rushing through last-minute appointments, and 
pardoning his cronies.
Jair Bolsonaro largely followed the same script as Trump by down-
playing the risk of the pandemic. On March 15, despite having been 
in close contact with several members of his administration who’d 
already contracted the disease, Bolsonaro joined a demonstration 
of his supporters where he touched a reported 272 people, claiming 
that his own tests came back negative.32 Even as the infection rate was 
climbing dangerously in Brazil, Bolsonaro continued to argue that the 
crisis was little more than a media conspiracy.33 By May, his right-wing 
supporters were calling for the return of military rule and an end to 
the lockdown that state governors had put into place. Bolsonaro, like 
Trump, encouraged his followers to ignore the recommendations of 
policymakers and health experts to maintain a social quarantine, and 
Brazil quickly became the epicenter of the virus in the Global South. 
After firing members of his team for their perceived disloyalty, Bol-
sonaro faced an approval rate of only 33 percent by the end of April.34 
Only a massive payout of benefits to low-income Brazilians prevented 
his popularity from plummeting further. By July, he himself had come 
down with the disease, as Trump would do as well in October.
Boris Johnson, the UK prime minister, also took an exceptionally 
cavalier attitude. “I can tell you I am shaking hands continuously,” he 
told reporters at one point. “I was at a hospital the other night where I 
think there were actually a few coronavirus patients and I shook hands 
with everybody.”35 Then, of course, Johnson became the first world 
leader to contract the disease and nearly died. He changed his view 
of the pandemic accordingly, but not before his country posted the 
highest death toll in Europe.
In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte initially dismissed 
the pandemic as late as mid-March, mocking those who were scared 
of the coronavirus. He moved slowly on travel restrictions and on 
limiting his own personal interactions.36 Then, when the threat 
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became unavoidable, he pivoted to his default position of strongman, 
acquiring emergency powers to address the pandemic. He pushed a 
“shoot to kill” strategy to police what would become one of the world’s 
longest and strictest lockdowns. He shuttered a major TV station that 
was occasionally critical of his policies and prosecuted the editor of 
Rappler, an independent internet news site.37 In July, he implemented a 
new national security law that provided him with even greater powers 
to go after his opponents.
Other new right leaders immediately understood how to capitalize 
on the situation to advance their agendas. Benjamin Netanyahu used 
the pandemic to suspend court proceedings, which not coinciden-
tally delayed his own corruption trial, and then exploited the crisis to 
push for a new coalition government that temporarily saved his politi-
cal career.38 In Italy, far-right leader Matteo Salvini used the pandemic 
to push his “closed ports” policy. In February, even as the outbreak 
was gathering steam in his country, Salvini declared that “allowing the 
migrants to land from Africa, where the presence of the virus was con-
firmed, is irresponsible.” At the time, there was only one reported case 
on the whole continent, in Egypt.39
Perhaps the most aggressive power grabs came from the leaders of 
Russia and China. Russian President Vladimir Putin pushed through 
a referendum that required an up-or-down vote on over 200 amend-
ments to the constitution, including one that declares marriage as only 
between a man and a woman and another that allows Putin to serve 
two more terms as the leader of the country. The public approved the 
changes in a vote marked by workplaces pressuring their employees to 
participate, the government offering lottery prizes to lucky voters, and 
some outright fraud as well. The vote wasn’t even strictly necessary, 
since the Russian parliament had already approved the changes.40 But 
Putin has always worked hard to demonstrate that his Russia is demo-
cratic, if only formally so.
Xi Jinping, meanwhile, didn’t feel the need to playact. He’d already 
made himself leader for life in 2018, when the National People’s 
Congress simply removed the two-term limit on the presidency. So, in 
the same week that Putin was securing his future, Xi focused instead 
on securing China’s future as an integrated, politically homogeneous 
entity. To put an end to the street protests that had been roiling Hong 
Kong for several years, Xi implemented a new national security law 
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in the territory that threatened demonstrators with long prison sen-
tences on four potential charges: secession, subversion, terrorism, and 
collusion with foreign forces.41 Some authoritarian leaders used the 
coronavirus to consolidate more power; Xi was more interested in 
consolidating control over territory while the world was distracted by 
the pandemic.
Outside of government, new right political movements were also 
advancing an anti-immigration platform. In Germany, the identitar-
ian movement hung banners proclaiming “Defend Our Borders” on 
the Brandenburg Gate, once a potent symbol of the erased border 
between East and West Germany.42 Together with other extremists 
and the ultra-right AfD, the identitarian movement infiltrated a series 
of protests against the German government’s quarantine policies. The 
protests, which sprang up in dozens of German cities, highlighted 
many of the conspiracy theories associated with the coronavirus, 
blaming the pandemic on Jews, globalists, China, the pharmaceutical 
industry, and tech companies. “What unites people is the hatred of the 
political elite and public broadcasting,” said Matthias Quent, a right-
wing extremism researcher.43
Throughout Europe, far-right parties were retooling their “great 
replacement” narrative—that immigrants are poised to overwhelm 
majority populations—to incorporate the coronavirus.44 It wasn’t just 
Orbán and Salvini. Shutting borders, enacting travel bans, and restrict-
ing immigration all became the new conventional wisdom. The threat 
that outsiders supposedly pose to the health of nations has long been a 
singular obsession of fascists.
The new right was also busy implementing its favorite strategy: 
hijacking existing movements and pushing them in an explicitly 
ideological direction. As the pandemic spread, the alt-right seized 
on the anti-vaccine movement as a vehicle to challenge both liberal 
policymakers and the scientific establishment. In the United States, 
organizations like Medical Freedom Patriots (“pro-God, anti-vaccine, 
QAnon friendly”) largely displaced the anti-vaxxers of the libertarian 
and hippy left.45 What started as an attack on medical and economic 
measures to contain the virus shifted into high gear once vaccines 
became available in late 2020, even in places where new right leaders 
like Trump were celebrating the arrival of the new drugs.46 A similar 
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alliance between the far right and anti-vaxxers in Europe has taken 
advantage of an even deeper mistrust of the science of vaccines.47
In Europe, at least, far-right parties in opposition did not benefit 
politically from the coronavirus crisis. The Alternative für Deutsch-
land witnessed a drop in public support from 15 percent to 9 percent, 
the far right in Italy suffered a comparable loss in support, the National 
Rally in France saw its control of council seats slip from 1,438 to 840 
between the 2014 municipal elections and those that took place in 
June 2020, and the far right in Spain experienced at best a flatlining 
in public opinion polls.48 With borders closed, these parties couldn’t 
stoke fears of immigration. And European leaders—Angela Merkel, 
Emmanuel Macron, Giuseppe Conte, Pedro Sánchez—were largely 
successful in dealing with COVID-19. Where the new right was in 
power—Poland, Austria—it could take advantage of a rally-around-
the-rally effect. Thus, while the new right in opposition was successful 
in spreading conspiracy theories, it was unable to translate this into 
concrete political advantage.49
New right civil society organizations have largely taken their cues 
from new right political leaders during the pandemic. Organizations 
like the Center for Immigration Studies presented seminars on insti-
tutionalizing Trump administration policies on immigration, such 
as stripping asylum seekers, refugees, and immigrants of all rights. 
The organization CitizenGo launched a petition to defund the World 
Health Organization, echoing the sentiments of Trump and his allies. 
And the World Congress of Families and the Alliance Defending 
Freedom International vigorously pushed their anti-abortion and 
anti-LGBT agendas during the pandemic, making notable advances in 
Poland, Hungary, and Ghana.
center vs. periphery
Analysts of the new authoritarian wave that has swept across the world 
over the last few years have largely focused on power grabs in capitals. 
Leaders like Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, and Xi Jinping have 
attempted to reduce the influence of legislative and judicial bodies in 
favor of their own executive power. They have targeted civil society 
and media, and used the coronavirus crisis to consolidate their control.
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An equally important feature of this new authoritarianism is its 
intolerance for regional or local power bases that lie beyond executive 
reach. For countries with federal structures, this means a conscious 
effort to strengthen the federal center at the expense of the regions. It’s 
part of the remaking of the nation-state in the twenty-first century, a 
reversal of the two-edged trend to devolve power to local authorities 
and delegate authority to international institutions. These nationalists 
don’t just hate globalists. They hate anybody who stands in their way, 
including just about any potential counterforce taking shape on the 
periphery of their own countries.
Autocrats fear the periphery because it’s where dissent can germi-
nate beyond the prying eye of the panoptical state. East Germany’s 
revolution in 1989, for instance, began with demonstrations every 
Monday in the southern city of Leipzig. The Romanian revolution a 
few months later was sparked by the Hungarian minority in Timiso-
ara. The overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia in 2000 began 
with protests by miners in Kolubara, an hour’s drive from Belgrade.
Federal states face a continual tension between center and periph-
ery, which occasionally breaks the country apart (as with Yugoslavia 
and the Soviet Union). The Spanish government cracked down on 
Catalan moves toward independence in 2017, imposing direct rule for 
a time. Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia all faced secession movements 
that resulted in autonomous regions claiming statehood. Occasionally, 
breakaway regions achieve international recognition as states—Ban-
gladesh, East Timor, South Sudan.
The autocrat fears secession as well as anti-government protest. The 
first attacks the unitary power of the nation-state, the second chal-
lenges the unitary power of the ruler. It’s one and the same thing for 
the authoritarian nationalist.
As the pandemic transformed the United States into the world’s 
leading hotspot, Trump and his strategists were desperate to deflect 
responsibility and distract attention from their mismanaged response. 
One tactic was to consciously pit states against each other in a replay of 
the pre-Civil War conflict over federal authority. Trump and his allies 
in predominantly red states pushed to reopen the U.S. economy and at 
the same time preserve the “freedom” of Americans to refuse to wear 
protective masks in public.50 This strategy echoed the arguments of 
southern states in the late 1850s to maintain their economic system 
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without federal interference, and to have the “freedom” to own slaves. 
Trump also precipitated a showdown over reopening public schools 
by ordering students to return in person for the upcoming school year, 
even threatening to withdraw federal funding from schools that didn’t 
reopen.
Trump did not have a unified federal government behind him. A 
number of public health officials, including the director of the National 
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Anthony Fauci, counseled 
caution about reopening the economy and forcing students to return 
to school. The military balked at the president’s plan to send soldiers 
out onto the streets to suppress public protest.51 But the president dis-
covered that he still controlled the security forces attached to other 
federal agencies. He deployed the National Guard in DC to tamp down 
protests in June, prompting the mayor of the nation’s capital to demand 
that the president withdraw the forces. Agents from both Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection were 
also used to police demonstrations in the wake of the killing of George 
Floyd.
But then Trump tried something different. He sent federal agents 
into Portland, Oregon, to crack down on anti-racism protests. They 
beat up peaceful protesters and fired impact munitions at demon-
strators, seriously injuring one of them. They drove around the city 
in unmarked vans pulling people off the street. Oregon officials at 
every level—the city, the state, and congressional representatives—
demanded that these agents of the Department of Homeland Security, 
the U.S. Marshals Service, and other federal authorities leave Portland 
immediately. The state filed suit against these federal agencies, and the 
ACLU called it a constitutional crisis.52
Rather than back down, President Trump doubled down, claiming 
the paramilitaries were there to restore order and that he was prepared 
to send them next to Chicago, with other major cities on a list of future 
deployments. “Look at what’s going on—all run by Democrats, all run 
by very liberal Democrats. All run, really, by the radical left,” Trump 
said. “If Biden got in, that would be true for the country. The whole 
country would go to hell. And we’re not going to let it go to hell.”53
By claiming that areas of the country under Democratic Party control 
were in fact swamps of anti-Americanism, Trump enlisted the classic 
vocabulary associated with dehumanizing America’s putative enemies 
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prior to attack. Trump’s use of federal paramilitaries, moreover, was a 
classic tactic of autocrats to test how far they can push their author-
ity and what forces they can count on in an emergency. The Black 
Lives Matter protests inadvertently provided Trump with that oppor-
tunity. In the event of a conflict between the federal government and 
the states escalating into civil war, Trump would know which guns are 
on his side. After his electoral loss in November, Trump attempted to 
overturn the results through legal suit and direct pressure, and even 
contemplated a federal declaration of martial law to remain in office.
Trump was not the only leader to strengthen the federal center at 
the expense of the regions. Halfway around the world, the Russian 
authorities arrested Sergei Furgal, the governor of the far eastern city 
of Khabarovsk, on charges that he orchestrated the murder of two men 
15 years ago. Tens of thousands of people demonstrated on the streets 
of Khabarovsk in July 2020, demanding the release of this leader of the 
opposition. Furgal and his supporters argued that the arrest was polit-
ically motivated.54 The protests continued into 2021.
In Hong Kong, authorities used a new national security law crim-
inalizing many forms of protest to arrest several pro-democracy 
advocates, who were promptly jailed. Others decided to abandon 
the city. A dozen dissidents who failed to reach Taiwan by boat were 
captured and charged with illegal border crossing. The Chinese Com-
munist Party has cracked down on any challenges to its authority from 
the periphery, whether in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, or Tibet.
In Turkey, meanwhile, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan replaced the mayors 
of cities affiliated with the People’s Democratic Party—the pro-Kurd-
ish opposition party—concentrated in the country’s southeast region, 
and put pressure on the party through financial audits and attacks by 
the government-affiliated press.55 Narendra Modi has made it more 
difficult for state governments, particularly those led by the political 
opposition, to raise revenue.56 Jair Bolsonaro clashed with the gover-
nors of Brazil’s states over their respective handling of the coronavirus.
The new nationalists have defined “the people” in very specific ways 
to exclude portions of the population based on ethnicity, religion, or 
politics. They are transforming the federal government into a tool 
to reward only those who support the ruler in the capital. They are 
attacking democracy, yes, but also reducing faith in governance more 
generally. What better way “to deconstruct the administrative state,” as 
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alt-right guru Steve Bannon likes to say, than to turn government into 
a body with no power or legitimacy beyond its military and police.
more extreme responses
While the radical right has focused on immigration, the extreme right 
has taken a very different approach. In their attempts to change the 
existing order step by step, advocates of restricted immigration and 
closed borders are ameliorationist. The extreme right, on the other 
hand, supports accelerationism: speeding the collapse of the existing 
order. For these more apocalyptic activists, the pandemic created pre-
cisely the kind of conditions—panic, widespread fear and skepticism, 
economic volatility, heightened belief in survivalism—that could pre-
cipitate a wholesale rejection of the liberal order.
Although they represent only a small fraction of the new right, 
these extremists have attempted to expand their influence during the 
pandemic by urging racist attacks on minorities and foreigners. The 
United States emerged as an epicenter of this epidemic of hate. Anti-
Asian attacks and harassment, motivated by the mistaken belief that 
China and the Chinese were deliberately spreading the coronavirus, 
spiked in the United States, with one monitoring initiative recording 
1,500 incidents in one month.57 On March 24, the FBI shot and killed 
a white supremacist who was planning a car bomb attack on a hospital 
in Missouri.58 Another white supremacist was arrested the following 
month for planning an attack on a Jewish assisted-living facility in 
Massachusetts.59
In some cases, these accelerationists simply urged their followers 
to add to the chaos. For instance, according to the New Jersey Office 
of Homeland Security and Preparedness, one neo-Nazi group recom-
mended that its supporters “incite panic while people are practicing 
social isolation during the COVID-19 outbreak, which includes dis-
charging firearms in cities and putting bullet-sized holes into car 
windows.”60 More ominously, accelerationists raised the possibility 
online of using the coronavirus as a bioweapon. According to one law 
enforcement agency report in February 2020, “extremists discussed a 
number of methods for coronavirus attacks, such as spending time in 
public with perceived enemies, leaving ‘saliva on door handles’ at local 
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FBI offices, spitting on elevator buttons and spreading coronavirus 
germs in ‘nonwhite neighborhoods.’”61
Some elements of the new right, including neo-Nazis and armed 
militia members, also participated in the movement to pressure U.S. 
governors to reopen the economy in their states. “The protests, which 
have been supported by conservative megadonors, have ties to a host 
of darker internet subcultures,” according to The Washington Post, 
“people who oppose vaccination, the self-identified Western-chauvin-
ist Proud Boys group, anti-government conspiracy theorists known 
as QAnon, and people touting a coming civil war.”62 The prospect of 
a “coming civil war” attracted the “Boogaloo Bois,” armed men who 
believe that the lockdown is the first step by the police and other 
authorities to take away their weapons.63 What was remarkable about 
these anti-government protests was the support they received from 
President Trump, presumably the head of government.
The organizing of these militia movements was on full display 
in Michigan, where in May 2020 hundreds of demonstrators, some 
armed, tried to force their way onto the floor of the Senate chamber 
in the State House in Lansing. Later, 14 far-right activists planned 
to snatch the governor from her vacation home and put her on trial 
for “treason.” Thanks to an FBI infiltrator, they were arrested in early 
October. The governor in turn blamed Trump for inciting these kinds 
of actions by, among other actions, tweeting “LIBERATE MICHIGAN” 
during the coronavirus lockdown in that state. The president had 
tweeted the same about Virginia, and the conspirators in fact consid-
ered kidnapping the governor there as well.64
In 2021, the militia movements shifted into high gear in a last-ditch 
attempt to keep Donald Trump in power. The assault on the U.S. capital 
looked much like what happened in Michigan in May, but with a much 
larger force that overwhelmed the unprepared security in DC. Some of 
that far-right organizing may have been aided by a $500,000 Bitcoin 
bequest from a French computer programmer just before he commit-
ted suicide. Half the money went to far-right media personality Nick 
Fuentes, who was present at the January 6 insurrection in Washing-
ton, DC.65 These efforts attracted international support from a motley 
collection of groups: QAnon believers throughout Europe, the Happy 
Science cult in Japan, Falun Gong practitioners in Taiwan.66 Embold-
ened by the publicity it received and the martyrs it lost during this 
the new right’s pandemic pivot
81
attempted coup, the far right planned various follow-ups to disrupt the 
inauguration of the new administration, which did not come to pass 
because of heightened security measures.
In the United States, the most extreme component of the “Stop the 
Steal” coalition has been the “accelerationists” who hope to spur on a 
race war. To that end, some showed up at the Black Lives Matter pro-
tests in the wake of the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis. 
Several were arrested for fomenting violence at these rallies, one for 
shooting a protester in Albuquerque and two more for a pair of mur-
ders in California. There have been at least 50 cases of cars ramming 
into demonstrators; the vast majority driven by extremists inspired by 
the accelerationist meme “all lives splatter.”67
The new right has devoted considerable time and energy to spread-
ing disinformation across the internet. It has touted conspiracy theories 
involving China—for instance, that the coronavirus was engineered in 
a biolab in Wuhan—which have been taken up by conservative media 
outlets and promoted by Trump and the Republican Party. In the 
run-up to the 2020 elections, Republican congressional candidates ran 
ads that blamed China for “the Wuhan epidemic,” promised to “make 
China pay” for “the lies they told and the jobs they stole,” and warned, 
“To stop China, you have to stop Joe Biden.”68 Republican congressio-
nal candidate Joanne Wright in Los Angeles, like many of her tribe, 
asserted that China manufactured the disease but added the twist that 
Bill Gates financed the plot.69
Far-right conspiracy theorists take a special interest in malign-
ing “globalists” like billionaire philanthropist Bill Gates, but they also 
attacked George Soros, infectious disease expert Anthony Fauci, and 
WHO head Tedros Adhanom. They’ve also added an anti-Semitic 
spin by accusing Jews of creating the coronavirus and conspiring to 
undermine the world economy.70 Alternatively, Muslims have come 
under attack, particularly in India where the government blamed the 
outbreak in the country on a religious gathering of Muslim mission-
aries in New Delhi in March 2020. In the aftermath of that incident, 
Deutsche Welle reported, “a Muslim man was beaten up by a mob in 
Delhi, vendors were refused entry into localities, people refused to 
buy from Muslims, and a hospital reportedly segregated coronavirus 
patients by their religion.”71
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Beyond offering an excuse to vent online spleen and spread con-
spiracy theories, the pandemic has presented a digital recruitment 
opportunity. According to a study by the Institute for Strategic 
Dialogue, the far right used its coronavirus conspiracy theories to bring 
new members into the movement. One Telegram channel devoted to 
white supremacy and COVID-19, for instance, grew nine-fold from 
300 viewers to 2,700 in one month.72 In the United States, the average 
number of daily searches related to white supremacy rose dramatically 
as the lockdowns spread.73
the european union
Prior to the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, the European 
Union was already being stretched to breaking point. The United 
Kingdom left the EU in early 2020 and formalized its exit at the end 
of the year. Hungary and several other East European countries were 
heading in a distinctly authoritarian direction. Italy was flirting with 
right-wing populism. Widening economic disparities hadn’t helped. 
Germany remained a powerhouse, but Greece had not made up the 
ground it lost in the 2009 crisis, and the countries of Eastern Europe 
had not yet closed the gap with the western half of the continent. Thus, 
the pandemic was a timely tool for the new right to make use of in 
impeding and rolling back European integration.
The EU is the only regional structure in the world to have dismantled 
many of its internal borders. In 1995, seven European nations created 
the Schengen Area, abolishing their internal border controls and visa 
requirements. Eventually becoming subject to European Union law, 
the area expanded to include 26 states. Until the pandemic hit, citizens 
of EU member states could move and work virtually anywhere within 
the bloc. But opposition to this freedom of movement, given that it 
challenges the state’s undisputed control over its own borders, has 
been a major rallying cry of the far right. It has argued that Schengen 
makes the control of immigrants more difficult (as with the influx of 
Tunisians into Italy in 2011) and compromises anti-terrorist policing 
(in the wake of a terrorism suspect’s flight from Germany to Italy in 
2016).74 Still, Schengen survived.
What the far right had been trying and failing to achieve for years, 
the coronavirus managed in a matter of weeks. Some members 
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re-established internal border controls without notifying the EU Com-
mission, as required by the Schengen Border Code.75 These moves 
prompted the EU to declare in mid-March a temporary closure of all 
internal borders. Europe was supposed to celebrate the 25th anniver-
sary of Schengen’s abolition of border controls at the end of March 
2020. Instead, there were new gates and road barriers where not long 
before travelers could pass between countries without even knowing it.
Then, by imposing even more restrictions on migrants still desper-
ate to get into Europe, European governments implemented another 
key plank in the new right’s platform. In mid-March, after Greece sent 
troops to its border with Turkey to stop refugees from crossing over by 
land, the EU closed its external borders to non-nationals. The desper-
ate continued to attempt to reach Europe by sea. Of the 800 who left 
Libya in March 2020, 43 made it to Italy and 155 landed in Malta.76 The 
Libyan coast guard gathered up the rest and returned them to Libya.
Not all European countries took such a hardline stance. Portugal 
boldly gave all migrants and asylum seekers full citizenship rights on 
a temporary basis so that they could access health care during the 
pandemic.77 A number of countries, including Spain and Belgium, 
suspended deportations. Beyond that, however, migrants suffered dis-
proportionately from the pandemic. In one German refugee camp, 
nearly half the 600 residents came down with the disease.78
The pandemic also deepened already existing cleavages in the EU, 
for instance, between Italy and everyone else.
Italy was the first hotspot to emerge in the European Union. 
Within a few days of the first reported case of infection in Lombardy 
on February 20, COVID-19 was putting an enormous strain on the 
hospitals of northern Italy. The EU’s response was largely bureau-
cratic—more consultations. When it came to concrete assistance, the 
EU had little to offer Italy.
On March 10, only a couple of weeks after the appearance of its 
first case, Italy’s permanent representative to the European Union 
Maurizio Massari wrote in no uncertain terms in Politico, “Italy has 
already asked to activate the European Union Mechanism of Civil Pro-
tection for the supply of medical equipment for individual protection. 
But, unfortunately, not a single EU country responded to the Com-
mission’s call. Only China responded bilaterally. Certainly, this is not a 
good sign of European solidarity.”79
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Worse, a number of European countries, including like France and 
Germany, actually imposed export limits on critical medical supplies 
for fear that they would need them in the coming days.80 Though the 
eventual intervention of the European Commission to impose region-
wide export restrictions in exchange for EU members rescinding their 
national bans may have alleviated shortages within the bloc, it was at 
the expense of poorer countries outside of it.81
For many Italians, the failure of European solidarity was nothing 
new. Writes Luigi Scazzeri at the Centre for European Reform:
Over the past decade, Italy has gone from being one of the most 
enthusiastic supporters of greater European integration to one of 
the most eurosceptic member-states. Many Italians felt that Italy did 
not receive much European solidarity during the eurozone crisis, 
and that the Union served as an enforcer of damaging austerity 
policies. The damage to Italians’ view of the EU was then com-
pounded by the bloc’s response to the migration crisis. Italy took in 
650,000 migrants between 2014 and 2018, and efforts to distribute 
these among other EU countries were largely symbolic …82
Hungary’s authoritarianism, Portugal’s generosity, Italy’s call for soli-
darity, Germany’s tightfistedness: European responses to the current 
crisis are literally all over the map. As Nathalie Tocci, a former advisor 
to the EU foreign policy chief, told The Guardian: “This is defi-
nitely a make-it-or-break-it moment for the European project. If it 
goes badly, this really risks being the end of the union. It fuels all the 
nationalist-populism.”83
In July 2020, however, the EU stepped away from the brink by 
achieving a consensus on a $2.1 trillion bailout package that directed 
significant funds to the countries—Italy, Spain, Greece—hardest hit by 
the pandemic. Much of the nearly $900 million targeted at the coun-
tries most affected by the lockdowns came in the form of grants so 
did not add to the debt problems of the southern tier. And despite 
the usual rift between the “frugal” and the “needy” countries, and 
some intemperate rhetoric at the summit, a spirit of solidarity pre-
vailed. “We showed collective responsibility and solidarity and we also 
show our belief in our common future,” concluded summit chairman 
Charles Michel.84
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the leviathan problem
In the 1970s, political scientist William Ophuls argued that overwhelm-
ing environmental problems—pollution, overpopulation, the energy 
crisis—required a Leviathan, a “government with major coercive 
powers” that could ram through necessary measures to safeguard the 
ecosystem and save humanity from extinction.85 This argument has 
resurfaced during the more recent climate-change debate, in the form 
of either an authoritarian state like China or a world government pro-
viding the coercive power necessary to reduce carbon emissions over 
the objections of sectoral interests like the fossil-fuel industry.86
Because it poses an urgent short-term threat, COVID-19 has turned 
a largely academic question into a viable policy choice, as even liberal 
societies have adopted more coercive measures to protect public 
health. “It’s very difficult for an emancipatory movement to find a gen-
uinely democratic way to change people’s behavior, to find consensus 
among interests,” notes Wolfram Schaffar.
In the absence of robust international institutions—and the new 
right is determined to keep them weak—the Leviathan option neces-
sarily relies on strong states. As such, COVID-19 is strengthening the 
sovereignist backlash against what had hitherto seemed to be an inex-
orable multilateralism. In addition to border closures and travel bans, 
a number of countries introduced export restrictions to ensure access 
to critical resources, including medical supplies and food.87 These 
measures were billed as temporary, provisional, and situational. Nev-
ertheless, because they intersect with the agendas of far-right political 
movements, they may ultimately encourage the growing anti-globalist, 
anti-immigrant, anti-multicultural trend in world politics.
In theory, the new right is skeptical of a strong state, which runs 
counter to notions of individual liberty. In practice, however, the new 
right expands the power of the state when it is in power, as Viktor 
Orbán has done in Hungary. The new right generally favors a strong 
military, the suppression of political opposition, and an economic 
patronage system that rewards political followers. The pandemic 
has exposed the new right’s allergy to transparency, its penchant for 
executive authority, and its preference to compel rather than solicit 
compliance. The new right favors a Leviathan state, but to maintain 
control within borders rather than to tackle cross-border problems.
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But the pandemic has also exposed significant vulnerabilities 
that the new right is not well positioned to address. Dealing with an 
infectious disease requires competent governance, which many new 
right leaders did not exercise before or during the crisis. In reveal-
ing enormous gaps in health care, COVID-19 may yet instigate the 
overhaul of public health infrastructure—hospitals, national disease 
control, public insurance—for which earlier cholera epidemics laid the 
groundwork, but that has been conspicuously absent from the plat-
forms of the new right. The failures of the intelligence and national 
security apparatus, meanwhile, have undermined the argument 
that only a strong military can protect the lives of the population.88 
Even as liberal and illiberal countries have called on their militaries 
to play a larger role in battling COVID-19, the pandemic may well 
prompt a thorough reconceptualization of national security at the 
level of doctrine, budget priorities, and international cooperation.89 A 
national security system predicated largely on large military budgets 
and military deterrence, so frequently a preoccupation of the new 
right, is fast becoming anachronistic. A tank, in the end, is useless 
against a virus (not to mention climate change, economic inequality, 
or any of the other threats to human security).
Despite various coronavirus power grabs, COVID-19 doesn’t spell 
the end of democracy. Open societies are generally more flexible and 
capable of responding to seismic shocks of this nature than non-dem-
ocratic societies. “Leaders who portray themselves as saviors are more 
exposed to blame if the death toll soars,” writes Declan Walsh, and 
there is even evidence that democratic societies suffer lower mortal-
ity in pandemics than undemocratic ones.90 But all societies will have 
to address the defects in governance that the pandemic has laid bare, 
from an inability to respond to urgent threats in a timely manner to 
failures in addressing the underlying economic and social inequalities 
amplified by the virus.




Responding to the new right
The Christchurch shootings shocked the world. On March 15, 2019, 
a white supremacist originally from New South Wales in Australia 
opened fire in two mosques in New Zealand’s second-most populous 
city, killing 51 people and injuring 49. He signaled his solidarity with 
the global new right by titling his manifesto “The Great Replacement,” 
which he sent to various places prior to the attacks, including the 
prime minister’s office.
The Christchurch attacks were a surprise to many inside and 
outside of New Zealand. “This is an incredibly tolerant, multicultural 
country,” says Paul Spoonley of Massey University in Auckland. “In an 
international value study, the proportion of New Zealanders who see 
immigrants as contributing positively to the country is probably two to 
four times higher than countries in mainland Europe. To be anti-im-
migrant or against a particular religion is politically damaging.”1
New Zealand’s current reputation for tolerance—by 2011, the 
country was ranked third in the industrialized world for its tolerance 
of minorities2—belies its history of discrimination. The indigenous 
Maori community dealt with an apartheid system well into the twen-
tieth century, and Chinese immigrants weren’t able to become citizens 
until the 1950s. The country has also been home to a small but globally 
connected far-right community, which was implicated in several 
murders and over a hundred incidents of racist violence between 2005 
and 2013.3 The largest of these groups, the League of Rights, boasted 
a membership of a thousand people. A strain of anti-immigrant senti-
ment has thrived on the margins and even in mainstream parties like 
New Zealand First, the junior partner in a coalition government with 
the Labor Party.
Prior to 2019, the Muslim community repeatedly complained that 
the New Zealand authorities weren’t properly addressing Islamopho-
bic threats.4 “It was taken quite lightly because we always believed 
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that New Zealand was the safest place on earth, that things like that 
happen somewhere else,” observes Ikhlaq Kashkari, the president of 
the Muslim Association of New Zealand. “We were living with a false 
sense of security even though we were getting more news every day 
from around the world about the promotion of Islamophobia.”5
Christchurch itself was not immune to these trends. “When Christ-
church emerged as having a problem, the defenses went up and local 
representatives said, ‘we’re not a racist city,’” reports Rawiri Taonui, 
New Zealand’s first professor of indigenous studies. “There have been 
more racist incidents in Christchurch than pretty much anywhere in 
the country.”6
Despite rising Islamophobia and a history of far-right organizing, 
the New Zealand authorities were not primed to look for a white man 
like the Christchurch shooter. “After 9/11, a number of people here 
suddenly labelled all the Muslim people of New Zealand who were 
living peacefully in the country as terrorists,” points out Meng Foon, 
New Zealand’s commissioner of race relations. “The New Zealand 
secret service targeted them more and, unfortunately, missed the 
shooter last year in Christchurch. They dropped the ball in terms of 
monitoring white supremacists.”7
The Christchurch shootings were not surprising in another, 
more global sense. Far-right violence had intensified leading up to 
2019, with attacks inspired by racism, Islamophobia, and anti-Sem-
itism taking place in Pittsburgh and El Paso, Munich and Hanau in 
Germany, Macerata in Italy, and Baerum in Norway. Many of these 
shooters saw themselves as part of a larger movement and their acts as 
paying tribute to their predecessors, particularly Anders Breivik, a far-
right crusader who killed 77 people in Norway in 2011.8
Matt Nipert of the New Zealand Herald has written a study showing 
the connections between these gunmen and Brenton Tarrant, the 
Christchurch shooter. These extremists cited many of the same 
sources, shared the same rhetoric, and didn’t think of themselves as 
lone wolves even when acting alone. Tarrant, he says, “didn’t throw 
a dart on a map and it landed in New Zealand. There are strong ties 
between the far right in New Zealand and Australia.” Tarrant also went 
to New Zealand because of its lax gun laws. Once there, he cast around 
for targets. “He said in his manifesto that he chose New Zealand 
because he wanted to show that no place is safe for Muslims,” Nipert 
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adds, “but really it was just a cover for his own laziness. He could do it 
without leaving the country again.”9
New Zealand’s failures before March 15, 2019, were on par with the 
performance of other countries. Their policing didn’t take seriously 
the prospect that digital connections, narratives like the great replace-
ment, and cross-border organizing would translate into homicidal 
actions.
But New Zealand’s response after March 15 was something altogether 
different. Squarely addressing its failures, the government of Jacinda 
Ardern immediately and unequivocally responded to the Christchurch 
killings with an unusual combination of empathy for the victims and 
zero tolerance for the culture that nurtured the perpetrator’s hatred, 
all the while recognizing the need for cross-border coordination. As 
it turned out, that’s exactly the kind of policy approach that paid off a 
year later when the coronavirus hit.
After March 15, Ardern demonstrated what leadership looks like. 
Following the lead of the mayor of Christchurch, she called the action 
“terrorism.” She donned a hijab and reached out to the Muslim com-
munity, refused to speak the name of the perpetrator, and introduced 
sweeping gun-control measures.10 She even went to the island of Fiji 
to console family members of those killed that day in Christchurch.
Unlike in the United States, where repeated mass shootings have 
not led to substantial gun control, New Zealand outlawed automatic 
weapons “with widespread public support and universal parliamen-
tary support (119 out of 120 MPs voted in favor),” Paul Spoonley notes. 
“There was some grumbling among those who go hunting that the ban 
had gone too far or was actioned too rapidly. Also, illegal weapons are 
not subject to registration and restrictions on sales. But we’re light-
years away from the United States.”
The government moved more forcefully to pre-empt right-wing 
violence, launching dozens of investigations into extremist groups 
and individuals, jailing a neo-Nazi who shared a video of the Christ-
church killings, and arresting a Defense Force soldier with links to the 
far right. It also pushed forward with a new effort to amend existing 
laws to outlaw hate speech.11 “If all the New Zealand government 
does is extend the Human Rights Act and the Harmful Digital Com-
munications Act, it will safely avoid curtailing free speech,” concludes 
Martin Cocker of Netsafe. Although such prohibitions against hate 
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speech set New Zealand apart from countries like the United States, 
the state has to be careful not to simply ban unpopular opinions. “It’s 
very difficult to combat the kind of things we’re seeing online without 
creating measures that could very easily impinge on free speech,” he 
adds.12
Perhaps Ardern’s most ambitious project was the Christchurch Call, 
“a commitment by Governments and tech companies to eliminate ter-
rorist and violent extremist content online.”13 Only two months after 
the shootings, New Zealand joined France in pushing for change at 
the international level. “They knew that they were unlikely to drive 
global change on social media as a country of five million people 
far away from the main political centers in the U.S. and Europe,” 
observes Matthew Feldman of the Centre for the Analysis of the Right 
Wing. “They put white nationalism very squarely on the UN General 
Assembly agenda.”
The big players—Facebook, Twitter, Google, Microsoft, and 
Amazon—all signed onto the Call, committing to develop algorithms 
and AI tools to quickly identify and remove hateful content from their 
platforms.14 Any Kiwi who views extremist content online is now auto-
matically directed to websites that help people leave hate groups.15 The 
Call also inspired Australia to pass a law criminalizing social media 
companies that don’t expeditiously remove “abhorrent violent mate-
rial.”16 That’s all to the good, but it hasn’t yet detoxified the internet. 
The impact of the Call, which is nonbinding, has been limited due to 
the “lack of alignment among countries and a lack of consistent pres-
sure on multinationals,” Martin Cocker points out. “If the Christchurch 
Call moved to the point of achieving consistency among countries in 
terms of what they demand from industry, it could continue to have 
some influence.”
When the shooter pleaded guilty in late March 2020, New Zealand 
was saved from the spectacle of a very public trial. “His guilty plea will 
likely reduce the priority of efforts to curb the far right,” Matt Nipert 
says. 
My concern is that New Zealand still views him as a lone wolf, as 
one deranged individual, that it’s not our problem, that an Austra-
lian came here to do it. That’s true, but the problem is global. These 
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groups operate cross borders and see themselves as a brotherhood 
not as citizens of a country. Someone did an analysis of who logs 
onto 8chan. You can’t see their identities but you can see where they 
log on from, and New Zealand was very highly ranked.
Meanwhile, the Ardern government has had to face other major 
problems, chief among them the coronavirus pandemic. Demon-
strating the same kind of firmness, managerial competence, and 
empathy applied after the March 15 tragedy, the prime minister led 
a successful effort to radically reduce the infection rate far faster than 
her European or North American counterparts. In both cases—one a 
political epidemic, the other a medical pandemic—it showed zero tol-
erance by jailing right-wing extremists after March 15 and, during the 
first week of the COVID-19 lockdown, demoting the health minister, 
who blithely visited a beach.17
Although the COVID-19 response has been more top-down, both 
efforts received overwhelming domestic support. Ardern’s approval 
rating rose to 51 percent a month after the Christchurch killings and 
soared to 65 percent during the coronavirus crisis.18
According to Meng Foon, the New Zealand government also 
learned from its initial mistake of ignoring the threat of white extrem-
ism, and was determined to ensure that its response to the coronavirus 
was fully inclusive. As a result, the virus did not have a disproportion-
ate impact on people of color so evident in the United States. “I don’t 
think any person of color has died of COVID-19,” he notes. “Only 
about 4 percent of the total of those who contracted COVID-19 are 
Maori and Pacific Islander.”
For Ikhlaq Kashkari, the key commonality has been the quality of 
the social response. He chokes up when he remembers how many 
people came out to support mosques in the days after the shootings. 
“People have gone out of their way to help each other as they did on 
March 15,” he says. “Our slogan here is: Stay home, stay safe, and be 
kind. Those three things explain it all.”
While other governments—Vietnam, South Korea, and Slovakia—
responded successfully to the coronavirus pandemic, none did so after 
learning valuable lessons from a successful battle against the global 
epidemic of right-wing violence.
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banning hate
As soon as an individual or group commits a crime, the authorities can 
apply all the tools of law enforcement to bring the culprits to justice. 
Shooters are charged with murder. Vandals who paint swastikas on 
synagogues are arrested. Groups that run afoul of financial laws can 
be sanctioned.
A more complex challenge is to prevent such crimes from happen-
ing in the first place. It’s by no means self-evident, even in countries 
with hate speech laws, that an expression of ugly sentiments—racist, 
sexist, xenophobic—is prosecutable as incitement or permissible 
as free speech. The extreme right, and its violent disregard for law, 
is easier to go after. Those who plot violent acts can be stopped, as 
the FBI did with the men who planned to kidnap the governor of 
Michigan. But what if someone praises the “great replacement,” which 
mass shooters and the radical right both embrace? The blurring of dis-
tinctions between these two categories, as in the creation of the new 
right, poses a whole new set of challenges to states, from the national 
level down to the municipality, as well as to social media companies.
Consider, for example, any effort to flag and remove hate speech 
from a platform like Twitter. It’s one thing for Twitter to identify 
memes that glorify the Islamic State. It’s not likely that someone in the 
mainstream, Muslim or not, is going to praise the would-be caliph-
ate. But white supremacist language has migrated, via the new right, 
into mainstream discourse. According to an account of a discussion 
at a Twitter staff meeting, one employee explained that “on a technical 
level, content from Republican politicians could get swept up by algo-
rithms aggressively removing white supremacist material. Banning 
politicians wouldn’t be accepted by society as a trade-off for flagging 
all of the white supremacist propaganda.”19
Of course, European countries have occasionally done just that: 
banned parties and politicians. “If the key objective is to minimize 
the direct impact of far-right groups, nothing is more effective than 
a ban,” writes Cas Mudde. “Banning far-right parties is also the best 
way to prevent them from winning votes, and consequently influenc-
ing other parties, and potentially policies.”20 After his incitement to 
insurrection, social media platforms decided that Donald Trump had 
crossed a line and banned him. Based on this precedent, Twitter sus-
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pended Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-GA) for spreading election 
fraud misinformation.
Some countries, like the United Kingdom, banned the Nazi and 
fascist parties that emerged in the 1930s and 1940s. Other coun-
tries banned the neo-Nazi parties that regrouped after World War II, 
such as the Socialist Reich Party that Germany’s constitutional court 
outlawed in 1952. The tactic is not used so frequently in Europe today, 
though Finland recently banned the Nordic Resistance Movement. 
Even in Germany, where the prohibition against Nazism is perhaps 
the strongest, the constitutional court refused in 2017 to ban the 
National Democratic Party, a longstanding extremist faction. Rather, 
as noted in Chapter 1, mainstream political parties have grimly tol-
erated the presence of far-right groups but refused to partner with 
them to form governments. In some countries, like Austria, even this 
informal agreement has evaporated, as the Freedom Party joined gov-
ernments in 2000 and 2017. Once banned, some extremist parties 
reemerge under different names, like the neo-Nazi Workers Party in 
the Czech Republic that became, after its ban in 2010, the Workers’ 
Party of Social Justice.
Germany has been more willing to enforce its bans on extremist 
organizations than to shut down extremist political parties. In early 
2020, for instance, Germany outlawed Combat 18, an extremist orga-
nization founded in the UK. But it did so only after the group was tied 
to the assassination of Walter Lübcke, a Christian Democratic politi-
cian in Hesse. Moreover, as researcher Michael Zeller has pointed out, 
Germany tends to ban organizations like Combat 18 only in reaction 
to upsurges in extremist violence and the resulting public outrage 
rather than after an assessment that the group’s rhetoric or actions 
violate the pertinent section of the constitution, namely that associ-
ations “whose aims or activities contravene the criminal laws or that 
are directed against the constitutional order or the concept of interna-
tional understanding shall be prohibited.”21
Some countries, like Austria, have criminalized Holocaust denial. 
Austria has also banned the Nazi flag, as has France, Russia, Poland, 
Ukraine, Lithuania, and Latvia. Germany has imposed perhaps the 
most restrictions on Nazi-associated language and objects. In Germany, 
you can’t wave a sign with a swastika on it or make a Nazi salute in 
public. In 2012, members of the National Democratic Party were even 
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kicked out of the Saxony parliament for wearing Thor Steinar clothing, 
a manufacturer that deliberately markets to neo-Nazis.22
Yet, such prohibitions against Nazi symbolism, for instance, in 
schools, have been difficult to impose, as sociologist Cynthia Miller-
Idriss points out. Determined designers and students devise clever 
workarounds. If schools ban students from wearing t-shirts that 
proclaim 88—“h” is the eighth letter of the alphabet, so “hh” or 88 has 
come to represent “heil Hitler”—then they’ll just wear shirts with the 
equation “100 – 12.” Although Germany bans people from wearing 
clothes that celebrate the Nazi Party—Nationalsozialistische Deutsche 
Arbeiterpartei or NSDAP—neo-Nazis figured out that they could buy 
Lonsdale shirts with the British clothing manufacturer’s name across 
the chest. Then, donning a bomber jacket and leaving it half-unzipped, 
they can proudly display the middle four letters of the brand name: 
NSDA.23
Where federal authorities have been unable or unwilling to ban 
the far right, localities have sometimes stepped into the vacuum. In 
Poland, for instance, the conservative Law and Justice Party (PiS) 
occasionally sided with the extreme right. But Warsaw, the capital of 
the country, remains quite liberal politically. So, even though PiS and 
the Catholic Church have promoted various forms of homophobia, 
the Warsaw mayor signed a 12-point declaration strongly defending 
LGBT rights in 2019.24 The year before, he banned a far-right march 
despite its nominal purpose of celebrating the country’s hundredth 
anniversary of independence (the constitutional court subsequently 
overturned the ban). With these and other moves, the municipality 
has pushed back against a national trend.
In the United States, states have occasionally taken the lead in com-
bating the far right. Most states have some type of hate crime law on 
the books (with several exceptions, such as Arkansas, Georgia, South 
Carolina, and Wyoming). Georgia even banned masks in public to 
reduce the influence of the Ku Klux Klan (suspended during the coro-
navirus pandemic).25 Unlike a number of other countries, however, 
the United States has no hate speech laws, owing to constitutional pro-
tections of speech and assembly. Every state has provisions in their 
constitutions or statutory prohibitions against paramilitary forces, 
which several municipalities have used against the far right.26 Several 
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Democratic governors indirectly targeted the far right by mobilizing 
against Trump administration policies and vigorously pushing back 
against the president’s attempts to send federal paramilitaries into 
cities to suppress dissent under cover of “fighting crime.”
Despite the strength of civil liberty arguments that have made bans 
at the federal or state level quite rare, the space has been open for U.S. 
citizens themselves to band together against the far right. One famous 
example is the community response in Billings, Montana, which 
inspired a PBS documentary, Not In Our Town. In December 1992, 
when a rock was thrown through the window of a Jewish family dis-
playing a menorah, the local newspaper printed a menorah that nearly 
10,000 citizens put up in their windows. Later, when skinheads dis-
rupted a church service, members of different faiths appeared in the 
pews to convey a sense of security and solidarity. The police chief 
of Billings strongly supported this civic response, which provided 
important official validation. The Billings example inspired similar 
local movements around the United States and even elsewhere in the 
world.27
Schools throughout the United States and the world have used the 
Not In Our Town video as part of the curriculum, and education is 
indeed a powerful against the far right. Some countries have mandated 
instruction in the schools on hate crimes, racism, tolerance, and mul-
ticulturalism. Other civic institutions—religious, cultural, and labor 
unions—have followed suit.
More recently, new civic movements have arisen to fight the new 
right. The Sardines came together to urge voters to reject right-wing 
populism in the Emilia-Romagna region of Italy. “We are anti-fas-
cist, pro-equality, against intolerance, against homophobia,” one of 
the founders described the movement.28 Their protests spread to 90 
cities in late 2019 and early 2020. In the pandemic era, the Sardines 
have been at the forefront of the migrant rights and Black Lives Matter 
movement in Italy. In Brazil, meanwhile, Movimento Estamos Juntos 
(We’re In This Together Movement) has brought together both left and 
right in defense of democracy and against Jair Bolsonaro’s authoritari-
anism. Drawing inspiration from the civic movements that brought an 
end to the country’s military rule, the new movement hopes to unite 
all the disparate anti-Bolsonaro forces.29
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naming and shaming
When Jair Bolsonaro received a Man of the Year award from the Brazil-
ian–U.S. Chamber of Commerce in 2019, activists from both countries 
raised such a stink that New York venues declined to host the May 
ceremony. In the end, Bolsonaro had to go to Texas to accept his award 
(where he faced further protests).30
Similarly, anti-Trump groups in England, with their threats of mass 
protests, prompted the U.S. president to cancel his trip to London in 
early 2018.31 When he made his first presidential visit to the UK later 
that year, the appearance of the infamous Baby Trump balloon led the 
president to steer clear of London. “I guess when they put out blimps 
to make me feel unwelcome, no reason for me to go to London,” 
Trump said.32
At the Hindu World Congress in Chicago in September 2018, several 
activists from Chicago South Asians for Justice managed to gain access 
to a plenary session packed with 1,000 people and featuring the head 
of the far-right RSS, Mohan Bhagwat. “We stood up and chanted ‘RSS 
turn around, we don’t want you in our town,’” reports Mansi Kathuria, 
one of the protesters. 
The response was pretty terrifying. The folks attending the confer-
ence immediately turned on us, pushing and grabbing. We were 
standing on chairs to have better visibility, and they pulled the chairs 
from underneath us. A man was choking one of my friends who was 
part of the disruption. The crowd took our banner and pushed us 
out of the hotel altogether into the parking lot.
But the protest attracted a lot of media coverage, including in India.33
Naming and shaming has a long tradition in the human rights 
movement. By exposing the wrongful actions of a government and 
organizing a pressure campaign to force the government to change its 
policies, activists threaten the reputation of the country, which in turn 
puts its trade deals and tourism earnings at risk. It can be a powerful 
tool for non-state actors to use against oppressive states.
Even if the target of the “name and shame” strategy shrugs off the 
reputational damage, it’s important to pursue the campaigns nonethe-
less. Herbert Pell, who was instrumental in bringing war crime charges 
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against the Nazis during and after World War II, saw “how Confed-
erate veterans in the South had created for themselves a misty-eyed 
mythology about the US Civil War and was determined that the Nazis 
would not do the same,” writes Dan Plesch in his study of international 
war crimes tribunals. 
Pell’s motivation was to prevent postwar nostalgia for the Nazis 
breeding more war: “In a small German village, the local member of 
the Gestapo will be the hero … He will tell young boys … of the fun 
of shooting Jews in Poland, or the profit of looting France … Pres-
ently will come someone hopeful of succeeding Hitler.”34 
Naming and shaming can effectively sever that link between the 
horrors of the past and a revival of such horrors in the future.
In the United States, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) is 
devoted to identifying extremist organizations and exposing their 
noxious policies, as is Hope Not Hate in the UK. Other countries, 
however, lack such an authoritative list of hate groups, so it is more dif-
ficult for civil society organizations to pressure outfits like Facebook to 
ban extremist organizations. “There’s no equivalent of ADL or SPLC 
in most European countries that puts up something that says, ‘here are 
the bad guys and here’s what they think,’” says Heidi Beirich, formerly 
of SPLC. “I’ve been asked repeatedly by Facebook and others, ‘Who 
can we talk to in these other spaces. Who can give us a list of bad 
actors in Germany.’ The answer is basically nobody.” This gap inspired 
her to create a new organization, the Global Project Against Hate and 
Extremism.
Naming-and-shaming tactics, by focusing on prominent individu-
als of the new right, can effectively push these leaders to the margins. 
Richard Spencer, who spent much of the 2010s traveling between the 
United States and Europe to strengthen the transatlantic far right, 
came to national prominence as the organizer of the Unite the Right 
rally in Charlottesville in 2017. But his failures to bring large numbers 
of people out onto the street, the cancelation under public pressure 
of his campus speeches, his banishment from social media, and his 
court troubles all contributed to his demotion within the alt-right.35 
The same applies to Milo Yiannopoulos, the far-right provocateur and 
former Breitbart editor, who was also booted from social media, had 
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his book contract with Simon & Schuster canceled, and was driven 
into millions of dollars of debt.36
Name-and-shame tactics can apply as well to groups as well as indi-
viduals. Whenever the far right appears in the real world—a speech, a 
demonstration, a conference—a counterforce of anti-fascist protesters 
are there to wave signs, chant slogans, and even disrupt the event. At 
the Unite the Right march in 2017, the mostly young white men of the 
far right were met by determined students, clergy, and city residents. 
For a gathering in Washington, DC, to mark the one-year anniversary 
of the march, only two dozen white nationalists showed their faces—
in contrast to the thousands of counter-protesters.37
The far right, however, has used the theater of protest and counter-
protest to attract greater media attention, which means that anti-fascist 
activists sometimes unwittingly give the far right greater visibility. 
One German town figured out a way to subvert this dynamic of 
demonstration. In 2014, in the town of Wunsiedel, the organization 
Right against Right set up an “involuntary walkathon.” The 250 
neo-Nazi marchers, unbeknownst to them, were registered for this 
walkathon: the further they walked along the parade route, the more 
money they raised for EXIT Deutschland, which helps people leave far-
right organizations. In the end, the neo-Nazis raised over $10,000 for 
an organization devoted to destroying their base.38 Inspired by Right 
against Right, the Jewish Bar Association of San Francisco came up 
with an “adopt a Nazi” campaign, by which donors pledged an amount 
of money for each extremist who showed up at a “Freedom Rally” in 
the Bay Area. The extremists got the message and canceled the event.39
Naming and shaming plays a public role in delegitimizing far-
right organizations and individuals. A somewhat different process, 
naming and turning, has moved individuals out of white nationalism. 
A number of YouTubers have set out to debunk the claims of the new 
right and succeeded in transforming the perspectives of “formers” like 
Caleb Crain.40 There are also professional organizations devoted to 
deradicalization, such as the German Institute for Radicalization and 
De-Radicalization Studies, which serves as a network for practitioners.
The German government has been a trailblazer in this regard, estab-
lishing its Exit to Enter program in 2009. Participants in the right-wing 
scene are identified, often at a workplace, and then gradually weaned 
off their dependency on the far right through discussion, training, 
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apprenticeship, additional education, and cash incentives. Every 
person gets involved with the far right for their own complex reasons, 
so each case of exit is tailored to the needs of the individual.41 But 
such programs can only function within a larger social-welfare ecosys-
tem and even then can only reach a small percentage of extremists. As 
Kristina Nauditt and Gerd Wermerskirch point out, “many right-wing 
extremists are neither young nor unemployed, whereas labor-mar-
ket integration is primarily focused on young adults who either have 
tired of the far-right scene or are looking to integrate into society after 
serving jail sentences for crimes they have committed.”42
digital pushback
The far right has long organized transnationally in the digital realm, 
while the left seems to be a few steps behind. “The playing field is not 
level,” says Julia Ebner of ISD. The far right “has a big advantage in 
terms of algorithms of social media favorable for spreading conspiracy 
theories and potentially harmful and inciting content.”
One place to begin leveling the playing field has been to monitor 
the far right’s digital footprint, tracking how far-right ideas and memes 
move through the internet and social media. ISD has produced just 
such a report that tracked the phrase “great replacement” and the asso-
ciated term “remigration” in three languages across Twitter.43 Another 
tactic has been to deploy AI to identify key words and images that 
suggest impending violence and alert the police accordingly.
Then there’s turning the far right’s digital tactics against the extrem-
ists. With “doxxing,” far-right activists compile personal information 
about their adversaries on the left in order to release private infor-
mation about them on the Web, initiate trolling campaigns against 
them, or harass them at their home or place of work. In extreme 
cases, doxxers phone in “terrorism” tips that bring SWAT teams to 
surround the victim’s house. Sleuths have done the same to right-wing 
extremists, often exposing the true identities behind their anonymous 
avatars. “I’m interested in raising the cost of being a white nationalist,” 
one such sleuth told The Washington Post, “raising the cost of being a 
Nazi, raising the cost of making these threats anonymously online, and 
making it clear that these people are not as hard to find as they think 
they are.”44
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But perhaps the most controversial and potentially successful 
technique for challenging the far right on the digital turf has been 
deplatforming. Providing information about how the far right breaks 
the rules of the social media platform and applying pressure to hosting 
companies like Facebook and Twitter to remove organizations asso-
ciated with hate have substantially reduced the potential audience for 
far-right organizations and individuals.
Consider the example of Infowars. For years, the conspiracy theorist 
behind Infowars, Alex Jones, had been disseminating misinforma-
tion, false rumors, and hate-filled rants across multiple platforms. He 
said, for instance, that “Hillary Clinton has personally murdered and 
chopped up and raped [children],” that FEMA has plans to incarcerate 
all Americans in concentration camps, that the mass shooting at Sandy 
Hook Elementary in Newton, Connecticut never happened. Across his 
websites, podcasts, and videos, he was regularly reaching more people 
than the National Review, Newsweek, or The Economist.45
After the parents of Sandy Hook victims took Jones to court, public 
pressure to deplatform him rose significantly. In early August 2018, 
Apple dropped his podcasts. Facebook, YouTube, Spotify, Twitter, 
and eventually PayPal followed suit.46 Jones claimed that the publicity 
associated with the bans would only give him a larger platform. But, 
according to The New York Times, 
In the three weeks before the August 6 bans, Infowars had a daily 
average of nearly 1.4 million visits to its website and views of videos 
posted by its main YouTube and Facebook pages, according to a 
New York Times analysis of data from the web data firms Tubular 
Labs and SimilarWeb. In the three weeks afterward, its audience fell 
by roughly half, to about 715,000 site visits and video views, accord-
ing to the analysis.47
Unfortunately, although the major social media platforms dropped 
to around two percent of the traffic to the site, several conservative 
and libertarian sites—the Drudge Report, The Liberty Daily—have 
continued to drive people to Infowars.48 Meanwhile, the coronavirus 
pandemic boosted sales of Jones’ survivalist products. Deplatforming, 
in other words, cannot by itself silence a noxious voice.
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Deplatforming faces other challenges. Once kicked off of platforms 
like Twitter, controversial figures start popping up in more like-minded 
places like Gab where it can be more difficult to monitor their rhetoric 
and proposed actions. “The argument has been that deplatforming 
will force a lot of the stuff into the shadows,” notes Matt Nipert. “But 
it’s already happening in the shadows. It won’t remove the problem but 
it will make recruitment difficult, will prevent the jump to the main-
stream. When the far right complains about it, you know you’ve done 
a good thing.”49
And the right has complained. “I lost 4 million fans in the last round 
of bans,” Milo Yiannopoulos has said. “I spent years growing and 
developing and investing in my fan base and they just took it away in 
a flash.” He tried to set up on other platforms, like Telegram and Gab, 
but “none of them have audiences who buy or commit to anything.” Joe 
Mulhall of Hope Not Hate thus concludes that the “failure to transfer 
their audiences from major to minor platforms is a perennial problem 
of the deplatformed.”50
The impact goes beyond the narrowing of the audience. The 
deplatforming of Donald Trump in early 2021, for instance, had an 
immediate impact on the level of disinformation available in social 
media. “Online misinformation about election fraud plunged 73 
percent after several social media sites suspended President Trump 
and key allies last week, research firm Zignal Labs has found, under-
scoring the power of tech companies to limit the falsehoods poisoning 
public debate when they act aggressively,” report Elizabeth Dwoskin 
and Craig Timberg in The Washington Post.51
Deplatforming can resemble a game of whack-a-mole. As soon as 
extremists are identified and removed from one social media niche, 
another set arises to take their place. In 2020, for instance, prompted 
by the threat of a boycott from sponsors like Starbucks and Ford, 
Facebook upped its fight against the far right by deplatforming 
hundreds of accounts associated with the Boogaloo Bois.52 It followed 
this up by purging QAnon accounts in October 2020 and “Stop the 
Steal” content in January 2021. These movements, too, migrated to 
other platforms, which led to efforts to shut down the alternative plat-
forms, as when Amazon, Apple, and Google pulled the plug on Parler, 
which had pitched itself as an alternative social media platform.
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The real threat to the far right, however, has been to attack its source 
of funding. However, even when deplatforming involves cutting off 
these sources—for instance, when PayPal canceled accounts for 
extremist organizations in the wake of the Charlottesville march in 
2017—the new right has established alternative e-commerce sites 
(1776.shop), crowd-sourcing platforms (Hatreon), and ways of trans-
ferring money (with cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin).53
When it comes to organizations, the success of deplatforming 
depends in part on the target. “If an organization is in the growth 
phase, then deplatforming is effective—you are removing their ability 
to do what they want to do,” argues Martin Cocker. “Once organiza-
tions are fully developed, deplatforming increases the complexity of 
combatting them and their issues.”54
Deplatforming also goes both ways. Authoritarian governments are 
skilled at removing critical voices from the public sphere by ensuring 
that they have no platform at all. For illiberal governments that operate 
in a semblance of democracy, the tactics can be more sophisticated. In 
Russia, for instance, news aggregators are liable for the content that 
appears on their sites if they have more than a million daily users—
unless they draw their news only from officially approved media.55 
This tactic ensures that views challenging the government’s narrative 
remain on the margins.
Progressives are well aware of the opportunities that digital orga-
nizing presents. “We’re in an age when there’s more instantaneous 
communication than at any point in human history,” points out Kumi 
Naidoo, the South Africa-born human rights activist. 
There’s a constant flow of information but very little coordination 
on a transnational level in a broad sense. There are lots of reasons: 
resources, language, access. But we have to figure that piece out: 
how and who to resource that. We have a five-year window to make 
some serious strides or we’re going to be in trouble.
One organization that has sought to fill the gap on transnational coor-
dination is the Online Progressive Engagement Network (OPEN), 
which links up citizen advocacy groups like MoveOn throughout the 
world. In the last six years, it has brought together 19 such organi-
zations, including Zazim in Israel, GetUp in Australia, and Skiftet in 
responding to the new right
103
Sweden. The network can mobilize its members rapidly on key trans-
national issues, such as corporate tax havens or the construction of 
a new coal mine by a TNC. OPEN has set up online forums where 
members can communicate and has also provided open-source plat-
forms that are cheaper and more accessible. Now, it’s pushing to 
expand into the Global South. “Our members are mostly white and 
heavily European, so we have to figure out how to diversify,” explains 
Giovanna Alvarez-Negretti of OPEN who is based in Barcelona. “In 
order to reach out to people in countries with a lot of poverty and 
inequality, mobilizing people will have to expand to mobile phones 
and accessible technology.”
Deplatforming can play a role in marginalizing the most hateful 
voices. In the end, though, progressives have to bring more people 
into the digital realm and fill it with factual information and positive 




The World Social Forum began when 12,000 people converged on 
Porto Alegre in Brazil in January 2001 under the banner of “another 
world is possible.” Across two decades of convenings, the WSF has rep-
resented a high point in progressive, multi-issue global organizing. Its 
successes and shortcomings provide an important reference point for 
current efforts to challenge the transnational right.
An extraordinary combination of political debate, strategy session, 
and carnival, the World Social Forum united two distinct trajectories 
in transnational organizing.
At the UN level, it was the culmination of a series of gatherings—
such as the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and the World 
Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995—that brought together 
representatives of states and civil society. “The first transnational 
mobilization was of the ecological movements to create the Earth 
Summit and to create legally binding treaties for biodiversity and 
climate change,” recalls activist author Vandana Shiva. “That legal 
infrastructure is what the one percent and the so-called populists are 
attacking right now.”
The second strand consisted of grassroots protests against the 
institutions and mechanisms of economic globalization. Environmen-
talists, trade unionists, and farmers met in Seattle in 1999, temporarily 
shutting down the World Trade Organization meeting and blocking 
what former director-general Renato Ruggiero called the “consti-
tution of a single global economy.”1 These activists created what has 
been called the anti-globalization movement. “I found that very ironic 
because the so-called anti-globalization movement was a very global 
movement,” observes Kumi Naidoo, formerly the head of Amnesty 
International. “It was using some of the tools of transnational connec-
tivity and the internet and online ways of connecting. We should call it 
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instead a global justice movement or a gender justice movement or an 
economic justice movement.”
This global justice movement accelerated after 1999, through the 
protests against the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2001 
and the G8 summit in Genoa in July 2001. But then it collided with the 
events of September 11, 2001. “The next big mobilization was set for 
October 2001, two or three weeks after the 9/11 attacks,” recalls Phyllis 
Bennis of IPS. 
First, every airport in the world was shut down. And people just 
realized that we just can’t keep going as if nothing had changed 
(because George W. Bush made sure of that). So, that meeting never 
happened, and even though the global justice movement continued 
to do really important work, organizationally it never really recov-
ered from that blow.
As the union of these two trajectories—the top-down gatherings and 
the bottom-up protests—the World Social Forum provided a people’s 
alternative to the World Economic Forum meeting at Davos. Even 
as the September 11 attacks interrupted the momentum of the post-
Seattle mobilization against the WTO and free trade, the WSF only 
grew larger, spawning regional forums and creating innumerable joint 
enterprises.
“All the demos against the war in Iraq were coordinated in those 
spaces,” Fiona Dove of the Transnational Institute remembers. “Some 
of the big trade campaigns, the movement against corporate impunity, 
also began there.” Sarita Gupta, formerly of Jobs with Justice, says that 
the organization’s relationship to “the New Trade Union initiative 
in India—which seeded the Asia Floor Wage Campaign but is now 
taking on gender-based violence in the garment sector—happened 
100 percent because of the WSF process.”
Kali Akuno connects the work of his organization, Cooperation 
Jackson in Mississippi, to the meetings, delegations, and conversations 
around the WSF, particularly participatory budgeting, a more inclusive 
mechanism for determining spending priorities that began in Brazil. 
“In the early 2000s, me and several others took a couple of different 
popular education courses on participatory budgeting,” he remem-
bers. “A number of political forces here in Mississippi committed 
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ourselves to bringing participatory budgeting here and implementing 
it after that.”
The forum was also noteworthy for being driven by groups from 
the Global South. The meetings took place in Brazil, India, Senegal, 
Tunisia, Kenya, Mali, and Venezuela. The WSF did not take place in 
the Global North—in Montreal—until its 15th edition in 2016.
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, other global movements 
intersected with the WSF. The Occupy Movement in the United States, 
the indignados in Spain, and the Arab Spring embraced a parallel 
spirit of social justice. These spontaneous uprisings achieved certain 
victories—the Occupy Movement “for the first time put inequality at 
the top of the global agenda,” argues Srećko Horvat, the Croatian phi-
losopher and author of Poetry from the Future—and helped sustain the 
energy of the World Social Forum. But they didn’t produce a durable 
transnational movement.
Particularly after 2008, many participants grumbled about the 
forum’s refusal to take political positions and its overall skepticism 
toward vertical organizing. “The Social Forum was the last truly 
global response to a failing globalization, a response on the scale of the 
problem,” argues Lorenzo Marsili. 
It was an incredibly rich space for cross-fertilization, for the 
exchange of best practices. But it failed to make the transition from 
a pure Habermasian discursive space, a forum for debate, to some-
thing more political—not necessarily a political party but a global 
political movement that would act as a movement, taking a stand on 
specific questions and trying to influence the debate with a global 
critical mass.
Kali Akuno agrees, “Instead of being a movement of movements, 
which is how it billed itself, there needed to be conversations about 
how to develop a coordinated international political strategy for 
maximum impact for our social movements,” he points out. “Unfor-
tunately, a certain level of rehashing of the ideological debates of the 
twentieth century reemerged. Some forces didn’t want to repeat the 
centralized politics of the left of that period.”
For Oded Grajew, one of the founders of the World Social Forum, 
the institution was always political in the sense of trying to influ-
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ence policy. But the forum was also careful to be an open space that 
welcomed a wide variety of organizations. When some people wanted 
the WSF to make a declaration in support of Brazilian leader Dilma 
Rousseff, for instance, Grajew encouraged them to put one out in the 
name of the organizations that agreed, but not in the name of everyone. 
“Others wanted to make a declaration that the most important thing 
to do is to fight climate change,” he says. “But others say that the most 
important thing is gender inequality or social inequality. You must 
respect everyone who has different positions and priorities.”
Although the 2018 Social Forum mobilized 80,000 people, the 
process no longer has the same momentum it did in the 2000s. The 
Workers Party in Brazil, which supported the WSF in its early years, 
lost power, and its leader Lula was imprisoned. The pink tide of 
left-leaning governments in Latin America ebbed. The sheer expense 
and carbon footprint of such gatherings were also challenges. “I always 
said that in periods of declining resources, we should conserve every 
bit of our energy and meet once every decade,” Vandana Shiva notes. 
“We bathe every day—but in India we have a cycle of 12 years before 
we go to bathe in the Ganges for the Kumbh, the fair of creation.”
As it neared its twentieth anniversary, the World Social Forum began 
to shift away from multi-issue gatherings to thematic issues such as 
the migration crisis (Mexico in 2018), the fight against the extraction 
economy (South Africa in 2018), and the focus on transformative 
economies (virtually in 2020). Although the thematic forums allow for 
more focused networking and organizing, activists still speak fondly of 
the larger, multi-issue gatherings. “If there’s a moment when we need 
a WSF-like space, it’s right now,” observes Sarita Gupta, currently the 
director of the Ford Foundation’s Future of Work(ers) program. May 
Boeve points out that “looking at issues with a cross-sectional analysis 
is all the rage now but we were doing that a long time ago—with 
the climate crisis, the wars, the debt crisis, bringing all those issues 
together. Those spaces are not happening now.” Ethan Earle adds, “Just 
because something has completed its life cycle doesn’t mean it can’t be 
reborn. So, another iteration of the World Social Forum or something 
similar could again be useful one day.”
The regional forums are no longer taking place. But one of the 
organizers of the U.S. Social Forum, Grassroots Global Justice, is pre-
paring to launch a national convening of 10,000 people in the United 
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States for 2021 that will attempt to take this kind of organizing to the 
next level, providing space for multi-issue discussions and building 
between different sectors with a more political focus. “We learned a 
lot of lessons from the U.S. Social Forum,” says GGJ’s Cindy Wiesner. 
“We’re thinking long-term about how to create a new indepen-
dent political vehicle that’s so desperately needed and that brings us 
together beyond our nonprofit organizations or activist collectives so 
that we can contend for power.”
In the wake of the coronavirus, WSF alumni pulled together a new 
effort on Zoom called the Global Dialogue for Systemic Change.2 But 
as with many progressive actions, it has consisted primarily of educa-
tion rather than organizing. Other activists have focused on issuing 
manifestos, like the COVID-19 Global Solidarity Manifesto.3 Ener-
gized by progressive organizing in Europe and the partial success of 
Bernie Sanders in the 2016 and 2020 Democratic Party primaries, a 
new Progressive International launched in May 2020. It has issued 
an open call, set up a progressive wire service, and launched several 
campaigns on international debt, the Green New Deal, and tenant 
organizing.
All of this is promising. But nothing yet approaches the size, breadth, 
or spirit of the World Social Forum.
locus of activism
Much of the multi-issue transnational activism of the left has 
shadowed official international gatherings. The World Social Forum 
was a response to the World Economic Forum in Davos. The mobili-
zations against free-trade agreements often took place alongside WTO 
meetings, G-7 gatherings or meetings around particular agreements 
like the Trans-Pacific Partnership or the North American Free Trade 
Agreement. During the 1990s and into the 2000s, the Helsinki Citizens 
Assembly created a civil society equivalent to the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe while the ASEAN People’s Forum 
attempted something similar with the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations. High-profile meetings of government officials provide a time 
and a date as well as a news hook for potential media coverage of the 
civil society shadow events.
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“It does make it easier when you have clearly defined institutions 
and their gatherings to go up against,” observes Kavita N. Ramdas. 
“When those institutions, however flawed, now seem the last resort of 
sanity, however, it makes you wonder whether we should be going up 
against the World Bank when Trump is ripping up any kind of interac-
tions with anyone in the world.” Other potential targets of protest and 
pressure include the headquarters of transnational corporations, inter-
national weapons shows, and global banks.
One obvious locus of activism for progressives is the United Nations, 
an institution that has embodied internationalism since its founding 
in the wake of World War II. Its human rights conventions, institu-
tions devoted to refugees and climate change, specialized agencies 
like the International Labor Organization (ILO), and commitment to 
peacekeeping all embody progressive transnational ideals. And indeed 
activists view the UN as one of the places open to enacting policy with 
global reach.
Workplace justice organizers, for instance, scored a victory in June 
2019 when the ILO established a new global standard to end violence 
and sexual harassment at work.4 “Across the world, campaigns are hap-
pening now to ratify the treaty and implement the framework at the 
national and local levels,” reports Cathy Feingold of the AFL-CIO. The 
Global Campaign to Reclaim People’s Sovereignty, Dismantle Corpo-
rate Power, and Stop Corporate Impunity is a multi-sectoral network 
of over 250 social movements, trade unions, and affected communities 
focused on reining in the power of transnational corporations. One of 
its principal campaigns is to push a binding treaty to regulate TNCs 
through the UN. “This global campaign brings together diverse move-
ments that feel unified in the struggle against corporate power,” says 
Kumi Naidoo.
However, Kavita N. Ramdas of Open Society continues, “The UN 
has lost so much legitimacy. Through 9/11, the bombing of Afghan-
istan and Iraq, the interventions to destabilize the Middle East, the 
rest of the world has lost confidence that the UN is anything but a 
mouthpiece for the United States and for the Global North.” Another 
criticism—from those pushing for immigration reform or fighting 
climate change—is that the UN is “all talk, no action,” that it produces 
lots of paper and holds plenty of conferences, but moves at a snail’s 
pace. Moreover, as Phyllis Bennis, argues, “From the vantage point of 
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the far right, the UN is already irrelevant. The far right is not focused 
primarily on challenging the UN because they don’t see it as a viable 
instrument of the globalists. They’re more focused on the interna-
tional financial institutions.”
One exception, because of the coronavirus pandemic, is the World 
Health Organization. Its very effectiveness made it a target of the new 
right, with Donald Trump leading the attack. In response, founda-
tions, cultural figures like Lady Gaga, and progressive organizations 
moved quickly in 2020 to throw their financial and moral support 
behind the WHO. It remains an institution that embodies the spirit 
of transnational solidarity and cooperation based on professional and 
technical expertise—these very qualities make it the object of the new 
right’s scorn.
Other institutions of liberal internationalism remain viable. Activ-
ists can rely on legal mechanisms at the International Criminal Court. 
The Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, whose 
members also include the United States and Russia, has a structure in 
which NGOs can speak directly to governments as part of the reviews 
of country performances on democracy and human rights. Within 
Europe, activists can also take their concerns to the European Court of 
Human Rights, the European Commission, and several other bodies. 
Indeed, when it comes to transnational activism, Europeans have 
several mechanisms for influencing policy across borders.
regional organizing
Multi-issue transnational organizing at the global level, via the World 
Social Forum, has subsided to a certain extent over the last few years. 
But transnational organizing at a regional level remains robust.
Europe, for instance, is a natural locus for such organizing because, 
as Lorenzo Marsili points out, it is an economically and politically 
integrated continent with “a transnational government in the form of 
the European Commission and the European Parliament and a very 
sophisticated system of interdependencies among member states. So, 
it provides fertile ground for building a genuine transnational coun-
terpower within the space that EU provides.” One such effort, Europe 
for the Many, is working transnationally to strengthen the “remain and 
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reform” movement within the European Union in the face of Brexit 
and other manifestations of Euroskepticism.
An example of successful European transnational activism was the 
campaign against the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 
which generated demonstrations in cities across Europe and involved 
young people, in particular.5 Widespread concern that ACTA would 
infringe on freedom of expression eventually prompted the European 
Parliament to kill the measure in 2012. “Because ACTA was trans-
national and about to affect transnational space, only transnational 
mobilization was able to stop it,” Igor Stokfiszewski of Krytyka Poli-
tyczna points out. “It became a pattern for coordinated transnational 
action of social movements and political parties to resist those kinds 
of political solutions.” But, he cautioned, with the exception of climate 
change and a few other issues, most of the problems facing Europe do 
not lend themselves to transnational solutions.
In Africa, too, a number of continental initiatives have taken root. 
Africans Rising for Peace, Justice, and Dignity involves over 370 orga-
nizations across the continent. On May 25 every year, Africans Rising 
sponsors events focusing on a different issue. In 2019, the focus was 
on slavery and human trafficking, with more than 130 events across 
the continent and in the diaspora as well. Coumba Touré of Africans 
Rising explains, “The issues we’re struggling with here are the same that 
Africans are struggling with in Brazil or the United States or Europe. 
By being Africans, some of our issues are automatically transnational.”
In Latin America in 2015, ten years after the defeat of the Free Trade 
Agreement of the Americas, social movements came together to create 
La Jornada Continental, the Continental Meeting for Democracy 
and against Neoliberalism. “We decided that the social movements 
of the continent needed to come together to strengthen the struggle 
against neoliberalism, corporate power, and free-trade agreements 
and stop the takeover of democracy by right-wing and authoritarian 
forces,” explains Karin Nansen of Friends of the Earth International in 
Uruguay. “But we are also integrating cross-cutting issues such as envi-
ronmental justice and feminist perspectives, which are fundamental 
to expose and confront the root causes of the systemic crisis we face.”
Women, too, are organizing across Latin America. “The women’s 
movement is old but what we are seeing is a new wave of this movement, 
a new generation of young women, many of them really radical not 
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just on access to abortion but against all the inequalities of the patri-
archy,” reports Luciana Ghiotto, who teaches political economy at 
Universidad Nacional de San Martín in Buenos Aires. The Movement 
of People Affected by Dams in Latin America (MAB) is drawing social 
movements together in the region and hopes to spread the organizing 
to Africa and Asia as well. Meanwhile, in North America, the groups 
behind the tri-national initiative to oppose NAFTA are hoping to 
revive the process in 2020, in part to challenge NAFTA 2.0 but also 
“to make the case that environmental and social concerns should be 
concerns for labor unions,” says Manuel Perez-Rocha of IPS.
In Asia, Women Cross DMZ has brought together women from the 
two Koreas, the United States, Europe, and elsewhere to advance peace 
and reunification on the Korean peninsula. “The Trump administra-
tion has been upending traditional approaches to U.S. foreign policy,” 
notes one of the driving forces behind the movement, Christine 
Ahn from Hawai’i. “For better or worse, it has created some strate-
gic opportunities. As a peace movement and a feminist movement, 
we have to seize the moment to create peace on the Korean penin-
sula.” Toward that same end, Cheong Wooksik of the Peace Network in 
Seoul is part of a regional movement “pushing an agenda of creating a 
nuclear-weapons-free zone on the Korean Peninsula as a prior step to 
the creation of a NWFZ in Northeast Asia.”
One of the most successful regional organizing efforts in Asia is 
constantly on the move. Founded in 1983 as a “floating peace village,” 
Peace Boat brings together hundreds of passengers from countries all 
around the world for two long peace tours in Asia every year (and 
three global tours). “Having people go beyond national borders is 
the very foundation of building peace,” explains Peace Boat’s Akira 
Kawasaki in Tokyo. 
When you look at the current intergovernmental disputes—for 
example, between Japan and South Korea or Japan and China—
they’re a symptom of people very much trapped in narrowly defined 
nationalism. Cultivating a sense of global citizenship or an identity 
as Asians rather than Japanese, Chinese, or Korean through our 
Asia voyages—a change in mindset—is the basic methodology 
Peace Boat has employed since its founding in 1983.
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In Northeast Asia, Peace Boat brought together groups from the two 
Koreas, Japan, and China for a meeting in Ulan Bator, Mongolia, to 
discuss concrete steps toward peace and denuclearization in the region.
Largely absent from regional organizing, at least on an activist level, 
is China. This poses a challenge to the progressive movement, which 
has praised the government in Beijing for its efforts on sustainable 
energy and criticized it for human rights abuses. Although Chinese 
environmental activists have collaborated with their regional coun-
terparts, civil society on the mainland remains relatively weak and 
isolated. “We can’t have a movement that calls itself global or a dis-
course that calls itself planetary that shuts out not only 1 billion people 
but the 1 billion people who through their political organization will 
shape the next decades in quite a significant way,” observes Lorenzo 
Marsili. Peace Boat has been perhaps most successful in engaging 
ordinary Chinese citizens. According to Akira Kawasaki, so many par-
ticipants in the voyages are now Chinese that the workshops onboard 
are conducted in Chinese, not only Japanese and English.
There have also been cross-regional initiatives. The Asia-Europe 
People’s Forum, for instance, has provided a progressive alternative to 
the Asia-Europe Meeting since 1996. A number of transatlantic pro-
gressive efforts have flourished over the years, but the rise of the right 
has complicated matters. “We used to appeal to the Europeans to be the 
voice of reason that’s been more willing to challenge the U.S. govern-
ment,” reports Medea Benjamin of Code Pink. “Because of the growth 
of the far right in Europe, the groups we work with tend to be weaker.”
translocal organizing
Outside of a few countries—South Korea, Spain—left parties are not in 
power. “I don’t see much light at the national level,” says the AFL-CIO’s 
Cathy Feingold, “except for the smaller countries like New Zealand and 
its wellbeing budget or Iceland and geothermal energy and feminism.”
Given this record, it is no surprise that some on the left are refocus-
ing away from national politics. “This right-wing hasn’t come from 
nowhere,” Fiona Dove of TNI points out. “They’ve been building this 
for quite a while. So, transnationally, we need to root politics locally, 
bring politics back closer to the people. In Europe at any rate, we’re 
quite excited by this new municipalism.”
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Rooting politics locally and working transnationally is not a con-
tradiction. In Spain in 2015, after winning power in several major 
Spanish cities, the left immediately realized “that the challenges of the 
current moment are transnational—climate change, unaccountable 
financial flows, the corporate capture of democratic institutions, the 
right to migrate and the protection of refugees, the arms trade—that 
had to be addressed through transnational cooperation,” Sol Trumbo 
Vila of TNI explains. “So, there was a strong effort to connect nation-
ally and transnationally with similar projects in Italy, in Latin America, 
and also with Cooperation Jackson in Mississippi and Richmond Pro-
gressive Alliance in California.” Thus was born the Fearless Cities 
campaign.
Through the Fearless Cities campaign, Spanish cities worked with 
their counterparts across Europe to press for regulation of transna-
tional corporations like Airbnb. It’s difficult to fight Airbnb locally, 
explains Laura Roth of Barcelona En Comú, “but if cities join efforts 
they are much stronger than companies in some cases. Cities are 
more willing to do these things compared to states or national politi-
cal parties.” In Spain, she adds, “When the refugee crisis started, cities 
basically pressured the state to accept many more refugees because 
they were willing to put the resources into receiving all those people.”
In Poland, the populist right is in control of national politics and 
most government structures. But the country is rather decentralized. 
“Because of this decentralization, it is possible to resist many of the 
tendencies that the government is trying to introduce at the level of 
cities,” including its anti-LGBT actions, Igor Stokfiszewski of Krytyka 
Polityczna explains. “One of the first actions of the Warsaw mayor 
was to sign an ‘LGBT charter’ that secures the wellbeing of the LGBT 
community at a city level.” The progressive mayor of Seoul, Park Won-
Soon, made similar efforts to transform the city even as politics at 
the national level drifted further to the right (under the eventually 
impeached President Park Geun-hye).6 California and other states 
have mounted challenges to the Trump administration’s regressive 
climate and immigration policies.
Translocal organizing is not just municipal. In Europe, renewable 
energy cooperatives are linking up to enable consumers to create a 
new energy model. As Jason Nardi explains, these new linkages are 
facilitated by blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies that avoid 
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the speculation and environmental problems of Bitcoin. Local curren-
cies—for instance, the léman in Geneva, Switzerland—can also help 
with relocalizing supply chains.7 “The whole supply chain for craft 
beer production is relocalized,” Nardi reports. “It is using the léman to 
substitute for the Swiss franc in exchanges with all the suppliers up to 
the bar or restaurant that sells the beer, from who produces the crop to 
who transforms it—even to mushroom producers using the residual 
‘waste’ to nurture their cultivation.”
Nor is the translocalism restricted to cities. ”The groups that we 
fund—peasant movements, indigenous people’s movements, women’s 
movements working in rural areas—there is transnational movement 
building,” observes Nikhil Aziz of the American Jewish World Service. 
“A lot of it is still localized, still responding to immediate assaults in 
terms of land grabs or the impact of climate change.” The Inter-Island 
Solidarity for Peace group, meanwhile, brings together activists from 
a number of Asian islands burdened by military bases and militariza-
tion—Jeju, Okinawa, Taiwan, Guam, Hawai’i.
linking issues
The World Social Forum was transnational and multi-issue. Although 
such big tent organizing is difficult and expensive, there are plenty of 
more modest transnational efforts that connect two or more issues.
The environmental movement, for instance, has brought together 
concerns over sustainability with economic justice, feminism, and 
issues of war and peace. “The #FridaysforFuture strikes: that is inter-
national organizing through solidarity,” Vandana Shiva points out. 
“That is today’s World Social Forum.” At Standing Rock in 2016, 
indigenous activists and environmentalists joined hands to block a 
proposed energy pipeline slated to cross reservation territory. And in 
Okinawa, environmentalists and peace activists have worked together 
to stop the construction of a new U.S. military facility, arguing that the 
base would disrupt the fragile ecosystem along the coast.
Labor and environmental activists have found common cause in 
such organizations as the Climate Justice Alliance, Labor Network for 
Sustainability, and Trade Unions for Energy Democracy. One oppor-
tunity for transnational linkage on these issues involves challenging 
corporations that use the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
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mechanism in free-trade agreements to file suits against countries that 
have tried to implement responsible environmental policies or regu-
lations.8 Manuel Perez-Rocha has compiled a database of all the suits 
filed by extractive industries against countries, which he plans to share 
with climate change activists “so that they understand the perils of 
ISDS in their fights against the fossil-fuel industries. Countries can 
make very nice declarations, but it doesn’t matter if they can’t meet 
those commitments because they might be sued by corporations.”
Arms trade activists have linked arms with human rights campaign-
ers to stop the flow of weapons to places like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and 
Israel. Sustainable farming advocates work with indigenous commu-
nities and environmentalists. Anti-corruption forces cooperate with 
economic justice advocates pushing for greater regulation of global 
financial institutions. #MeToo activists have taken on structural 
racism.
There is no shortage of cross-linkages in progressive transnational 
organizing. The challenge, as Cindy Wiesner points out, is to aim not 
for the lowest common denominator politics but to cohere at a higher 
level: “To be honest, this is the kind of work that doesn’t get acknowl-
edged by funders or by other movement counterparts—the work of 
bringing people together despite differences around shared interests.”
The left faces some tensions in its overall agenda. Activists square off 
over the relative importance of pocketbook issues vs. identity politics. 
Environmental concerns do not always play well among traditional 
working-class constituencies, particularly those whose livelihoods 
depend on polluting industries. So, cross-linkages can also lead to 
cross-purposes.
But these are not the only challenges facing progressive transna-
tional organizing.
The rapid spread of the new right has thrown progressives onto the 
defensive in country after country. One immediate response has been 
to refocus attention on the national rather than transnational level. 
Ran Cohen observes,
Each and every organization or party is really busy with what’s hap-
pening at home—in Hungary, in Israel, in Greece—without giving 
much attention to how anti-democratic forces are rising around the 
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world and whether or not we should be looking at it as a global 
emergency that requires global solutions.
At a time of heightened threats, the other tendency has been to 
refocus on one issue to the exclusion of others. When Metta Spencer 
of Canada’s Peace Magazine approaches people to work on multi-issue 
efforts these days, 
Almost everyone would say: I’m working my butt off on climate 
change or on chemical weapons and I can only do so much. You’re 
asking me to diffuse my efforts. You have too broad a scope. Just 
take one thing and work on that. But by doing just that one thing, 
we don’t see how we’re connected to other people working on other 
issues.
Then there’s the problem of agenda creep. With the new right eager to 
undermine the status quo, the left often ends up fighting for what had 
previously been taken for granted by liberal mainstream society such 
as independent media or free and fair elections. For a left determined 
to promote transformational change, it can be a challenge to pivot to 
defending the building blocks of an embattled status quo.
The commonplace challenges of transnational movement-build-
ing—the urgency of defending gains at a national level, the 
compartmentalization of activism, the tension between transforma-
tional and incremental change—have only been accentuated by the 
rise of the new right.
the centrality of democracy
The new right is not just attacking liberalism, both domestically and 
internationally. “What’s in danger here is democracy itself not just liber-
alism,” argues Jan-Werner Mueller. “We can’t leave the term ‘democracy’ 
to the populists, unless you want to say that we have democracy as long 
as the governing party doesn’t stuff ballot boxes on election day. Orbán, 
Erdoğan, and other populist leaders damage democracy as such when 
they undermine fundamental political rights.”
If the new right is challenging democracy, a natural response should 
be to strengthen democracy. “In order to address the crisis, we need 
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more and more democracy, deeper democracy,” argues Karin Nansen 
of FOEI Uruguay, “in which people have a say, where they can reclaim 
the political arena and take politics into their hands, and make fun-
damental decisions like how we should produce our food, how to 
distribute it, how to change the economic and energy systems.”
“The answer to attacks on democracy is more democracy,” agrees 
Eric Ward. “It is not the white nationalist movement that is threaten-
ing American democracy. What is threatening American democracy is 
our inability to put forward an alternative to white nationalism that is 
grounded and inclusive of American voices.”
An inclusive, pro-democracy approach, however, can be either 
partisan or non-partisan. Annabel Park, who started the Coffee Party 
in 2010 in response to the right-wing Tea Party in the U.S., thinks that 
a non-partisan approach would have more traction, at least in the 
United States. “For a lot of Americans, democracy is a calling, almost 
a religion,” she says. “Give them the right opportunity, they’ll drop 
everything.” But, she added, “They don’t want to do something that’s 
partisan. They don’t want to spend their time just supporting a party 
or a candidate—because they are either conflict-averse or they reject 
the two-party system.”
Political parties are, for the most part, national. So, it is rather diffi-
cult to promote a transnational partisan approach. In Europe, however, 
where members have been directly elected to the European Parliament 
since 1979, transnational politicking is increasingly an option, not 
only through linked parties—such as the various Green Parties—but 
through new transnational efforts like DiEM 25 and Volt.
As the co-founder of DiEM25, a relatively new trans-European 
movement with an electoral component, Srećko Horvat has no doubt 
that the left must organize transnational political parties to combat the 
far right. Although DiEM25 did not manage to enter the European 
Parliament after the 2019 elections, it received 130,000 votes in 
Germany with a budget of only 35,000 Euros. “130,000 votes in 
Germany is something we have to capitalize,” Horvat says. “Even if we 
get 10 percent of these people to become active, that’s already a step 
further.” The party subsequently won nine seats in the recent Greek 
legislative elections.
Even in Europe, however, where European integration makes 
cross-border electioneering possible, the challenges are enormous, 
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beginning with the EU’s 24 official languages. “It’s very difficult to 
persuade national parties that it’s in their interest to establish trans-
national coordination and relinquish some sovereignty,” says Lorenzo 
Marsili, author of Citizens of Nowhere. “I’ve talked to dozens of party 
leaders across Europe. They think nationally, their strategic campaign-
ing is done nationally, and they think they won’t have much to gain in 
investing in transnational structures, with the Greens being something 
of an exception.”
For Mary Kaldor, the future of partisan campaigning within the 
European Union is “less a question of creating trans-European parties 
and more about building up coalitions that already exist.” She cites 
the same anti-political sentiment in Europe that Annabel Park has 
observed in the United States. After all, voters have witnessed what 
happens when progressive parties take power. Progressive leaders in 
Latin America transformed mainstream politics by, for instance, intro-
ducing family payments in Brazil to reduce poverty and helping to end 
political impunity in Chile. But progressive parties have succumbed to 
some of the same problems that have afflicted liberal and conservative 
parties, such as corruption. Also, the electoral success of progressive 
parties has created a certain dependency, particularly as these govern-
ments co-opted social movements. “This weakened social movements 
and civil society, which lost their critical role, for instance, on the cor-
ruption issue,” points out Oded Grajew.
One way of splitting the difference between partisan and non-par-
tisan organizing is to embrace a platform transnationally—such as 
the Green New Deal (GND). Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (AOC), the 
outspoken democratic socialist elected to Congress in 2016 who has 
promoted the GND, “has been an enormous inspiration for people 
in Europe, even for the Democratic Left Alliance in Poland,” reports 
Bartosz Rydliński. “We are copying the argument of the Green New 
Deal.” In Europe, most member countries of the European Union now 
back a call to put the Green New Deal at the heart of the economic 
response to the pandemic, with the European Commission’s vice pres-
ident pledging that every Euro of recovery funding “must flow into a 
new economy rather than old structures.”
The inspiration goes beyond Europe. In South Korea, the Green 
New Deal was a major element of the ruling party’s platform in its 
2020 election victory. “People in the Global South are in fact inspired 
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by AOC,” Walden Bello concurs, “and are looking very carefully at the 
strategizing and approaches that she and other new women represen-
tatives in the House are providing.”
Another strategy is to break down the traditional separation 
between groups that work on electoral politics and those that work 
across borders. “These are both important parts of the movement,” 
argues Tobita Chow of Justice Is Global out of Chicago. “A big part of 
what we are trying to accomplish is to bridge that gap.” The new group 
has brought together U.S. workers with laborers from other countries 
to make the case for global economic justice at presidential forums in 
early primary states in fall 2019.
the structure of organizing
Right-wing movements are notoriously hierarchical, often organized 
around a single man (or, very rarely, woman). Outside of Commu-
nist parties and movements, which also tend to be hierarchical, the 
left has been suspicious of too much verticality. Consider the Occupy 
Movement, which avoided leaders and structures. The left, points out 
Ethan Earle, takes pains to make sure that its structures are “at least 
somewhat democratic and respectful of human rights. The far right 
doesn’t share these values. It wants to win and that’s all. It’ll figure 
everything else out afterwards.”
Laura Roth sees virtues in more horizontal organizing. “The left has 
traditionally tried to organize in ways that are not different from the 
right—and sometimes even worse in hierarchical, centralized ways—
and that hasn’t been successful,” she points out. “I’d like to think that 
more horizontal and decentralized ways have the advantage of making 
the efforts less vulnerable to attack. A network is harder to attack 
compared to a visible structure.”
“There is a suspicion of hierarchy, I accept that,” counters Francine 
Mestrum of Global Social Justice in Belgium. “But a hierarchy can be 
made democratic. Trade unions are hierarchical, but they are demo-
cratic.” Elsewhere, she writes, “the attachment to horizontality has now 
become a cover for hiding the really existing power relations. There 
is no structure, no one has any responsibility, and hence there is no 
accountability. There is no transparency, let alone democracy.”
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Srećko Horvat agrees: “The problems from the future are actually 
so big that you need more verticality in the sense of efficient deci-
sion-making process and global cooperation. For instance, if you have 
hundreds of millions of climate refugees, you really need a strong plan 
and infrastructure to handle this.”
A related tension in transnational organizing has been between 
social movements and NGOs. At the World Social Forum, those who 
favor direct action against structures of power and those who favor 
engagement to reform structures of power have often been at odds. 
Although the Social Movements Assembly met during the forum to 
formulate consensus positions, Shalmali Guttal believes that the WSF 
“was much more a space for middle-class organizations. The class char-
acter of the organizers and participants was not that of the majority 
who are living in very dire straits today and who might be capable of 
organizing on the ground.” Fiona Dove agrees: “The big World Social 
Forums at one point got very NGOized. Who got to go were other 
NGOs, not necessarily movements, and those with access to donors 
who could pay their way. At some point there was a sense that they 
were no longer representative.”
One way of squaring this particular circle is the “inside-outside” 
strategy. NGOs attempt to influence policymakers on the inside with 
more-or-less quiet diplomacy. Meanwhile, on the outside, social move-
ments make noise in the streets and otherwise mobilize people power 
in support of more radical change. If the two work at cross-purposes, 
they can cancel each other out. But if they cooperate, they can become 
more than the sum of their parts.
agents of change
Activism requires activists. The challenge for transnational activism 
is the lack of international institutions that can employ or otherwise 
support such activists. “Transnational organizing in the traditional 
sense is very difficult at this point without an institutional base,” Gar 
Alperovitz points out.
One such institutional base remains the union movement. “Despite 
the challenges unions face, we’re still the largest global force,” Cathy 
Feingold says. The International Trade Union Confederation, where 
Feingold is the deputy president, represents over 200 million workers 
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in over 300 affiliates. In terms of transnational activism, she points to 
new organizing in the informal economy, to a recently opened Just 
Transition Center to address the common interests of workers and 
a sustainable economy, and to the role that unions have played in 
democratization, like the Tunisian General Trade Union that shared 
the Nobel Prize in 2015 and continues to represent the “glue for the 
inclusive democracy” in that country.
Unions and workers organizations are taking on new transnational 
corporations like Amazon. In 2018, for instance, Amazon workers in 
Germany and Spain went on strike—and Polish workers conducted a 
work slowdown—in a coordinated push for better wages and working 
conditions. Although many Western European companies have set 
up in Eastern Europe to take advantage of cheaper labor—Poland has 
special economic zones just like China and Mexico—“Amazon is the 
first example where we have an intensive connection with workers 
abroad,” reports labor activist Magda Malinowska of Inicjatywa Pra-
cownika in Poznań. “They want to work with us because they now 
need us.”
Organizing among domestic workers around the world has 
increased dramatically through the efforts of the National Domestic 
Workers Alliance, Jobs with Justice, and, beginning in 2013, the Inter-
national Domestic Workers Federation, which represents 500,000 
domestic workers around the world. With continued job loss in man-
ufacturing and agriculture, health care remains a growing field. “The 
lack of care infrastructure around the world is very real,” Sarita Gupta 
observes. 
It calls into question a much larger set of questions around caregiv-
ing and specifically around what people can depend on from their 
governments in terms of social programs. There’s an opportunity 
to create 50–85 million more jobs in the health care sector in the 
global economy. How we shape that is a huge opportunity.
A growing challenge for the economic justice movement has been a 
“precariat” of temporary workers, part-time workers, workers without 
contracts, student workers, and so on. “In the Netherlands, only one 
in five people has permanent contracts: 80 percent of people are in 
precarious labor,” notes Fiona Dove. “We need to rethink what we 
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consider labor. Is it only those with permanent contracts in blue-col-
lar jobs, or can we consider it working people in a much bigger sense?”
Economic precariousness is behind a good part of the new right’s 
electoral success. So, there’s an urgent political need to reach out to 
this constituency. “We need to counter the skillful use of identity 
politics by nationalists with the ability to reach out to not only the 
moveable middle but also to the groups that feel threatened by polit-
ical and economic change,” argues Jordi Vaquer. “This has to do with 
blue-collar workers, of course, but also with small homeowners, the 
lower middle class. They and their children are getting employment 
that pays less well, that’s much more precarious. The inability to artic-
ulate narratives to reach these groups makes them vulnerable to the 
populist arguments.”
Another way of conceptualizing agency in this regard is to bring 
together all those fighting against economic inequality, which would 
unite workers with farmers, indigenous communities, the unem-
ployed, and the otherwise marginalized.
Fight Inequality Alliance, a global network founded in 2017, unites 
trade unions, social movements, and NGOs. “We have good strong 
policy recommendations on all the biggest policy levers to reduce 
inequality, many of them from our members and within the move-
ment,” explains Fight Inequality Alliance’s Jenny Ricks, who is based in 
South Africa. “But we lack the countervailing grassroots people power 
to fight for a different future and a different type of system and society. 
We need to build power from below. It’s not about having polite advo-
cacy conversations in corridors in capital cities.” Every January, Fight 
Inequality Alliance sponsors a week of action that coincides with the 
World Economic Forum in Davos. The Kenya chapter, for instance, 
held its alternative summit in 2018 at the Dandora landfill, a garbage 
mountain in Nairobi, which combined performances with discussions 
about inequality to create a microcosm of an alternative and equal 
society.
Similarly, in the United States, the Poor People’s Campaign has 
revived Martin Luther King Jr.’s final effort to unite the economically 
marginalized of all backgrounds. “The Poor People’s Campaign has 
managed to put together issues of war, environment, and economic 
justice,” relates Edgardo Lander. “This offers a possibility of inclu-
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sion that’s not seen as extremely radical or impossible but as common 
sense.”
Another tactic to fight economic inequality has been the campaign 
Attac has organized globally advocating the levying of a tax on finan-
cial transactions in order to slow down the rapid flow of capital in 
and out of countries, and to raise money for various purposes. The 
network is active in 40 countries where the tax is part of a larger effort 
to construct alternatives to neoliberalism, strengthen food sovereignty, 
or promote, as in Austria, a “good life for all.”
Intellectuals, too, have played key roles in social movements around 
the world, including the changes in Eastern Europe in 1989 (Václav 
Havel), the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa (Desmond 
Tutu), the democratization of South Korea (Kim Dae-Jung), and the 
rollback of authoritarianism in Latin America (Michelle Bachelet). 
Today, Edgardo Lander points out, the right has been effective in 
taking its culture war into the university, where it seeks to suppress the 
left and promote philosophies like climate-change denial. “There’s an 
anti-intellectual version of the left that considers it not critical because 
it’s not working class,” he observes.
Particularly when it comes to the environmental movement, young 
people are an important vector of change. “I’m inspired by voices of 
young people,” says Kumi Naidoo. “They’re the main stakeholders of 
the future. High school students in particular have stepped forward in 
creative, powerful ways. The voices of young people might move CEOs 
and heads of state who have children and grandchildren.”
May Boeve started out a decade ago as part of the group of young 
people who launched 350.org. “People have always understood climate 
change as an issue where young people are particularly vulnerable,” 
she explains. “To have very young people publicly shaming political 
leaders for doing nothing has struck a moral chord now that’s really 
quite powerful.” This new generation—through #FridaysforFuture 
and Extinction Rebellion—has many allies providing assistance (for 
instance, 350.org’s training director wrote a guide with them on how 
to organize climate strikes). In fall 2019, during the week of Septem-
ber 20–27, people all over the world walked out of their jobs to join 
students on their climate strike.
“This movement inspires me because millennials are playing an 
important role in their own future,” says Tunisian youth activist Salma 
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Belhassine. “The symbol is also inspiring because older generations 
judge millennials as nonchalant and internet-obsessed. But they are 
showing that they, too, can take the future into their own hands.”
Women have also led the opposition to the far right. The women’s 
marches in Washington, DC, were a very visible signal of popular 
resistance to the Trump administration. The World March of Women 
has done the same thing on a global scale. “These right-wing move-
ments are so misogynistic and intent on rolling back the gains of the 
women’s movement that women’s rights and women’s issues have to 
be at the forefront of the response to the right,” says Walden Bello. “At 
the same time, in pushing this issue especially in the Global South, we 
have to address some of the concerns about security that have moved 
many women to embrace right-wing parties that have emphasized 
personal security.”
Similarly, because the far right has targeted them, ethnic, racial, 
and religious minorities occupy an important place in any progressive 
response. “Black Lives Matter, which emerged in the U.S. of course, has 
been taken up by African migrants in France and among Afro-Brazil-
ians,” notes Khury Petersen-Smith. “Black Lives Matter has also been 
a vehicle for talking about other issues. In the U.S., it has involved cri-
tiques of gender and heteronormativity, and there have been efforts to 
center an analysis around the leadership of black women and queer 
black folks.” In 2020, the protests against the police killing of George 
Floyd in Minneapolis spread not only throughout the United States, 
in big cities and small, but also internationally. Anger over racism and 
police brutality brought 20,000 into the streets in Paris, 10,000 dem-
onstrators in Amsterdam, tens of thousands in Auckland, thousands in 
London and Berlin and throughout Australia.
Migrants, too, have received the brunt of right-wing fury. The 
Transnational Migrant Platform—Europe (TMP-E) has served to 
amplify migrant and refugee voices. The Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal 
devoted two sessions (in Palermo in 2017 and in Barcelona in 2018) 
to the violation of the human rights of migrants, which also featured 
testimony from migrant representatives, and concluded that current 
EU immigration policy is guilty of systemic abuses amounting to a 
kind of “necropolitics.”9 “It would be really useful right now to have the 
leadership of immigrant and refugee leaders, particularly those who 
have come from totalitarian-leaning societies,” argues Eric Ward. “And 
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because they are connected to another society, they would naturally be 
able to draw on support from those other places. That would give us a 
jumpstart on building transnational relationships.”
But migrants and refugees are also wary of the limelight. “They tend 
to be the ones who want to keep their heads down because society is 
already hostile to them,” explains Larry Olomoofe of PADLINK. “Even 
though we encourage them to fight for their rights, they’d rather deal 
with the situation as it is rather than escalate it.”
One community often absent from the left’s list are the very people 
who voted for the new right. “True activism is going into spaces where 
people have very different views and winning them over,” maintains 
Kumi Naidoo. “Talking to ourselves about how bad the system: That’s 




The left has engaged in a tremendous amount of transnational 
activism: within regions, translocally, on an issue-by-issue basis. But 
with a few exceptions, like the Black Lives Matter protests in 2020, this 
effort is not making headlines. Nor is it precipitating a wave of new 
progressive governance at the level of nation-states.
Moreover, progressives are on the defensive in the face of well-
funded and vigorous efforts by the new right to roll back the gains 
made by social movements over the last century of patient organiz-
ing. The internet, once a utopian dream of free speech and creative 
potential, has been overwhelmed by right-wing trolls, conspiracy the-
orists, and hatemongers. On top of this, a pall of despair has settled on 
people everywhere as they witness the effects of climate change, the 
corruption of public officials, and the ever-widening gap between rich 
and poor.
The coronavirus pandemic represents yet another challenge. 
The new right has capitalized on the changes that the pandemic has 
accelerated—with respect to the global economy, borders, and gov-
ernance—to advance its racist, xenophobic, and illiberal agenda both 
domestically and internationally. By riding a third wave of authoritar-
ian rule—following the rise of fascism in the early twentieth century 
and the spread of autocratic rule throughout the Global South in the 
1960s and 1970s—the new right threatens to remake the rules of 
politics so that it can remain in power indefinitely and reshape society 
accordingly.1
The new right has not been irreversibly successful. Rather, it created 
a sense of momentum through a few critical wins: the Brexit referen-
dum in the UK in 2016, Trump’s election that year, Bolsonaro’s victory 
in Brazil in 2018. A few big wins at the national level could do the same 
for the global left. 
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If Orbán or Erdoğan loses an election, that will have a domino 
effect,” Ran Cohen points out. “Orbán and Erdoğan will claim that 
foreign forces are intervening in the elections, but they claim that 
anyway! So, let’s work together on a global scale to make sure that 
authoritarian leaders go home.
Donald Trump’s 2020 loss demonstrates that, despite his concerted 
effort to undermine democratic institutions, the electoral process, the 
court system, and impassioned community organizing continued to 
serve as a brake against autocracy. But 74 million Americans voted for 
Trump in the 2020 election. The Republican Party, ever more com-
mitted to an agenda of xenophobia and illiberalism, has a powerful 
bloc in Congress and controls a majority of state houses. Nationalist 
populism remains a winning strategy in many countries around the 
world. And yet, after November 2020, some of the air has leaked from 
the new right’s balloon. “Without Trump, who’s going to lead this? 
Brazil, Poland, and Hungary?” observes Eliane Cantanhêde, a Brazil-
ian political commentator. “The party’s over … No one was taking this 
seriously anyway—but now without Trump, they’ll just laugh.”2
Civil society triumphs at the global level can be as inspiring as elec-
toral victories. El Salvador’s blanket ban on metal mining, instituted 
in 2017, was the result of a transnational effort.3 “It was a concerted 
campaign going on for years built around the front-line communities 
who faced mining taking place in their backyards,” Ethan Earle notes. 
“The tipping point in the campaign was when the archbishop of El 
Salvador, who’d been wavering, read the Pope’s encyclical on climate 
change, changed his position, and came out in favor of the campaign.”
Patrick Bond of the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannes-
burg points to other key transnational victories, such as the Montreal 
Protocol in 1987 to restrict CFCs affecting the ozone. “The single 
greatest victory was the movement to secure anti-retroviral medicines 
for free,” he argues, “thanks to ActUp and African civil society led by 
the Treatment Action Campaign in South Africa working together to 
reverse [former President Thabo] Mbeki’s opposition. This victory 
raised life expectancy in South Africa from 52 years at birth in 2005 
to 64 in 2019.” The UN Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, 




Similar victories by the left in the future could have a catalyzing 
effect. The problem at the moment, however, is that in addition to 
several key wins under its belt, the new right has a vision of the future 
it wants. This vision is intolerant, exclusionary, and backward-look-
ing, but it is a clear alternative to the current more-or-less liberal status 
quo. The left is still casting around for a similarly clear vision of an 
alternative to this status quo.
“Marxism so monopolized thinking on the left for 100 years in 
terms of social classes, bourgeoisie, proletariat and so forth,” Larry 
Rosenthal points out. “It was effective in many ways but it ran dry and 
nothing has replaced it. What is necessary is some synthetic vision and 
its success somewhere.” Fiona Dove also recalls when the left had a 
theoretical consensus around an understanding of the world. “I find it 
difficult to think of how to move forward without a common frame-
work within which you build a political identity,” she concludes.
“We have a crisis of alternatives,” laments Luciana Ghiotto, coordi-
nator of the Continental Platform Latin America Better without Free 
Trade Agreement. 
The World Social Forum showed its limits: the limits of only getting 
together to talk about how much we hate neoliberalism. But we need 
to be moving forward with alternatives. We also have a new wave of 
global social movements from what we had 20 years ago centered 
around two dynamic movements: climate action movements and 
the feminist movement.
It is easy to become pessimistic given the urgent threats and the 
failure, so far, of the left to come up with a popular, integrated political 
platform in the face of ascendant authoritarianism. One option is to 
step back, to hibernate in the equivalent of modern monasteries. “We 
could rather think about where to retreat, where to organize non-au-
thoritarian pockets, self-organized communities where we can save 
and further develop the knowledge about humanism, human rights, 
and solidarity,” Wolfram Schaffar says. “We may have to go through a 
difficult time until we can reconstruct what we now take for granted 
as civilization.”
Another option is to ignore the new right, particularly if the move-
ments are simply making a lot of noise and are not in control of key 
institutions. “Right-wing populists attack institutions and, because of 
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that, they are not governing. Therefore, they can’t produce results,” 
points out Jan Nederveen Pieterse. “By criticizing, attacking, and tar-
geting them, you may make them appear stronger than they are.” The 
identitarians, for instance, have a limited following that doesn’t even 
add up to a movement. And new right figures like Steve Bannon often 
exaggerate their own global clout. Deprived of the fuel of media atten-
tion, they will eventually run out of gas.
Preparing for battle is a third option. “We need to be prepared when 
the next crisis hits. Sooner or later, something will break, whether it’s 
financial, climatic, or geopolitical in a way that will speed up the reor-
ganization of the global system. The last time this happened in 2008, 
we were not prepared,” Lorenzo Marsili points out. 
When it hits, we’ll need a few clear ideas of what needs to be 
changed, notably in the international system, and sufficiently worked 
out alliances between movements and parties across the world to use 
that window of opportunity that a crisis gives you to change the global 
structures. It will be a race: who will best manage the coming crisis. We 
are not winning this race.
But, he adds, “That’s how all the beautiful movies begin. You have to 
be lagging behind in order to catch up and win. Otherwise it’s not fun 
and no one watches it.”
The next crisis, which hit after I spoke to Marsili, indeed revealed 
progressives to be still unprepared and still in the underdog position. 
But has the coronavirus pandemic also provided an opportunity for 
progressives to turn the crisis to their advantage?
It is often said that the Chinese character for crisis (wei-ji) trans-
lates into danger (wei-xian) plus opportunity (ji-hui). The reality is a 
bit more complex. Rather than opportunity, explains Sinologist Victor 
Mair, the second element of the crisis character really translates into 
either “incipient moment” or “resourcefulness” or “machine.” “Any 
would-be guru who advocates opportunism in the face of crisis should 
be run out of town on a rail, for his/her advice will only compound the 
danger of the crisis,” Mair adds.4
Following Mair’s analysis of the critical phoneme ji, the current coro-
navirus crisis is not danger plus opportunity but a time of danger and a 
moment for technological resourcefulness. In other words, digging into 
the word “resourcefulness,” it’s a time to deploy scientific know-how to 
put available resources to more efficient or ingenious use.
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Progressives, by offering the Green New Deal, are proposing just 
that: deploying scientific know-how to put available resources to more 
efficient or ingenious use. A “Global” Green New Deal, meanwhile, 
offers the kind of internationalist framework that could revive trans-
national cooperation at all levels: among international organizations, 
nation-states, civil society, and local initiatives.
the global green new deal
Despite its political successes, the new right has an Achilles’ heel. It has 
no credible response to the most urgent threat facing the planet: the 
current climate crisis.
For the last couple of years, new right leaders like Donald Trump 
and Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro have ignored climate change and boosted 
support for extractive industries like oil and coal. Thanks to Trump, 
the United States was the only country to pull out of the Paris climate 
deal. Bolsonaro, meanwhile, reneged on Brazil’s offer to host the 
climate confab in 2019, which wrapped up in Madrid instead. Despite 
these ostrich moves by Trump and Bolsonaro, the climate crisis hasn’t 
gone away. In fact, it’s gotten worse.
Prior to the pandemic, the world utterly failed to restrain carbon 
emissions despite dire warnings from the scientific community. In 
2020, despite a dip in emissions due to the economic downturn caused 
by COVID-19, the world again registered an all-time high in carbon 
dioxide concentration in the atmosphere.5 The radical right doesn’t 
have a plan to reduce carbon emissions. One wing of the movement 
continues to deny that there even is a crisis. The other wing is focused 
on dealing with only the demographic effects of the climate crisis—by 
proposing higher walls to keep out a future wave of climate refugees.6
The new right is unable to rise to this challenge. It has no effective 
response to the climate emergency other than to pretend that it doesn’t 
exist. “I think that the right will go into a profound crisis on these 
questions,” argues Tom Athanasiou of EcoEquity in Berkeley. “At this 
point, climate denialism, as a movement with any sort of legitimacy, is 
over. It’s just a zombie phenomenon with billionaire funders propping 
up the sock puppets.”
The Green New Deal, meanwhile, offers an inclusive response. The 
GND is not just about marshaling national (and eventually interna-
right across the world
132
tional resources) to combat climate change. It is intersectionality 
par excellence. The policy initiative, in the admittedly sketchy form 
introduced in the U.S. Congress, involves many of the infrastructure 
financing, job retraining, and targeted subsidies for green industries 
that the left has championed as a way to win back voters disillu-
sioned by neoliberalism. It can also serve as a power strip that other 
movements can plug into: immigrant rights, the women’s movement, 
anti-racism activists.
Although U.S. journalist Thomas Friedman coined the phrase Green 
New Deal, the concept is not an American invention. The Green New 
Deal Group began in the UK in 2007. South Korea launched something 
similar in 2009. That same year, the UN proposed taking it global.7 So, 
it is no surprise that the Green New Deal has already established (or 
re-established) a transnational following. Yanis Varoufakis, the former 
Greek finance minister who co-founded DiEM25, calls the Green New 
Deal the “glue and cement” that can hold together a political alliance 
of greens, leftists, and liberals and serve as “both the inheritor of and 
a radical improvement on” the Juncker Plan of 2015, otherwise known 
as the European Fund for Strategic Investments.8 In Asia, a GND 
could push China’s Belt and Road Initiative toward greater sustainabil-
ity.9 For Africa, a GND could provide an opportunity for countries to 
leapfrog over existing technologies and achieve parity with the Global 
North at far less cost to the environment.
The Global Green New Deal cannot be solely an initiative of the 
rich. Tom Athanasiou argues,
If the wealthy countries were to come to a vision of the global 
GND that involved real public finance for the international bur-
den-sharing mechanisms devised under the umbrella of the Paris 
agreement—and which have to be animated if we’re to have any 
hope of holding to the two-degree line, let alone 1.5C—that would 
certainly get the attention of people in the developing world.10
The World Social Forum served a convening function. Ultimately, 
many activists felt that it failed to produce strategic coordination, 
which involves the more political act of determining priorities and pro-
posing collective action at all levels. The Green New Deal, meanwhile, 
can serve as the vehicle for strategic coordination. “The climate crisis 
conclusion
133
and complete environmental breakdown is our window of opportu-
nity,” argues Srećko Horvat. “This is the first time in human history 
that there is a single issue on which all of humanity can agree.”
Setting up GNDs in every country, coordinating among them, and 
establishing new international institutions to finance the effort will be 
an enormous challenge. “The challenge is comparable to the one after 
World War II, when a set of new multilateral institutions were spun 
out,” Athanasiou concludes.
Prior to the outbreak of the coronavirus, governments and main-
stream political parties routinely protested that there was neither 
political will nor sufficient resources to launch a vast, government-led 
initiative like the Green New Deal. The trillions of dollars spent on 
bailouts refute this argument. Unfortunately, much of that money went 
to shoring up a carbon-intensive status quo with money for extractive 
industries, airlines, and financial institutions.11 But the climate crisis is 
an even larger existential threat to humanity, so progressives in every 
country must use the COVID-19 precedent to push for an even larger 
sum devoted to creating sustainable national economies and restruc-
turing the global economy.
A Global Green New Deal is not a quick fix. It is a transformative 
framework that will require an enormous commitment of time, orga-
nizing energy, and finances. But that’s what progressives need right 
now.
“One of the things that the right has been fantastically successful at 
is having a long-term project,” observes Jenny Ricks. Indeed, Gar Alp-
erovitz sees the reversal of the right’s ascendance as a 30-year fight, 
comparable to the social movements of the past. “The environmental 
movement was nothing in the 1960s,” he recalls. “There were conser-
vationists, not many environmentalists. Yet somehow a movement was 
built around a set of ideas and moral themes that has become poten-
tially transformative on the climate change issue. The same thing can 
be said of feminism.”
left populism?
One variant of the Green New Deal is entirely reformist. It seeks to 
accommodate the existing structures of capitalism by relying on mar-
ket-based solutions—like carbon taxes and cap-and-trade mechanisms. 
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Thomas Friedman, The New York Times columnist who originated the 
phrase, prefers to emphasize one aspect of the “New Deal” connection, 
which was FDR’s effort to save capitalism rather than institute an alter-
native.12 In this version of market-based environmentalism, the Green 
New Deal represents a more technocratic than political solution to the 
climate crisis.
But many progressives prefer to understand the GND as a way 
to build political support by pitting the corporate one percent that 
benefits from the current order—the fossil-fuel company executives, 
the small number of businesses that produce the largest amount of 
emissions, the wealthiest individuals with the largest carbon foot-
print—against the 99 percent of people with modest means who bear 
the brunt of the consequences of climate change.
In other words, the Green New Deal has been a battleground 
between those hoping to tweak the status quo and those aiming for a 
more substantial transformation of political economy. For those who 
support the latter, does the GND require a different kind of politics to 
confront the new right’s populism?
The theorist Chantal Mouffe has been perhaps the most vocal 
proponent of left populism. She distinguishes between the tradition 
of political liberalism (rule of law, separation of powers, individual 
freedoms) and the tradition of democracy (equality, popular sover-
eignty). By emphasizing popular sovereignty over the technocratic 
emphasis on experts managing the political realm, she argues for an 
anti-establishment politics that rallies the people against the politi-
cal elite, the underdogs against those in power. A political party that 
effectively uses such a left populism, as Podemos has done in Spain, 
can potentially win back many of the working-class and middle-class 
voters that supported the new right populists because they were artic-
ulating the only class politics in town.13
Mouffe also anticipates critics who charge that populists, whether 
left or right, have a poor record of dealing with minorities and 
movements that reflect identity politics. She foresees an ever-evolv-
ing coordination between working-class interests and those of “new 
movements” to create a “common will.” In this way, progressives don’t 
choose between class politics and identity politics but are constantly 
articulating a “99 percent” category that includes both. In this way, 
conclusion
135
progressives maintain a rainbow cosmopolitanism and a coalition 
politics based on economic solidarity.
As a political strategy, this left populism has much to recommend 
it. The rise of the new right speaks to the utter rejection of conven-
tional political strategies of the “third way,” triangulation, and corrupt 
patronage. Progressives have to offer something new but at the same 
time something sufficiently familiar to voters that they see it as viable. 
Thus, Bernie Sanders managed to create an effective coalition by 
bringing his left populism within the Democratic Party. By contrast, 
the Green Party in the United States has not met with similar success.
The ruling coalition in New Zealand offers another successful 
variant of this kind of politics. Jacinda Ardern’s Labour Party reflects a 
synthesis of traditional social-democratic politics with a more recent 
overlay of identity politics. A second junior partner is the Green Party, 
which provides a sustainable spin on the usual Labour politics. But 
what made the New Zealand case so unusual is the presence of a third 
partner in the ruling coalition: New Zealand First. Led by a number of 
prominent Maori politicians, New Zealand First is a strong advocate 
for the indigenous community. Its economic positions also overlap 
with Labour’s. But New Zealand First has also maintained an anti-im-
migration platform that overlaps with the agenda of new right populist 
parties in Europe and Trump’s Republican Party in the United States.
New Zealand First occupied a number of key ministerial posi-
tions in the Ardern government: foreign affairs, defense, and regional 
economic development. The party’s leader, Winston Peters, served 
as the minister of foreign affairs, which put him in the interesting 
position of defending New Zealand’s support of such pacts as the UN 
Migration Agreement. At the same time, the Labour Party couldn’t get 
too far out in front on immigration questions without alienating its 
junior partner and by extension the constituency that supports it. The 
New Zealand example shows how progressives can incorporate David 
Goodhart’s “decent populism,” which represents the views of those 
who have a very local identity, without foreswearing entirely a cosmo-
politan “anywhere” identity.14
In the general election in October 2020, Labour won enough seats 
to form a majority government but nevertheless chose to bring the 
Greens back on board. It didn’t even have to contemplate reaching out 
to its third coalition partner. In a crushing loss, New Zealand First lost 
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all its parliamentary seats. The pandemic largely removed the immi-
gration issue from the equation. But inviting the populists inside the 
tent also deprived the party of its outsider status and thus its political 
distinctiveness.
a geopolitical shift
The new right has articulated a rather old-fashioned view of geopoli-
tics in which nation-states are like billiard balls whose external borders 
are hard and impermeable. These sovereignists have pushed back 
against giving greater authority to international institutions. They 
have also resisted the continuing efforts of progressive civil society to 
expand minority rights and protections, as well as to champion human 
rights internationally.
At first blush, it seems that the coronavirus pandemic only strength-
ens the new right’s backlash against globalism. Given the short-term 
responses to COVID-19—strengthening of borders, imposition of 
states of emergency, demonization of minorities—the political future 
of the globe is likely to be less democratic, less internationalist, and 
more intrusive. Additionally, the pandemic has aggravated social 
divisions, for instance, between those able to work remotely and the 
“essential workers” who expose themselves to the virus by picking 
up garbage, delivering mail, and staffing slaughterhouses and super-
markets. It has concentrated economic power in the businesses best 
positioned to ride out quarantines and apply for government stimulus 
funds. And by making hundreds of billions of dollars available in these 
funds, frequently without appropriate oversight, the pandemic has 
also accentuated government corruption.15 But such pandemic trends 
fail to capture other dynamics of the crisis.
Despite the largely national (and nationalist) responses to COVID-
19, for instance, there is still a recognition in most quarters that a 
global pandemic requires global cooperation and a global solution. 
While Donald Trump has withdrawn the United States from the WHO 
amid criticism of the organization’s uncritical stance toward China, the 
organization has elicited praise for mounting a rapid response on a 
miniscule budget.16 A beggar-thy-neighborism is to be expected in the 
first flush of a global panic. But the pandemic has also strengthened 
the international network of scientists, doctors, and policy profes-
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sionals pushing for a more effective set of global rules for addressing 
these health threats, along with the requisite funding and authority to 
enforce them, as happened after the SARS outbreak in 2003.
The new right is not only concerned about the preservation of 
national sovereignty. It has a certain vested interest in the balance of 
power at the geopolitical level. It supported Donald Trump not simply 
as a putatively charismatic leader but for his version of U.S. hegemony, 
in which the United States allowed its junior partners full authority 
within their borders. Donald Trump only cared about human rights 
in U.S. adversaries like China or Venezuela or Cuba, a position that 
aligned with the concerns of repressive U.S. allies like Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt. A similar commitment to non-interference initially attracted 
many authoritarian leaders to China, which has also been strictly sov-
ereignist in its orientation, one of several ideological overlaps with the 
new right. Although Joe Biden promises to reprioritize democracy and 
human rights in U.S. foreign policy, Trump did much to undermine 
U.S. authority on these issues. Having observed U.S. politics whipsaw 
from Obama to Trump to Biden, the international community will be 
wary of investing too much faith in American claims to be a beacon of 
liberal internationalism.
With the European new right on the ascendant, the European 
Union too cannot unequivocally champion liberal internationalism. 
The pandemic has, alas, not presented an opportunity for the inter-
national community to come together to tackle a common problem. 
Nor does the Leviathan option, with its emphasis on coercion to solve 
major global problems like climate change, preserve any space for the 
traditional concerns for human rights.
Progressives can and should offer a new internationalism that 
rejects both U.S. and Chinese hegemony in favor of a more equita-
ble and democratic distribution of power. Such an internationalism 
must also reject nineteenth-century notions of inviolable national 
sovereignty as the nation-state is incapable of unilaterally addressing 
climate change, pandemics, or global supply chains. Pandemics do not 
recognize borders or the distinction between Global North and Global 
South. Rising oceans and superstorms will impact everyone. These 
global problems have remade the map of the world. Geopolitics hasn’t 
yet caught up to that fact.
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looking ahead
The new right has hijacked much of the agenda and even some of the 
tactics of the left. And now it is hijacking the internationalism of the 
left as well. These forces are increasingly networked at the government 
and party level, through civil society interactions, and in cyberspace. 
They have developed a compelling narrative of “make [insert country 
name] great again” that plays on anxieties over a demographic, 
economic, and political “replacement” by those of a different ethnic-
ity or religion.
Although the new right has disparaged the “administrative state,” 
once it takes power at a national level, it often finds the levers of 
state power to be useful for the realization of such goals as border 
control or the promulgation of “family values.” The same applies at a 
regional level. The new right discovered that rather than destroying 
the European Union it might be better served taking over the institu-
tional apparatus. Despite broadsides against “globalists,” the new right 
may well come to the same conclusion about international authorities 
if it gets closer to taking charge of institutions like the World Bank.
The left has not abandoned transnationalism. Environmental, 
economic justice, and peace groups are perhaps better networked now 
than ever before. Groups are organizing within regions and across 
widely dispersed localities. Awareness of the linkages among issues 
has never been greater.
And yet, the left seems a few steps behind on three fronts. It has 
not mobilized an effective global response to the far right. It has not 
woven together a popular and more strategically political succes-
sor to the World Social Forum—a large-scale, multi-issue campaign 
that addresses urgent global threats such as climate change, economic 
inequality, and endemic military conflict. And it has not come up with 
a positive alternative narrative that combines messages of hope and 
urgency while mobilizing people of different backgrounds under a 
common banner.
Above all, progressives need a quantum leap in transnational net-
working to counter what the new right is setting up. The left does not 
need another global network simply for the purposes of communica-
tion or one “based on old myths of unity and the effacement of internal 
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inequalities among its participants,” as Gadi Algazi points out. “Super-
ficial international coalitions cannot address local complexity.”
What is needed is strategic coordination. That coordination is par-
ticularly critical given the urgency of the situation. This is not 1975 
or 1999. “While I have great faith in multi-issue organizing all over 
the world, I think that time will not allow them to stop the machin-
ery of destruction,” observes Edgardo Lander. “How do you construct 
another possible world and be effective in stopping this massive 
machinery of destruction which is threatening life on earth?”
The challenge, then, is to figure out how to combine the horizon-
tality of organizing that respects local differences with the verticality 
of politics that the scale of the global problems demands. The Global 
Green New Deal addresses the urgency of climate change while also 
addressing the widespread discontent with neoliberal globalization 
that has provided a significant base of support for the populist right. 
With a “thousand flowers bloom” approach, many local initiatives can 
coordinate a decentralized campaign against the new right through 
monitoring, amplifying, and storytelling—within or at least near to the 
larger frame of the Global Green New Deal.
But for the various Green New Deals to move from paper to policy, 
a more vertically organized campaign is indispensable. That requires 
cooperation among political parties across borders. It requires sus-
tained NGO campaigns at the UN and through other international 
agencies. It requires social movements providing the “street heat” nec-
essary at critical junctures to provide inside players with the power 
they need. It requires, in short, strategic coordination.
Avoiding a climate catastrophe will also require a certain amount of 
coercion even more intrusive than the measures dictating face mask 
use and social distancing during the coronavirus crisis. At a national 
level, if voters support a Green New Deal, parliaments will still have to 
coerce a range of powerful interests (coal companies, oil and gas cor-
porations, auto manufacturers, the military) to fall into line. And for 
any global pact that implements something similar, an international 
authority like the UN would have to coerce recalcitrant or non-com-
pliant countries to do the same. This indispensability of coercion is the 
lesson progressives need to learn from the Leviathan problem.
For such coercion to be democratic, a Global Green New Deal 
requires progressive internationalism: to create a structure that allows 
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for both horizontal and vertical organizing, that employs a coordinated 
“inside–outside” strategy, and that provides a truly democratic alter-
native to the authoritarian movements of the right, left, and center.
Another world is still possible, a world that is neither neoliberal nor 
hyper-nationalist. But it will require progressives to turn weaknesses 
into strengths, apathy into engagement, and frustration with the status 
quo into support for transformation.
In this way, the best can regain their conviction to stem what Yeats, 
100 years ago, chillingly predicted would be a “blood-dimmed tide.” In 
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